



МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ФОНД  
ДЕМОКРАТИЯ

РОССИЯ  
XX ВЕК

# ЛУБЯНКА СТАЛИН

И НКВД-НКГБ-ГУКР «Смерш»

1939 – март 1946

ДОКУМЕНТЫ

- LUBYANKA

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**LUBYANKA**

**STALIN AND NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh"**

**1939-March**

**1946 Stalin's archive.**

**Documents of the highest bodies of the party and  
state  
authorities.**

***The International Foundation  
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## INTRODUCTION

In the third volume of documents on the role of I.V. Stalin in the organization and activities of the state security bodies reflects the events associated with the pre-war period, the years of the Great Patriotic War and the transition to peaceful development. In the organs of

the NKVD of the USSR, since the end of 1938, there has been a significant renewal of the personnel in connection with the mass layoffs of operational workers accused by Stalin of violating the law during the years of the Great Terror. By transferring the right to approve the positions of security officers to the party bodies, he did not allow the campaign to bring to justice the vast majority of violators of the law who carried out the orders of the Politburo. The circle of the guilty included mainly the leadership of the center and regions, headed by the former people's commissar N.I. Yezhov, who was shot. Most of the employees were dismissed from the service.

The documents trace Stalin's role in expanding the scale of the punitive policy of the Soviet state after the period of mass terror of 1937-1938, its weakening in most of the republics of the USSR while shifting the center of gravity to the territories of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic states. The policy of sovietization in these regions was based on repression. The state

security agencies, together with the troops of the Red Army, carried out the will of the Politburo, which gave instructions for the scrapping of the existing bodies of state power and administration, leveling the social structure through arrests and deportations of the population. The category of "class-hostile" included representatives of various non-communist parties and movements, thereby eliminating any manifestations of dissent. This policy was a direct continuation of what was happening in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s.

In response to this, a mass protest movement unfolded, and in 1939 an armed struggle began against the Soviet government, which flared up with renewed vigor in 1944.

The materials of the volume confirm the position that in the pre-war years huge human and material resources were directed to the defense industries, which developed at an accelerated pace. In the context of the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet

leadership was aware of the need to strengthen the combat readiness of the Red Army, arming it with new models of military equipment. For Stalin, the NKVD-NKGB organs, on the one hand, remained a source of information about the state of affairs in the branches of the country's defense complex, a means of monitoring the implementation of plans. As a result of another reorganization at the end of 1938, two departments were formed in the state security bodies - the Main Economic Department (GEM) and the Main Transport Department (GTU), which performed these tasks. On the other hand, as in previous years, one of the "methods of intimidation" of the leadership of the people's commissariats, hundreds of thousands of people employed in the production of products for the needs of the army, were arrests and subsequent accusations of "wrecking" work. The system of an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime that

existed in the USSR, the absence of democratic procedures for making vital decisions tragically affected the fate of the country as a whole and of each person individually. For the state security organs, this was reflected in the fact that information about the impending attack by Germany was ignored by Stalin. During the Great Patriotic War, the reorganizations carried out under the control

of Stalin led to the creation of an extensive system of bodies that ensured the security of the front and rear. In 1943, they were a huge army of employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat of State Security, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" and troops for the protection of the rear of the army. The state security organs were entrusted with the tasks necessary to repel

the German attack and ensure the subsequent offensive of the Red Army. First of all, the NKVD, the NKGB and the Smersh GUKR fought against the reconnaissance and subversive activities of the German special services. Fighter battalions operating in the rear and led by employees of the authorities

state security, played an important role in the fight against paratroopers and enemy saboteurs. Their number by the end of 1944 exceeded 300 thousand people. Operational groups actively operated behind enemy lines, participated in the creation of a partisan movement. Stalin constantly

clarified the tasks of the state security agencies, controlled their activities, and in April 1943 even directly subordinated the Smersh Main Directorate of Counterintelligence to himself.

Foreign intelligence supplied the top leadership of the country with strategic information about the plans of Germany and the countries that were allies of the USSR in the anti-

Hitler coalition. At the same time, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the punitive orientation of the state security agencies, which were an integral part of the established cruel bureaucratic system based on violence, could not change. During the war years, the state security organs uncovered thousands of so-called anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary organizations. Tens of thousands of people were groundlessly repressed for disagreeing with Stalin's policies.

The documents published in this volume are stored in the archives of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (AP RF), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF), the Central Archive FSB. The documents are arranged in

chronological order. The volume includes documents of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the highest bodies of state power and administration, and judicial institutions. First of all, they contain information about the events with which he was acquainted, which he discussed and on which Stalin often gave his opinion. The vast majority of the documents reflect the main activities of the NKVD, the NKGB, the Smersh GKR. These are special messages, orders, circulars, directives, cipher telegrams, information reports, protocols of interrogations. Most of the documents are published for the

first time. Some documents are given with abbreviations that do not affect the general

source content. Text omitted during publication is marked with a dot. Some appendices to documents are not published when their content is disclosed in the main document. A certain part of the identified

documents was not included in the main body of the publication, but, as far as possible, was used in the notes.

The texts of documents are printed with the preservation of stylistic features, but for the most part in accordance with the rules of modern orthography. Spelling errors and omissions in documents have been corrected without reservation. Saved and

reproduced all resolutions and notes on documents, except for insignificant office work.

The volume is equipped with a scientific reference apparatus, including an introduction, notes on the text and content of published documents, nominal comments, a list of abbreviations, as well as an index that contains a list of surnames and, if possible, initials of persons mentioned in documents.

***V. N. Khaustov V. P. Naumov***

**No.**

# **1 Anonymous letter from I.V. Stalin about "enemies" in the People's Commissariat of Mechanical Engineering**

01/03/1939

Copy

of the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comrade. TO STALIN I hesitated for a long time whether to send or not to send what I wrote long ago. \*I thought over everything I had heard for a long time and came to the conclusion that in Narkommash, apparently, there is a deeply disguised enemy nest\* and it is supported by someone from above, so you need to help the motherland to open and expose these

double-dealers, provocateurs - enemies of the people. A few days ago, I accidentally came to the head of the Personnel Department of the People's Commissariat of Engineering, Lokshin, for the birthday or name day of his child. The evening was rich. They played until the morning. \*\*Four cars were on duty near the house\*\*. The people were important. The point, of course, is not the booze, but the conversations that I had to hear

from drunk people remained very incomprehensible and mysterious to me. 1) How Lokshin, Bezelensky (head of the secret department of Narkommash) and others boasted that they cunningly and skillfully dispersed their party committee, how workers of the industrial department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks helped them in this matter - \*\*Iganson\*\*, \*\*Dobrovolsky\*\*, \*\*Shishkin\*\*, \*\*Anikeeva and others\*\*. 2) \*Now Lokshin, Bezelensky must try by all means to arrest some of the old party committee\*, then their authority will rise greatly. A big man from the NKVD \*\*Lermant\*\* or \*\*Lerman\*\* should help them with this.

3) In the People's Commissariat \* a secret commission was created consisting of: Lokshin, Mandrov and Bezelensky \* to remove from the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Engineering

everyone who does not support them. 4) They must place only "their people" in the apparatus and outside. 5) They talked for a very long time about which of the party members they should recruit and bribe to their side. Listed a lot

surnames, I can't remember all of them, but I remember some. **Ruzen**, **Kutsukov**, **Schenov**, **Chizhov**, **Petrosyan**, **Kamzinov** from the party committee, **Gryazny**, **Ginzburg** — employees of the People's Commissariat.

6) \*Finish with the Leningrad "affairs" and some other statements against Lokshin and Bezelensky\*. Lokshin assured that this is nonsense, now we are in the party committee. We'll arrange everything. 7) \*

Lokshin told how, when he was in Leningrad, the secretary of the district committee of the Kirov Plant was arrested and the People's Commissar was very sad \*.

8) That Lokshin and Bezelensky were informed by the NKVD about the arrest of many NKVD officers in the October days and why they removed comrade. Yezhov.

By the way, one of Lokshin's guests, who lives in Astrakhansky Lane, got so drunk that the driver dragged him to the apartment on his own back, and very high at that. From all the conversations of these

guests, one can feel a group of people capable of any provocation, just to break through their career and fame. Before Mandrov left Lokshin, the latter

thanked him, Mandrov, for the color of the ZIS car and asked him to pay the driver extra to the basic rate.

### 3.1.39 \* SIDOROV \* AP

RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 326. L. 173-174. Copy. Typescript. On the sheet there is Stalin's resolution: "T-schu Beria. This is anonymous (Sidorov is a fictitious name), but valuable. I. St. \*—\* Underlined in pencil. **—** Circled in pencil.



No.

2 Note by I.V. Stalin A.Ya.

Vyshinsky [1]-

**ON THE ORGANIZATION OF AN OPEN TRIAL  
OVER THE NKVD WORKERS**

**(1) *January 3,***

**1939** To T. Vyshinsky An open trial of the perpetrators is  
needed. I.

Stalin. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 96. L. 110. Copy. Typescript.

**No.**

### **3 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about a special technical bureau**

**01/07/1939**

No.

47 / b of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade STALIN I.V. At the same time, I represent the "Regulations on the Special Technical Bureau under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR", the structure, staff and order of the People's Commissariat on the Special Technical Meeting. Until now, the business of using imprisoned specialists for the design of weapons for the army and navy was left to the hastily organized 4th Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR, which was not provided with either appropriately qualified personnel or the

necessary conditions for the successful implementation of this work. To seriously improve the work on the use of imprisoned specialists, I have taken the following measures: the staff of the bureau has been established in such a quantity that material support, technical supply and technical consultation of design teams are fully provided; measures have been taken to improve the welfare of prisoners working in design teams; the staff of the bureau was replenished with young specialists.

Young specialists with experience in design and production work were sent to work in the Special Technical Bureau from among the workers mobilized by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the NKVD.

In order to give more importance to the work on the use of imprisoned specialists, the Special Bureau will be headed by the People's Commissar. I ask for your instructions.

People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA "" January 1939

**POSITION**

## ABOUT THE SPECIAL TECHNICAL BUREAU UNDER THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF

THE USSR 1. In order to use prisoners with special technical knowledge and experience, a Special Technical Bureau is organized under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. 2. The task

of the Special Technical Bureau is to organize the design and introduction into production of new weapons for the army and navy. 3. The Bureau is composed of the following

groups on

specialties:

a) a group of aircraft construction and aircraft propellers;

b) a group of aircraft engines and diesel

engines; c) a group of naval shipbuilding; d)

a group of

gunpowders; e) a group of artillery, shells and

fuses; f) a group of armor

steels; g) a group of chemical warfare agents and anti-chemical

protection;

h) a group for the introduction of the AN-1 aircraft diesel into the series (at

plant No. 82). As needed, new groups can be created, both by dividing existing groups, and by organizing groups in specialties not provided for above.

4. The Special Technical Bureau is headed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the

USSR. 5. Specialty groups are headed by assistants to the head of the Special Bureau. The duties of the assistant head of the bureau include:

organizing a workplace for the group; material and household services for those working in a group; organization of technical consultations for group workers and preparation for the production of prototypes and samples. 6.

Thematic plans of the Special

Technical Bureau are submitted to Defense Committee approval.

7. Thematic plans of the Special Technical Bureau are drawn up both on the basis of prisoners' proposals and on requests.

8. Produced technical projects are submitted for approval by the Committee of Defense in order to obtain permission for

production of prototypes. The transfer of tested prototypes to mass production is carried out after the approval of these samples by the Defense Committee.

9. A special technical bureau attracts civilian specialists to work in groups, primarily from among young specialists.

10. To consider the work plans of groups and technical projects, a permanent meeting is created under the head of the Special Technical Bureau, consisting of: the head of the bureau (chairman), his deputies and the secretary of the bureau with the participation of the head of the groups.

### **ORDER**

ON THE PEOPLE'S COMISSARIAT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE  
USSR for

1939 January 1939 Moscow

special technical knowledge. 2.

Approve the "Regulations on the Special Technical Bureau".

3. Approve the structure and staff of the Special Technical Bureau. 4. Leave plant No. 82 at the Special Technical Bureau as an experimental support

base. 5. To the head of the AHU - commissar of state security of the 3rd rank comrade. SUMBATOV to provide the Special Bureau with the necessary office space within a month, as well as to allocate 6 M-1 cars for the Special Bureau. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA "I

APPROVE" People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (L. BERIA) ""

January 1939

### **STATE**

SPECIAL BUREAU UNDER THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

1. Head of the  
Bureau 1 2. Deputy Heads of the  
Bureau 3 3.  
Secretary of the Bureau 1 4. Assistant Heads of the  
Bureau (team leaders) 8 5. Deputy  
Heads of the Groups 8 6.  
Employees for  
assignments  
3 7. Clerks 3 8.  
Accountant 1 9.  
Accountant- cashier  
1 10. Typist 4 11. Stenographer 1  
12. Draftsmen-  
designers 15  
13. Copiers  
15 14. Couriers  
3 15. Cleaning ladies 3 16. Drivers 12 AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 142. L. 72-79. Scr

**No.**

## **4 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the work to preserve the body of V.I. Lenin**

**01/08/1939**

No.

58 / b TOP SECRET OF

THE CC AUCP(b) to comrade I.V.

STALIN Professor ZBARSKY, supervising the work on the preservation of the body of V.I. LENIN, made the following proposals for the further preservation of the body of V.I. LENINA: describe in detail the entire process of embalming carried out in 1924, as well as the work carried out to preserve the body over the past 14 years, for which to get all the materials on this issue; to equip a laboratory for conducting experimental embalming, for the training of young specialists in it, who can replace Professor ZBARSKY in this work; carry out some alterations of the sarcophagus to create better conditions for viewing the body; subordinate the Mausoleum to one of the responsible leaders of the Party; permission to write on the 15th anniversary of the death of V.I. LENIN article "How we saved the body of V.I. LENIN".

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, by a decision of September 26 last year, decided to approve the proposals of Professor Zbarsky and assign it to Comrade. Ezhov, monitoring the entire work of Professor Zbarsky and his

group and providing them with the necessary assistance. \*To date, nothing has been

done to implement this decision\*. \*I ask for your

instructions\*. I am enclosing a copy of Professor Zbarsky's proposals. At the same time, in accordance with the conclusion of Professor ZBARSKY on the need for regular work to refresh the body of V.I. LENIN, \* I ask you to allow the closure of the Mausoleum of V.I. LENIN from

Under the guidance of Professor ZBARSKY, the body of V.I. LENINA will be refreshed by washing.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1207. L. 79-80. Script. Typescript.

Published without Zbarsky's note.

On the first sheet there are resolutions: "For. I. St. "; "IN. Molotov"; "Kaganovich"; "TO. Voroshilov"; Zhdanov. Poskrebyshchev's hand: "vol. Mikoyan is for it, Comrade Kalinin is for it, Comrade Andreev is for it." \*—\* Underlined in pencil

**No. 5**

**From the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee  
of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the Workers of the  
NKVD in the Ukrainian SSR (telegram from Comrade Khrushchev)" [2]**

**01/08/1939**

25 - On the workers of the NKVD in the Ukrainian SSR (telegram from comrade Khrushchev) a) Approve the following decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine: from the work of the head of the UNKVD in the

Voroshilovgrad region. Approve Comrade Cherevatenko M.I. head of the UNKVD for the Voroshilovgrad region, releasing him from the work of the head. Press Department of the Nikolaev regional committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine.

2) Release Comrade Korablev I.M. from the work of the head of the UNKVD in the Vinnitsa region. Approve

Comrade Shablinsky B.K. head of the UNKVD for the Vinnitsa region, releasing him from the work of the secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk city committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine. 3) Release Comrade Volkov A.A. from the

work of the head of the UNKVD in the Poltava region. Approve Comrade Bukhtiyarova N.D. head

of the UNKVD for the Poltava region, releasing him from the work of the secretary of the Magdalino district committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine in the Dnepropetrovsk region.

...

b) The workers released by this decision shall be recalled to the disposal of the NKVD of the USSR<sup>1</sup>. RGASPI. F.

17. Op. 3. D. 1005. L. 8-9. Script. Typescript. Protocol No. 67.



**No.**

## **6 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about S.Ya. Galnembe [3]**

**01/09/1939**

No. 71 /

b TOP SECRET of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN Galemba Sofia Yakovlevna was arrested on February 22, 1938 years as the wife of a traitor to the motherland.

Her husband GALEMBA A.L. - Former head of the armaments department of the Engineering Directorate of the Red Army, convicted in

1938. The investigation, which lasted for 2 months, did not bring any specific charges against GALEMB Sofia; she pleaded not guilty. The NKVD had no other compromising materials. However, by the decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of October 13, 1938, Galemba Sofia was sentenced to 5 years.

links.

After checking the case of GALEMB Sophia, I gave an order for her immediate release from serving her sentence. At the same time, I submitted a question to the Special Meeting on the review of the case. At the same time, I

inform you that I have given instructions not to arrest academicians BRITSKE and LAZAREV, for whose arrest the NKVD of the USSR requested a sanction.

I am enclosing a copy of my order for the release of GALEMB S.Ya.  
People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F.

3. Op. 58. D. 206. L. 118. Original. Typescript.

**No. 7**

**From the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union**

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the work of the Bashkir Regional Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" [4]**

**01/09/1939**

32 - On the work of the Bashkir Regional Committee of  
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks After hearing the report of the First  
Secretary of the Bashkir Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks,  
comrade. Zalikin, the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks recognizes the work of the Bashkir regional  
party committee as unsatisfactory. Knowing about the unsatisfactory work of the NKVD of the  
Bashkir Republic, about the clogging of the NKVD bodies with clearly dubious elements,  
Comrade Zalikin not only did not take any measures to check and eliminate shortcomings in  
the work of the NKVD and cleanse its apparatus of dubious people, which was the direct  
responsibility of the regional committee of the CPSU (b) , but hid the available signals and  
facts from the regional committee and thereby covered up major shortcomings and outrages in the NKVD bo

As a result of the weak leadership of the Bashkir Regional Committee  
of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in industry, the largest  
enterprises (Ufa Motor Plant, Beloretsk Plants, enterprises of the  
Bashzoloto trust, etc.) do not fulfill their production

program ... 1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1005. L. 12-13. Script.  
Typescript.

Protocol No. 67.

**No.**

**8 Cipher telegram I.V. Stalin to the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and the leadership of the NKVD-UNKVD on the use of physical measures against "enemies of the people"**

01/10/1939 26/sh Cipher

of the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks FOR SECRETARIES

REGIONAL COMMITTEES, THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE HEADS OF THE UNKVD

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union learned that the secretaries of the regional committees - regional committees, checking the workers of the UNKVD, accuse them of using physical force on those arrested as something criminal. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party explains that the use of physical force in the practice of the NKVD was allowed from 1937 with the permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was pointed out that physical impact is allowed as an exception, and, moreover, only in relation to such obvious enemies of the people who, using the humane method of interrogation, brazenly refuse to extradite the conspirators, do not give evidence for months, and try to slow down the exposure of the conspirators who remained at large, - therefore, continue the struggle against the Soviet power also in prison. Experience has shown that such a policy gave its results, greatly speeding up the work of exposing the enemies of the people. True, later in practice the method of physical influence was defiled by scoundrels Zakovsky, Litvin, Uspensky and others, for they turned it from an exception into a rule and began to apply it to honest people accidentally arrested, for which they suffered due

punishment. But this does not in the least discredit the method itself, since it is correctly applied in practice. It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use physical force against representatives of the socialist proletariat, and, moreover, they use it in the most ugly forms. The question is why socialist intelligence should be more humane in relation to \*inveterate\* agents of the bourgeoisie, \*sworn\* enemies of the working class and collective farmers. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party considers that the method of physical coercion must continue to be applied, as an exception, against open and non-disarming enemies of the people, as an absolutely correct and expedient method. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union requires the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Party to be guided by this explanation when checking NKVD workers. Secretary

of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. STALIN AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58.

D. 6. L. 145-146. Script. Typescript. \*—\* Inscribed by hand by Stalin.

## **No. 9**

# **Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the transfer of Intourist to the jurisdiction of the NKVT" with the attachment of a special message by L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin [5]**

**01/10/1939**

44 - On the transfer of "Intourist" to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade Transfer "Intourist" to the jurisdiction of the People's

Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Ows. secret January

9, 1939 No. 63/b of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade POSKREBYSHEV I am sending a copy of the letter dated December 7, 1938 addressed to comrade. STALIN

and comrade. MOLOTOV about \*All-Union Joint Stock Company "INTOURIST"\*.

People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR (L. BERIA) December 7, 1938 No.

111967 TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC AUCP(b) comrade. STALIN \* All-Union Joint Stock Company government transferred to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

\* The presence of "INTOURIST" in the NKVD system is considered inappropriate for the following reasons \*: 1. "INTOURIST" is

known abroad as the All-Union Joint-Stock Company, its branches that recruit (acquisition) foreign tourists in a number of countries are also known, exist and are registered as joint-stock companies. 2. The contractual relations of INTOURIST with capitalist tourist, railway and shipping firms are regulated by special clauses in the contracts, which specifically stipulate that the firms undertake to present all claims only

VAO "INTOURIST" and not make any claims against the Government of the USSR, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, trade missions or any other organizations of the USSR.

3. The fact of the transfer of "INTOURIST" to the jurisdiction of the NKVD will certainly become known abroad. Capitalist tourist firms and the press hostile to us will try to use this fact to spread harassment around the representative offices of "INTOURIST", they will call them branches of the NKVD and thereby impede their normal work, and with their provocation they will scare away people from the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia from traveling to the USSR.

\*Based on these considerations, I consider it expedient to withdraw "INTOURIST" from the jurisdiction of the NKVD\*. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank  
BERIA RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1207. L. 69. Original. Manuscript. L. 70-72. Script. Typescript. Protocol  
No. 67. \*—\*

Underlined in pencil. \* There is a resolution on the sheet: "T.t. Molotov, Mikoyan. It seems that Comrade Beria is right, it would be possible to transfer Intourist to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. I. Stalin. 10.1.39"; "For - Molotov, for - Mikoyan, for - Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Zhdanov." Poskrebyshchev's hand: "T. Kalinin is for it, Comrade Andreev is for it."

**No. 10**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union**

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the work of special departments of the NKVD of the USSR" [6]**

**01/11/1939**

Top secret 52 -

On the work of the special departments of the NKVD of the USSR and internal troops of the NKVD. 2. Special Departments of the NKVD carry out these tasks by: a) organizing an agent-information apparatus in the army, navy and among the civilian population, which has direct contact with military units, institutions, contact with the supply apparatus and individual military personnel;

b) conducting investigations into cases of counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, treason, sabotage in the Red Army and the Navy, the NKVD troops and among the above-mentioned civilian population and through the production, in connection with this, searches, arrests and notches.

3. The arrests of private and junior commanding officers of the Red Army Special Departments of the NKVD of the military districts (armies) are coordinated with the Military Councils of the districts. Arrests of the middle, senior and senior command and command staff of the Red Army are coordinated by the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR with the People's

Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 4. For the management of the Special Departments of the NKVD and the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the Special Departments for the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of the Navy and the Main Directorate of

troops of the NKVD of the USSR, a Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR of the army and navy is organized, which is part of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD

of the USSR. 5. In the places of deployment of the administrations of military districts, individual armies and fleets, Special Departments of the NKVD of the districts, individual armies and fleets are created, directly subordinate to the

Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR. 6. With army groups, corps, flotillas, divisions and brigades, fortified areas and large military facilities (military schools, warehouses, etc.), Special Departments (departments, groups and representatives) of the NKVD are created, subordinate in all respects to the corresponding Special Departments NKVD military district, separate army or

navy. 7. The head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR is appointed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in agreement with the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and is subordinate to the head of the Main Directorate

of State Security. The heads of the Special Departments of districts, armies, corps, divisions and brigades are appointed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in agreement with the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. The appointment of detectives of the Special Department at regiments, military educational institutions and warehouses is coordinated with the Military

Councils of the districts (armies). The appointment of the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR, the heads of the Special Departments of districts (armies) and the heads of the Special Departments of divisions by the People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR is also announced by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 8. The Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR carries out special tasks of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissar of

the Navy, and in the localities - of the Military Councils of the corresponding districts, armies and fleets. 9. The head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR is obliged to timely and comprehensively inform the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (the People's Commissariat of Defense, his deputies, and on certain issues, at the direction of the People's Commissar of Defense, the heads of the central departments of the People's Commissariat



manifestations of enemy work, as well as all available compromising materials and information on military personnel, especially on commanding staff. On the ground, the Special Departments of the districts, armies and navies inform the corresponding Military Councils, special departments of the NKVD of corps, divisions and brigades - the commanders and commissars of the corresponding military formations, and the detectives at individual units, institutions and institutions of the Red Army - the corresponding commanders and commissars of these units.

10. The chiefs of the Special Sections of the corps, divisions and brigades are part of the military-political conferences and inform these conferences about shortcomings in the political and moral state of the units, their combat training and supplies.

11. Communists and Komsomol members working in the Special Departments, except for those working in the center and in the Special Departments of the NKVD of military districts (armies) and fleets, are registered with the Party and Komsomol under the

relevant political bodies. The present order shall be extended to the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 24. L. 82-83. Script.  
Typescript.

Protocol No.

67. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Beria, Voroshilov, Mekhlis, Frinovsky.

**No. 11**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on bringing the employees of the NKVD of the Yakut ASSR to trial [7]**

**01/16/1939**

Top secret 111 —

Vyshinsky's question Approve

Comrade Vyshinsky's proposal to bring Efimov and Timofeev, employees of the NKVD of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, to trial by the Military Tribunal for the unjustified arrest and beating of teacher Gavriliev.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 96. L. 114. Copy. Typescript. Protocol

No. 67.

**No. 12**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the composition of the commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee on judicial affairs" with a note by M.I. Kalinina**

**01/19/1939**

MOST SECRET 122 - On

the composition of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee on judicial affairs Introduce Comrade Beria L.P. as a member of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee on judicial affairs. with the replacement of comrade V.N. Merkulov, releasing comrade

N.I. Yezhov from  
work in  
the

Commission. January 17, 1939 No. 37 / ss Copy of the  
POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN I.V. In connection with the transfers that have taken place, I ask you to introduce Comrade L.P. Beria as a member of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee on Judicial

Affairs, with the replacement of Comrade V.N.  
Merkulov, with the

release of Comrade N.I. Attached is the draft resolution of the Central Committee.

M. KALININ AP RF.

F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 128-129. Copy. Typescript. Protocol No. 67. In the text there is a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kalinin, Beria, Merkulov.

**No.**

**13 Note by A.Ya. Vyshinsky I.V. Stalin on familiarization of prosecutors with the contents of the cipher telegram dated January 10, 1939.**

**01/26/1939**

No. 58lss

Top secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

- to Comrade I.V. STALIN \* I ask you to allow me to acquaint the employees of the central apparatus of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, who oversee the investigation of NKVD cases, with the contents of the cipher telegram \* of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 10 of this year, addressed to the secretaries of the Regional Committees and Regional Committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Central Committee of the National Communist

Parties, the NKVD of the Allied and autonomous republics and UNKVD of territories and regions. \*At the same time, I ask you to allow the secretaries of the Regional Committees, Regional Committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties to acquaint local prosecutors

supervising the

investigation in the NKVD with the contents of the named cipher telegram. A.

VYSHINSKY AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 156. Original. Typescript. There is a resolution on the sheet: "For. I. S

\*—\* underlined in pencil.

**No. 14**

**Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union  
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the expulsion of Italian citizens**

**01/26/1939**

Top secret 171 -

Question of the People's

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Italy) Do not object to the

following proposal of comrade. Litvinova: Promise the Italian embassy,  
subject to the release from captivity of sailors from the Soviet ships  
Komsomol, Katayama, Tsyurupa and Max Gelts, that the serving of  
sentences for arrested Italian citizens be replaced by expulsion from the  
USSR and permission to leave the USSR V.V. Lavrova - the wife of an Italian citizen.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 24. L. 87. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 67.

**No. 15**

**Note by I.V. Stalin to the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Party on familiarizing prosecutors with the contents of the cipher telegram dated January 10, 1939**

*01/27/1939*

Sov. secret

Cipher

Copy

FOR SECRETARY

OBKOMOV,

KRAIKOMOV,

Central Committee

NATIONAL COMPARTIES

Familiarize local prosecutors supervising the investigation in the NKVD bodies with the content of the cipher telegram of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated January 10 of this year. No. 26/sh on methods of investigation. No. 83/sh Secretary of

the Central Committee I. STALIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 157. Copy. Typescript.

**No.**

# **16 Letter to G.M. Malenkova I.V. Stalin about the investigators of the Moscow Party Colleg**

**01/28/1939**

Comrade Stalin!

After your remark, in connection with the mistake of the ORPO, I am taking serious measures to correct the shortcomings in the work of the ORPO, to check the apparatus and to educate many new and inexperienced employees of the apparatus. This has to be done with inexperienced deputies, like the best

So deputies - Skvortsov, Burmistenko,

Donskoy, Ponomarenko, Seleznev - appointed to local work.

I can convincingly prove with facts that I firmly accepted your remark to the leadership and I am doing everything that Party duty requires in this case. I am compelled to turn

to you now because Comrades Spichkin and the investigators of the Moscow Party Collegium, Comrades Klestova and Comrades Lebedev, with whom he is investigating the error of the ORPO, are directing the whole matter, and, moreover, quite noisily, with a clear predilection for the apparatus of the Central Committee and personally for to me. (Yes, and the very fact about which the case arose requires a much more objective

approach.) The investigators require the employee of the ORPO to fill out with answers (with an underlined prohibition to leave the investigator's room) a pre-compiled questionnaire with numerous questions, including about me . This has been going

on for many days. In the party collegium of the Moscow Committee at a meeting, the investigator speaks about the apparatus of the Central Committee in a way that one should not speak about.

I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to entrust the case of the error of the ORPO to Comrade.

Andreev. I ask about this also because comrade. Shcherbakov told me the other day that he was dealing with the problem of the contamination of the Moscow Party Collegium. Tov. Shcherbakov informed me that, for all

the small size of the Moscow Party Collegium, in its composition there are clearly dubious people. For example, for

one employee of the party collegium named Presnyakov, there is direct evidence in the NKVD that he is a member of a counter-revolutionary organization.

About comrade Klestova, who is involved in our case, the NKVD has materials stating that as early as 1937 she was connected with the Trotskyists exposed in Moscow. State. University, and that she is the daughter of a landowner. For some reason, Zhurbenko covered up this material and did not check it. Dig deeper, there will be other facts. No one has yet dealt with the Moscow Party Collegium. And something completely unheard of was in exposing numerous enemies in the Moscow organization ... Now, Comrade Stalin, I need your support. I ask you to protect from investigators like those described above. RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 762. L. 1-3. Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a note: "My archive. St.", "From comrade Malenkov.



# **No. 17 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about I.I. Yezhov**

**01/30/1939**

No. 471 /

b of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade S T A L I N U V of the NKVD of the USSR from a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, an employee of the UNKVD in the Moscow Region Comrade. SHABULIN Mikhail Ivanovich received a statement that he knew about the terrorist statements of EZHOV

Ivan Ivanovich, the brother of the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. We conducted an investigation into this statement and interrogated the applicant SHABULIN, the witness SOKOLOVA (LOGINOVA) Alexandra Ivanovna (non-party, a soldering worker) and the witness EZHOVA Zinaida Vasilievna (wife of I.I. EZHOVA, non-party, clerk of the house management of house

No. 14, on Narodnaya Street) . Witness SHABULIN M.I. during interrogation on January showed:

- His acquaintance Ivanova Zinaida Vasilievna several years ago married Ezhov Ivan Ivanovich - the brother of Comrade. N.I. Ezhov.

In the summer of 1937, in the absence of SHABULIN, another acquaintance of his, Alexandra LOGINOVA, a worker, wife of a party member - the manager of the Proletarsky District Council, came to his apartment and said that her friend Zinaida IVANOVA (EZHOVA) had reported on the terrorist moods of her husband EZHOV Ivan Ivanovich. The latter told his wife that "now he will work in the NKVD and that it will be easy for him to get through and commit the murder of comrade. STALIN".

SHABULIN further testified that the very next day he filed a report addressed to the Head of the DTO of the GUGB NKVD of the Dzerzhinsk Railway, KAMENSKY (now arrested), who, in turn,

reported a report to the former head of the Transport Department of the GUGB NKVD VOLKOV (also arrested).

Witness SOKOLOVA (LOGINOVA) A.AND. on interrogation from 15-January th of this year

testified: - Once, in the middle of 1937, Zinaida Ivanova-Yezhova, in a conversation with LOGINOVA, announced that her husband, Ivan Ezhov, in the company expressed his anger towards the party, saying that at the first opportunity he would commit a terrorist act against comrade.

STALIN. Witness Ezhova Z.V. during interrogation on January 15 of this year. showed:

Her husband, Ivan Ezhov, drank endlessly, debauched, was repeatedly detained by the police, once for breaking the head of a policeman while drunk, but each time he was released, having found out his close relationship with b. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs comrade. N.I. Ezhov.

EZHOF Ivan at various times received from the NKVD four rooms with furnishings, which he immediately sold, and left the rooms the women who cohabited with him. On

November 26, 1936, EZHOVA Zinaida, regarding her husband, addressed an oral statement to former NKVD workers - VOLOVICH and SAVICH, and then at the end of May 1937 sent a statement addressed to N.I. Ezhov. In this statement, Zinaida Ezhova reported that her husband had established contact with the Poles, SHPAKOVSKY, living in Moscow, was drinking with them in a suspicious company, that SHPAKOVSKY himself once said in a conversation: "It would be nice for me to be elected to the Supreme Soviet. I would kill STALIN at the first opportunity, and there it would be clear - maybe someone else. However, in response to his application addressed to N.I. EZHOVA, Zinaida EZHOVA did not receive. At the same time, Zinaida Ezhova testified that, according to Ksenia

KRASNOLUTSKAYA, who lives in the same apartment with Comrade nephew. N.I. EZHOVA - Viktor BABULIN, she knows that the latter systematically gets drunk and mixes with foreigners, often visits restaurants, and once, in a drunken state, was brought to his apartment in the car of some embassy.

The same KRASNOLUTSKAYA reported to Zinaida Ezhova that Viktor BABULIN was taking bribes from persons whose relatives or relatives had been arrested. So, Viktor BABULIN took 2,000 rubles from a citizen of SOYNA Matilda Ivanovna for petitioning for the release of the latter's son, Nikolai, who was arrested for preparing a terrorist act against comrade. STALIN; Nikolai SOIN was released. For a bribe, Viktor BABULIN managed to release another detainee from prison, named Alexey MAKAROV. Viktor BABULIN received vouchers to resorts through his wife

N.I. Ezhov. - Evgeny Solomonovna and sold them. In addition, Zinaida EZHOVA testified that N.I. EZHOVA - Evdokia

Ivanovna and her husband Egor PIMENOV, a handicraft tailor, living in the former apartment of Comrade. N.I. Ezhov, express sharply anti-Soviet sentiments. Yevgenia Solomonovna EZHOVA constantly sent gifts to the Pimenovs' apartment by whole cars. The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to arrest Ivan Ivanovich Ezhov. I ask for your instructions.

APPENDIX: Record of the interrogation of the witness Ezhova Z.V. dated

January 15, 1939.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP  
RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D.

372. L. 112-115. Script.

Typescript.

**No.**

**18 Special message by L.P. Beria and  
A.Ya. Vyshinsky I.V. Stalin on the  
removal of convictions from convicted  
extrajudicial bodies of the NKVD with the  
application of a draft decree of the Supreme Soviet o**

**02/05/1939**

No. 530/

b TOP SECRET OF THE CC

AUCP(b) to comrade ST ALIN U A special

meeting of the NKVD, the former OGPU collegium and troikas in the field since 1927 was sentenced to various penalties (imprisonment in camps, exile and expulsion) - 2,100,000 people.

The bodies of the OGPU and the NKVD did not practice the removal of convictions and, in particular, in relation to Article 55 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR in cases in which the punishment was determined up to 3 years in prison, in which the conviction is removed mechanically after a certain period and the courts are obliged to issue information about this former convicted person. Also, the Special Meeting has never considered the issue of removing a criminal record in a different order.

All these persons are considered convicted, and according to the law on the passport regime (Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1441 of August 8, 1936), most of them, even after serving their sentences, cannot live in a number of cities in the country.

The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the USSR Prosecutor's Office consider it expedient to streamline this issue and submit the following proposals for your decision.

1. With all those convicted by the former collegium of the OGPU, the special meeting of the NKVD and the troikas of the OGPU-NKVD, both socially dangerous, and under all articles of the Criminal Code (excluding 58-1-14) after three years after

serving a sentence - a criminal record and the restrictions associated with it should be removed if these persons have not committed new crimes.

2. Grant the right to the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR to expunge the convictions of those convicted by the former collegium of the OGPU, the special conference of the NKVD and the troikas of the OGPU-NKVD on all points of Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (and the corresponding articles of the Criminal Codes of the Union republics) on their applications, if these persons are at least 3 years after being released from punishment, they did not commit new crimes and were engaged in socially useful work all this time. The execution of this decision in the Soviet order

must be carried out in accordance with Art. 49 p. "3" of the Constitution of the USSR by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA Prosecutor of the USSR A. VYSHINSKY

<b><i>Project</i></b>
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DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE  
USSR ON THE REMOVAL OF A CONFIRMATION FROM THE CONVICTED b. BOARD  
O.G.P.U, SPECIAL CONFERENCE AND NKVD troikas

Establish the following procedure for the removal of a criminal record from convicts  
b. The Collegium of the OGPU, the Special Meeting and the Troikas of the NKVD:

1. From all convicted b. collegium of the OGPU, the Special Meeting of the NKVD and the troikas of the OGPU-NKVD, both socially dangerous, and under all articles of the Criminal Code (excluding 58-1-14) after three years after serving the sentence - a criminal record and related restrictions should be removed if these persons are not committed new crimes.

2. Grant the right to the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR to remove the criminal record from convicts b. board of the OGPU, the Special Meeting of the NKVD and the troikas of the OGPU-NKVD on all points of article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (and the corresponding articles of the Criminal Codes of the Union republics) on their statements, if these persons have not committed new crimes for at least 3 years after being released from punishment and all this time they were engaged in socially useful work.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of the SSR  
M. KALININ

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of the  
SSR A.

GORKIN "" February

1939. Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 207-209. Script.  
Typescript.

**No. 19**

**Note by I.V. Stalin to the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties on familiarizing judicial workers with the content of the cipher telegram dated January 10, 1939.**

*02/14/1939*

Sov. secret Cipher

Copy FOR

SECRETARY

OBKOMOV,

KRAIKOMOV,

Central Committee

NATIONAL COMPARTIES

Familiarize the chairmen of the regional, regional, republican courts with the content of the cipher telegram of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated January 10 of this year. No. 26/sh on methods of

investigation. No. 165/sh Secretary

of the Central Committee I. STALIN AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 169. Copy. Typescript.

**No.**

**20 Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the permission to return to the USSR those previously sent by the ECCI as volunteers to Spain and now located in F**

**02/14/1939**

Top secret 99 -

On the permission to re-enter the USSR previously sent by the ECCI as volunteers to Spain and now in France .

2. Instruct t.t. Beria and Litvinov, the resolution of all questions, related to the return of the comrades referred to in the first paragraph.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 24. L. 104. Original. Typescript.

Minutes No. 68.

The text contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Dimitrov, Beria, Litvinov, Andreev.



**No. 21**

**Decree of the Politburo of the KC of the All-Union Communist  
Party of Bolsheviks (b) on  
the betrayal of members of the "right-wing Trotskyist" organization**

**02/16/1939**

Strictly secret 112

— Question of the

NKVD The cases of active enemies of the party and Soviet power, who were in the leadership of the counter-revolutionary right-wing Trotskyite conspiratorial espionage organization in the amount of 469 people, are to be submitted for consideration by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR with the application of the law of

December 1, 1934. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 373. L. 1. Copy.

Typescript. Protocol number 68.

**No.**

**22 L.P. Beria, A.Ya. Vyshinsky and N.M. Rychkova I.V. Stalin with an order on the implementation of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated November 17, 1938 "on arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation"**

**02/21/1939**

No. 676 /

b of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN In order to verify the implementation by the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938 "On arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation" in terms of organizing an investigative work and the implementation of prosecutorial supervision over the investigation, the NKVD of the USSR was convened on February 19 of this year. the meeting, which was attended by 26 heads of regional, regional UNKVD and people's commissars of internal affairs of the union and autonomous republics and a number of senior officials of the

prosecutor's office of the center and periphery. At the meeting, it was found that at present the NKVD bodies have a large number of unfinished investigative cases, which negatively affects the quality of investigative work, which still lags behind the requirements set by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938.

The meeting revealed the very weak state of the prosecutor's oversight of the investigation, both in the center and especially in the periphery. The weakness of prosecutorial oversight is explained by the inconsistency both on the political and business side of a number of prosecutorial

workers, as well as a large gap between the required number of workers and the available staff.

The decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks regarding the verification and submission for approval of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the candidacies of all prosecutors supervising the investigation in the NKVD bodies, despite the expiration of the established period, was not fulfilled.

It is especially necessary to note the weak participation of prosecutors in the investigative work carried out by the NKVD bodies, the unacceptable delay in checking cases received from the NKVD bodies, and the red tape in the transfer of cases to jurisdiction, which is directly dependent on the lack of personnel and self-insurance practiced by a number of prosecutors. The Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated November 17, 1938, in connection with the liquidation of judicial troikas created by special orders of the NKVD of the USSR, as well as troikas at regional, regional and republican administrations, obliged the People's Commissariat of Justice and the judiciary (military tribunals), regional and supreme courts, linear courts of railway and water transport) to prepare for the reception of these cases in order to ensure the correct and timely consideration of incoming cases from the NKVD. To do this, it was necessary to review and strengthen the judiciary with proven qualified personnel, such training was not carried out by the People's Commissariat of Justice.

In many judicial instances, the proceedings are extremely slow, cases are delayed for months, the consideration of court cases is unsatisfactory, there are many cases of unjustified return of cases for further investigation.

In order to ensure the implementation of the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of November 17, 1938, we ask

1. <sup>quantity</sup> Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks <sup>to increase</sup> To increase the prosecutor's office supervising the bodies of the NKVD by 1,100 people.

2. Instruct Comrade. VYSHINSKY, together with the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, check the personnel of the prosecutors supervising the investigation and remove dubious and unfit employees. Report the results of the work done within a month to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

3. To oblige the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties to provide full assistance to comrade. VYSHINSKY in checking the staff of prosecutors.

4. To oblige the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, under the personal responsibility of the first secretaries, to staff, within a month, the local prosecutor's offices supervising the investigation in the NKVD bodies with verified and qualified workers. Submit a report on the work done to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

5. Oblige comrade. comrade MALENKOV and VYSHINSKY to select 100 people for the USSR Prosecutor's Office, mainly from among those who graduated from higher educational institutions. 6. Oblige the People's Commissariat of

Justice of the USSR comrade. RYCHKOV and Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR comrade. GOLYAKOV to take measures for the consideration by the courts of the accumulated cases transferred from the NKVD and the prosecutor's office, and to establish a procedure that guarantees in the future the timely and correct consideration of cases transferred to the courts.

7. Instruct comrade. RYCHKOV, together with the relevant party organizations, to check and staff the judicial bodies of Leningrad, Saratov, Ukraine (Sumy, Kirovograd and Zaporozhye regions), Rostov, Chelyabinsk, Perm and others within 2 decades and report the results to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

We enclose a copy of the order of the NKVD of the USSR and the USSR Prosecutor on measures to ensure the implementation of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated November 17,

1938. People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs BERIA Prosecutor of the USSR VYSHINSKY

People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR RYCHKOV

<b>ORDER</b>
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OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND  
PROSECUTOR OF THE USSR FOR 1939 On the

implementation of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated November 17, 1938 "On arrests, prosecutorial supervision and conducting the investigation

"" "" February 1939 city. Moscow

In order to verify the implementation by the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938 "On arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation" in terms of organizing investigative work and exercising prosecutorial supervision of the investigation, the NKVD of the USSR convened 19 February of this year, a meeting in which 22 heads of regional and regional UNKVD and People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union and Autonomous Republics and a number of senior officials of

the Prosecutor's Office of the center and periphery took part. At the meeting, it was found that at present the NKVD bodies have a large number of unfinished investigative cases, which negatively affects the quality of investigative work, which still lags behind the requirements of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938. The meeting revealed that the prosecutor's supervision of the investigation, both in

the center and especially in the periphery, is carried out very weakly. It is especially necessary to note the weak participation of prosecutors in the investigative work carried out by the NKVD bodies, the unacceptable delay in checking cases received from the NKVD bodies, and the red tape with the transfer of these cases to jurisdiction.

In order to decisively eliminate shortcomings in the implementation by the organs of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938, WE ORDER: : a) for the fastest completion of the accumulated investigative cases, strengthen the

investigative units with employees at the expense of other operational

departments;

b) take measures to eliminate existing shortcomings in the investigative work (poor documentation, non-compliance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially in terms of the timing of the investigation and the mandatory drawing up of protocols after each interrogation, etc.). 2.

Prosecutors of the Union and Autonomous Republics, territories and regions, military prosecutors, prosecutors of the railway and

water transport, district prosecutors: a) establish

business contact with the NKVD bodies, ensuring timely and prompt resolution of all issues arising in the course of the investigation from the moment the case arises until it is completed and transferred to jurisdiction; b) to strengthen the prosecution staff by

involving in the consideration of investigative cases that have accumulated in the republican, regional, regional prosecutor's offices and the prosecutor's offices of military districts, a number of employees of the central and peripheral prosecutor's offices;

c) to ensure the establishment of such a procedure for the consideration of investigative cases received from the NKVD bodies, in which the terms for the consideration of these cases by the prosecutor's office would not exceed 10

days; d) draw the attention of prosecutors to the inadmissibility of returning cases to the NKVD bodies for additional investigation on minor, mostly formal, grounds, especially in cases where the shortcomings of the investigation can be eliminated directly by the prosecutors themselves without returning the cases for additional investigation; e) upon presentation

of a request for division or consolidation of cases in accordance with Art. 117th Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR and the corresponding Art. Code of Criminal Procedure of the Union Republics proceed from the specific circumstances of each case, taking into account the political expediency and practical necessity and possibility of implementing these requirements. 3. The procedure

for extending the investigation period, established by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 701 of October 23, 1938, should be canceled and continue to be guided by Article 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure of other Union republics.

4. Read this order at joint operational meetings of employees of the NKVD and the prosecutor's office and outline the necessary practical measures.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the

USSR L. BERIA Prosecutor of the USSR VYSHINSKY AP RF.

F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 172-175. Script.

Typescript.

**No. 23**

**Letter from O.A. Kedrovoy I.V. Stalin [8]**

**03/07/1939**

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! I, Kedrova

O.A., an old underground worker, 37 years old without a break in the ranks of the CPSU (b), I appeal to you with a request to personally examine the case filed with the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) by my son, an employee of the NKVD, which, according to my observations, has , in the course of events of national importance meaning.

In mid-February, my son, Igor Kedrov, member. The CPSU(b), told me that he was removed from work with the motivation "because of the inability to use." Shortly before that, he raised the question of some very disturbing facts and serious troubles in the work of the People's Commissariat before the leadership, but that he did not meet support from Comrade Beria and he transferred this issue to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Moreover, he let me know that the possibility of further repressions by Comrade Beria was not ruled out, since he, Igor, decided at all costs to bring to the attention of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the government and the CPC about the troubles in the work of the NKVD.

I, not being initiated into the essence of the matter, trusting his honesty and exceptional devotion to the cause of communism, undertook to hand over the package to Comrade Shkiryatov myself, and the next day, February 20 or 21, he was arrested.

Simultaneously with his son, another NKVD worker, V. Golubev, was arrested, who, together with him, submitted material to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and, as it were, his guardian, the bedridden patient N.V., was also arrested. Baturin.

Back in the autumn of 1938, the son was removed from work and sent as a camp commandant far to the north. I then wrote a letter to Comrade Yezhov, but received no answer. After that, the son's wife wrote Comrade. Molotov, and then only it became clear that there were no grounds for removing him from work, and he was returned in early January, and Comrade Beria entrusted him with serious operational work. All this makes me even more wary and

think that the signals of my son and Golubev have serious grounds, and I, not

only as a mother, but also as a member of the CPSU(b), a citizen of the Soviet Republic, I ask you to read their statement in detail. O.

KEDROVA,

member of the CPSU(b), p.b.

No. 1223175 RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 180. L. 13-14. Script. Manuscript.



**No. 24**

**Note by N.I. Ezhova I.V. Stalin [\[9\]](#)**

***03/13/1939***

Tov. Stalin!

I beg you, talk to me for one minute. Give me this opportunity. RGASPI. F.

558. Op. 11. D. 20. L. 53. Original. Manuscript.

**No.**

## **25 Special message by L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the release of specialists**

**03/27/1939**

No. 893 /

b of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade STALIN Comrade VOROSHILOV applied to the NKVD of the USSR with a request to release the following persons arrested by the NKVD: 1. TUROVEROV K.I. - b. teacher at the Artillery Academy, born in 1887, ex. lieutenant colonel of the tsarist army, arrested in July 1938 as a member of the c.-r. military-fascist organization, in which he was recruited in 1928. The investigation of the case has been completed and is to be sent to the Military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

2. Leonov K.V. - b. teacher at the Artillery Academy, born in 1894, ex. officer of the tsarist army, was a member of the CPSU (b) from 1919 to 1920, arrested in June 1938 as a member of the K.-r. officer organization, which he was recruited in 1936. The investigation of the case has been completed and is to be sent to the Military collegium of the Supreme

Court of the USSR. 3. ZHUKOVSKY N.I. - b. employee of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, born 1877, b. colonel of the tsarist army, arrested in January 1938 as a German spy, recruited in 1906, and as a participant in a military fascist conspiracy. The investigation into the case has not been completed. Works in his specialty in the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR. 4. E. A. Berkalov. - b.

employee of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, born in 1878, ex. general of the tsarist army, arrested in February 1938, exposed by the testimony of a number of former employees of the Red Army in espionage and wrecking work. The investigation has been completed.

BERKALOV is used by specialty in the Special  
technical bureau of the NKVD of the USSR.

Comrade VOROSHILOV asks them to be released as highly needed  
artillery specialists. I ask for  
your instructions.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the  
USSR, Commissar of State. security 1st rank

L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 142. L. 81-82. Copy. Typescript.

**No. 26**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party  
of Bolsheviks "on the surrender of cases by N.I. Yezhov to the  
secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks"**

**03/29/1939** 99 -

On the surrender of cases to Yezhov N.I. for the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Malenkov, Poskrebyshv and Krupin within 5 days to accept all cases on the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks b. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade Yezhov N.I.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1006. L. 23. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 1.

**No.**

**27 Cipher telegram N.A. Skvortsova I.V.  
Stalin and L.P. Beria on the arrests  
of deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR**

**04/03/1939**

No. 368/

sh Sov. secret

Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks to comrade STALIN, BERIA Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Konuspanov, Kuzhaev, Umurzakov, Mankin were exposed as belonging to a bourgeois-nationalist organization. For each of them there are from four to six direct testimonies, from three to five indirect ones, as well as undercover materials confirming their enemy work, are available in the NKVD of the USSR. After the 18th

Party Congress, I asked Comrade Beria to authorize the arrest of these persons, but I did not receive consent. I urgently ask, as an

exception, to authorize the arrest of Mankin and Kuzhanov, who have been carrying on anti-Party work until the last day. Their arrest is absolutely necessary, both are out of work. I ask for your instructions. Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party (b) of

Kazakhstan SKVORTSOV RGASPI. F. 558. Op.

11. D. 66. L. 2. Original. Typescript. There is a resolution on the cipher telegram: "For the arrest of Mankin and Kuzhanov. St." and a note: "Comrade Beria reported."

**No. 28**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union**

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks on increasing the staff of the NKVD of the USSR [10]**

**04/05/1939**

Strictly secret

182 - Question of the

NKVD To increase the staffing of the operational-Chekist organs of the NKVD from March 1, 1939 by 5189 units and allocate the necessary funds for this. RGASPI.

F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 7. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 1.

The text

contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Beria, Molotov.

**No. 29**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the removal of a criminal record from convicts by extrajudicial bodies**

**04/05/1939**

183 - On the removal of a criminal record from convicts b. Board of the OGPU, a special meeting and troikas of the NKVD

Approve the following draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

“Establish the following procedure for the removal of a criminal record from convicts b. Collegia of the OGPU, a special meeting and troikas of the NKVD:

1. From all convicted b. The Collegium of the OGPU, the Special Meeting of the NKVD and the troikas of the OGPU-NKVD, both socially dangerous, and under all articles of the Criminal Code (excluding 58-1-14), after three years after serving the sentence, remove the criminal record and the restrictions associated with it, if these persons have not committed new crimes.

2. Grant the right to the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR to remove the criminal record from convicts b. The Collegiums of the OGPU, the Special Meeting and the troikas of the OGPU-NKVD on all points of Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (and the corresponding articles of the Criminal Codes of the Union Republics) on their statements, if these persons did not commit new crimes for at least 3 years after being released from punishment and were engaged in all this time by socially useful work.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1008. L. 42-43. Script.  
Typescript.

Protocol No. 1.

**No. 30**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the condemnation of elements "counter-revolutionary" [11]**

**04/08/1939**

Strictly secret

217 - Question of the NKVD and the USSR

Prosecutor's Office Cases against active participants in counter-revolutionary, right-wing Trotskyist, conspiratorial and espionage organizations in the amount of 931 people should be transferred to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR for consideration in accordance with the law of December 1, 1934. Moreover, in relation to 198 leading members of these organizations - to apply the highest measure of criminal punishment - execution, and the remaining 733 accused should be sentenced to

imprisonment in a camp for a term of at least 15 years each.

RGASPI. F.

17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 7. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 1. In the text there is a typewritten note about the mailing: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Vyshinsky,



**No. 31**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the organization of a motorized department as part of the NKVD of the USSR with the attachment of a special message by L.P. Beria**

**04/09/1939**

225 - On the organization of the Mobotdel as part of the NKVD of the USSR a) Allow the organization of the Mobilization Department as part of the NKVD of the

USSR. b) To approve comrade Sherede-ga I.S. as the head of the Mobilization Department of

the NKVD. April  
8, 1939

No. 1007/b Sov.

secret CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE AUCP(b) comrade.

TO STALIN The mobilization department of the NKVD of the USSR in 1934 was liquidated.

Since that time, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR has no apparatus that would directly supervise the development of mobilization issues related to the preparation of all organs and troops of the NKVD for war and the provision of reliable protection of state borders and the rear of the country in wartime.

In order to establish control over the mobilization readiness of the organs and troops of the NKVD in wartime, to plan mobilization work, to draw up a consolidated mobilization plan for all elements of the mobilization of organs and troops of the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR asks for permission to organize the Mobilization Department as part of the NKVD of the USSR.

Head of the Mobilization Department of the NKVD, I ask you to approve comrade. Sheredeg Ivan Samsonovich, who is now working as an assistant to the head of the Investigative Department of the NKVD

of the USSR. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 181. Copy. Typescript; L. 182.  
Script. Typescript. Protocol  
No. 1. In the  
text there is a typewritten note about the mailing: "T.t. Beria, Malenkov.

**No. 32**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the Trial of  
Members of a "Right-Trotskyist" Organization in the Krasnodar Territory**

***04/10/1939***

Top secret 228 —

Question of the Krasnodar Territory Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks To approve the proposal of the Krasnodar Territory Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NKVD of the USSR to hear the case of the right-wing Trotskyist organization operating at the Gulkevichi feed mill in an open court session in

the village of Gulkevichi. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 96. L. 127. Copy.

Typescript. Protocol No. 1.

**No.**

## **33 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin with the application of M.P. Frinovskiy**

**04/13/1939** No.

1048 / b of the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks to Comrade I.V. TO STALIN At the same time, we are sending a statement from the arrested Frinovsky  
March 11,

1939 We continue the interrogation  
of Frinovsky. Appendix:  
according to the text. People's Commissar of Internal  
Affairs of the USSR BERIA TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOC. REPUBLIC TO  
THE COMMISSIONER OF STATE SECURITY 1st RANK:  
B E R I Y A L.P.

From the arrested FRINOVSKY M.P.

### **STATEMENT**

Investigators charged me with anti-Soviet conspiratorial work. For a long time the thought of the need to confess to my criminal activity during the period when I was at large struggled in me, but the miserable state of a coward got the better of me. Having the opportunity to tell you and the leaders of the party honestly about everything, of which I have been an unworthy member in recent years, deceiving the party, I did not do this. Only after my arrest, after the indictment and after talking with you personally, I took the path of repentance and I promise to tell the investigation the whole truth to the end, both about my criminal enemy work and about the persons who are accomplices and leaders of this criminal enemy work.

I became a criminal because of my blind trust in the authorities of my leaders YAGODA, YEVDOKIMOV and EZHOV, and having become a criminal, together with them I worked on a vile counter-revolutionary deed against the Party. In 1928, shortly

after my appointment as commander and military commissar of the Special Purpose Division under the OGPU Collegium, at the district party conference that took place, I was elected to the plenum, and by the plenum to the bureau of the party organization of the Sokolnichesky district.

Even at the conference, I established contact with a former employee of the OGPU (committed suicide in 1937 in connection with the arrest of Yagoda) - POGREBINSKY, who informed me of the existence of a group struggle among the members of the district committee. Subsequently, as a member of the bureau, I joined the majority, which turned out to be rightists, and worked jointly with this group of members of the bureau until it was exposed in the district party organization.

At the next party conference in 1929, this majority of the bureau, including myself, and other employees of the OGPU: MIRONOV, LIZERSON, POGREBINSKY, were completely exposed. MIRONOV and I made speeches of repentance at the conference, but did not completely break with the right group in the region. After the conference, the OGPU

held a meeting of the leadership in connection with the instructions of the Central Committee, which condemned the involvement of the OGPU party organization in the group struggle in the Sokolniki District Committee.

After the district party conference, I hesitated and decided to take the right path of the party, to break with this group. However, shortly after that, I was summoned by Yagoda for an official report on the affairs of the division. After the report, Yagoda went over with me to talk about the affairs of the party organization. He began to scold me in every way, saying: "How did you, the commander and military commissar, get cold feet, start repenting at the conference, how can you be trusted after this division?" And then he said, "Keep in mind that you had some other sins behind you." I asked in bewilderment - what? Yagoda replied: "You were trying to discredit RYKOV." I say "when was that?" For a long time, the documents about the attempt to discredit RYKOV are in my hands, you keep that in mind. When I asked Yagoda what was the matter, he told how in 1920 in Kharkov, during the arrival of RYKOV with

a group of workers, in the mansion where he lived, I conducted a search. Immediately YAGODA told me: "You keep in mind, RYKOV will take his." And he added: "Try to be completely guided by me in political affairs and consult more often, in particular with POGREBINSKY. And on political work in the division, you consult with MIRONOV; he is a politically literate person and will show how to conduct this business." In the same year, 1929, Evdokimov arrived in

Moscow in connection with his planned transfer as head of the SOU OGPU. I was in his room at the Select Hotel. At first Evdokimov asked me how things were going in Moscow, then he told me that he was being transferred to Moscow and that the Central Committee suggested that he organize the operational work of the OGPU. In the same conversation, I shared with

Evdokimov and said that hit the right in practice. At

that time complications were already taking place in the countryside in connection with the collectivization of agriculture. I asked Evdokimov - how are you doing in the North Caucasus? He says: "Things are complicated, the collective farms in the Cossack and national regions are taking root poorly, there is great resistance," and he put it this way: "The devil knows, will anything come

of this business?" During Evdokimov's stay in Moscow, and then after he moved to Moscow, I had several meetings with him. In the course of these meetings, Evdokimov said that the Central Committee allowed many outrages in the countryside and "the devil knows what all this will lead to"

In 1930, after the decisive offensive of the party and the government against the kulaks, as a result of the excesses allowed on the ground, uprisings began, and these uprisings took on especially complex forms in the national regions of the North Caucasus, in particular in Dagestan. I was summoned to the Collegium of the OGPU and sent to Dagestan. I did not manage to talk to Evdokimov before leaving.

The next meeting with Evdokimov took place when I arrived in the Transcaucasus in 1930, when he toured the regions where counterinsurgency operations were being carried out.

After the official conversations, I had an intimate conversation with Evdokimov, during which he told me that, as the Central Committee thinks, you cannot create collective farms by force of arms. Here, he says,

In Dagestan, the population says that the collective farms are kaput, and this is not only in the national regions, that the situation is very difficult in central Russia as well. It might turn out this way, Evdokimov said, that we would ruin the kulak and physically destroy it, but there could be many complications in our country and the Party would not create farms in the countryside.

This ended the conversation with him. After staying for several days, Evdokimov left. I had

a subsequent meeting with Evdokimov in 1930 before leaving for work in Azerbaijan. We met in Evdokimov's office. I asked him for directions. Along with the operational instructions, he told me that he, Evdokimov, did not believe in the success of the operation that had begun to eliminate the kulaks as a class, although he was entrusted with carrying out this operation across the USSR. He also does not believe in the expediency of the operation carried out by decision of the Central Committee, believing that this could lead to the impoverishment of the countryside and the degradation of agriculture. During this time in Azerbaijan, I did not do any anti-Soviet work.

led.

In 1933, shortly after my appointment as head of the GUPVO OGPU and my arrival in Moscow, I met Evdokimov at his apartment. He came from Rostov.

Evdokimov talked to me about the fact that the situation in the country, despite the seemingly slight improvement in the situation in the countryside with manufactured goods and with food in the cities, is still extremely difficult. And right there, Evdokimov began a frank conversation with me. He asked: "How are you, the right-wing moods that you had, have they become obsolete or not?" I say: "The devil knows whether they have become obsolete or not, I don't know, but what?" "You see, sooner or later the Rights will succeed in proving to the Central Committee the wrongness of the line of the Central Committee and the correctness of the line of the Rights." I tried to object, declaring that the position of the collective farms was becoming stable. He replied: "Wait, collective farms have begun to exist, but this is only the beginning, and what will happen next is unknown. The right-wing cadres are large, the right-wingers are doing a lot of underground work both in recruiting cadres and in creating discontent against the government and the Central Committee.

Then Evdokimov asked: "Did you accept the GUPVO or not?" After my affirmative answer, he said: "You should be interested in the questions of the troops as you should. The troops will play a big role in the event of any complications within the country, and you must take the troops into your own hands." Knowing that my deputies for the

GUPVO are KRUCHINKIN, LEPIN and ROSHAL, Evdokimov, touching them, said: "KRUCHINKIN, apparently, is a Yaginsky man, but that's okay. YAGODA himself takes care of the troops, but this is not scary either. Immediately, Evdokimov informed me that YAGODA himself was also right, recommended: "Nevertheless, in relations with YAGODA, do not go far and do not fully trust him and, especially, his entourage, since these people are capable of crimes, on these crimes will fail and may give you away, but take KRUCHINKIN into your hands." And then Evdokimov told that KRUCHINKIN, being on a business trip in Central Asia, when Evdokimov was there, during operations, because of his cowardice, the operation failed. I raised the question before Yagoda, Evdokimov said, about putting Kruchinkin on trial, but something is silent. Carefully you need to pull him towards you, but also start to wind up your own cadres in the troops of the OGPU.

I asked what exactly should be done with regard to the troops? First, said Evdokimov, get your absolutely reliable people and take them into your hands in such a way that in case of complications they will carry out your will.

In the same year, 1933, YAGODA, after my skirmish with him on a business matter, began again to bring me closer to him with the help of BULANOV. Bulanov often invited me to his dacha under the guise of fishing and playing billiards. On one of these trips to BULANOV, on a day off at the dacha, Yagoda came, who, after dinner and drinking, had a conversation with me in a separate room.

Yagoda began the conversation by saying that I was wrong in turning against him, and that Evdokimov's hand was apparently at work here, and he immediately told me: "Keep in mind: that you remain right, I know that you are doing the work, I also know, and wouldn't it be better for you to put up with the situation that exists in our central office, slow down your ambition and obey me. And then, continuing the conversation, YAGODA asked me: "How are things going in the GUPVO, you have



many deputies, wouldn't it be better to get rid of some of them. Who do you think is better to leave: KRUCHINKIN or LEPIN?

Without waiting for my answer, YAGODA said that KRUCHINKIN was a reliable person. I realized that KRUCHINKIN was connected with him in criminal activities.

With regard to LEPIN, YAGODA said that he hesitated, guided himself by Akulov and Balitsky when they worked in the OGPU. "Maybe he should be offered to BALITSKY," he said, "let him go to him. ROSHAL needs to be broken off\*, and you should have taken KRAFT or RYMSHAN to the combat training department. After that, YAGODA began to invite me to go to his dacha, but because of the late time, I refused. Saying goodbye, YAGODA said: "Well - world and full contact." In fulfillment of the assignments that I received

from Evdokimov, and after a conversation with Yagoda, I began in every possible way to bring Kruchinkin closer to me and soon had an open conversation with him. I asked KRUCHINKIN what kind of work he was doing on Yagoda's assignments in the army. At first, KRUCHINKIN made a bewildered look, and then he began to say that he did not receive special assignments, mainly that he was working on selecting people and educating them in the spirit of endless devotion to Yagoda personally.

KRUCHINKIN finally told me about the work he had done and a number of people who were recruited by him and were working inside the OGPU troops upon his return from Xinjiang in 1934. Expanding the full

picture of his anti-Soviet work, KRUCHINKIN named the following people for me: KRAFT, RYMSHAN, who at that time was already seconded from the GUPVO to the Red Army, ROTHERMEL, LEPSIS, ZARIN, BARKOV, KONDRATIEVA, the commander at that time of the special purpose division, moreover, he stipulated, that YAGODA and BULANOV have a direct connection with KONDRATEV, and that KONDRATEV \*has his own people in the division\*.

LEPIN at that time was already working in Ukraine as the head of the UPVO, and, despite the fact that BALITSKY agreed to take him on, his relations with BALITSKY were not entirely normal, and YAGODA could not forgive him for his orientation towards Akulov and BALITSKY in his time.

On his next visit to Moscow in 1934, LEPIN complained to me. I summoned KRUCHINKIN, and together with him we told LEPIN that I had become aware of LEPIN's participation in enemy work under the leadership of KRUCHINKIN. LEPIN was surprised at first, and then, having learned that I also take part in this work and had already begun to lead it in the border guard, we opened up to each other. After that, LEPIN asked to settle the issue of his relationship with Yagoda and BALITSKY. We managed to do this by a direct conversation with Yagoda that LEPIN is our man and we cannot put him in such a position, all the more so in Ukraine, where in our interests he should contact the Ukrainian people and find out what is happening in Ukraine. I myself spoke with BALITSKY so that he would not offend LEPIN. I

learned from LEPIN that he had the impression that in the Ukraine there was also work being carried out by the right within the bodies and troops of the OGPU. KRUCHINKIN and I instructed LEPIN to get in touch with the Ukrainians, without revealing to them his connections in Moscow and without saying anything about YAGODA, about me and KRUCHINKIN, to get into BALITSKY's environment and, if they recruit him, go

Approximately in the first months of 1935, LEPIN, on his next visit to Moscow, told me that he had contacted BALITSKY and that BALITSKY had connected him with a number of people from the border guard, in particular with the head of the political department of the UPVO - SAROTSKY \*\*, the head of the border detachment in Odessa - KULESHOM \*\* and deputy. Head of

the UPVO of Ukraine - SEMENOV\*\*. During the same time - 1934 - I had several meetings with Evdokimov when he arrived in Moscow. At these meetings, he gradually revealed to me his practical work and spoke about the work of the center of the Rights and the Union. In particular, he spoke about the fact that he had a number of people inside the GPU apparatus, and named RUDI, DAGIN, RAYEV, KURSKOY, DEMENTYEV, GORBACH and others. He said that he had connections in national regions: in Dagestan - through MAMEDBEKOV, in Chechnya - GORSHEYEV or GORSHENIN, and immediately said that he had difficulty only with KALMYKOV, who had his own line, and Evdokimov could not break him off in any way, but characterized KALMYKOV as a person completely "ours" - right, but, apparently, h

I asked him, what is being done in the Union in general? Evdokimov said that a lot of work was being done, a number of people who occupy a great position in a number of other regions of the USSR had gone over to the right. And here he declared: "You see how now you have to fight the Central Committee: once they fought the insurrection, but now you yourself have to look for threads, connections with the insurrection, and in order to organize it, you have to go to the grassroots. This is a very difficult and dangerous job, but without the lower ranks - secretaries of district committees, chairmen of the RIKs or people who are connected with the village - we will not be able to lead the insurgency, and this is one of the main tasks that we face.

Evdokimov asked what I was doing with the troops. I fully told him about everything, in particular, about the meeting with Yagoda, about the conversation with him. Evdokimov again gave me such an instruction that I should not break this connection with YAGODA, but not go to the end and, mainly, say nothing to Yagoda about my connection with him - Evdokimov. In one

of the meetings, Evdokimov suggested that I contact the former. deputy People's Commissar forced PROKOFIEV and to probe his moods. When I asked - what is the goal, he answered - I'll tell you later.

In fulfillment of Evdokimov's task, I became close friends with PROKOFIEV. Later I found out that Evdokimov was looking for connections with PROKOFIEV in order to get in touch with him personally, which he essentially did through me. Their first meeting was at my dacha, and after that, during his visits to Moscow, he began to call on PROKOFIEV. Some time later Evdokimov told me that by approaching PROKOFIEV he pursued the goal of checking whether Kalmykov was connected with the OGPU.

In 1934, while expanding work in the GUPVO, we, together with Kruchinkin, tried to get in touch with the former. commander of the special purpose division of the OGPU - KONDRATEV, since KONDRATEV directly received assignments from Yagoda and BULANOV. We wanted to know what kind of assignments he receives in the division. However, the conversation between KRUCHINKIN and KONDRAT'EV yielded no results, and only after the inspection of the division, which we managed to carry out during YAGODA's leave, and the discovery of a number of facts about the ugly state of the division's units, did we manage to force

KONDRATIEVA tell about the conspiratorial work he is doing

by division.

Kondratiev said that most of the regimental commanders of the division, as well as many of the workers of the political apparatus, were recruited by him. KONDRAT'EV also said that GOL'KHOV, the head of the division's political department (he had arrived with KONDRAT'EV from the Far East), had been involved in the conspiracy.

Further, KONDRATEV said that YAGODA gave him the task (and he is working it out) so that the command staff, recruited and involved in the work, worked out a plan of possible actions for the division in the conditions of Moscow. This plan basically consisted in cordoning off and isolating the Kremlin from the rest of the city. In addition, he said that in case of complications, there is a \*\*troop group from the division\*\*, which should immediately be at the disposal of Yagoda. And, finally, he said that the commanders appointed to the squad for duty inside the OGPU, on armored cars, stand out mainly from among the participants in the conspiracy \*\*\*. Having told this, KONDRAT'EV, immediately shy, began to say that he would like Yagoda not to know about his conversations with us until he settled this issue with him. At the same time KONDRAT'EV said that he knew from BULANOV that KRUCHINKIN and I were working.

In 1935, Evdokimov began to ask me: is there Yagoda's hand in the murder of Kirov, and do I have any information about this? Moreover, he pointed out that if YAGODA is a participant in this case, this is not a good deed, not from the point of view of regret for the loss of KIROV, but from the point of view of complicating the situation and those repressions that began shortly after the murder of KIROV.

During this conversation, Yakov Lifshitz, ex. deputy People's Commissar, who, after greeting me, said: "We live in the same city and do not meet." Evdokimov immediately said - it would be necessary to meet, it would be useful for both. It was on the eve of a day off, and Lifshitz invited us to his dacha for a day off. After Lifshitz's departure from Evdokimov, I asked him whether Lifshitz

had honestly repented? Evdokimov replied: "To be honest, people like Yashka don't repent," and added that Lifshitz was doing the corresponding work.

On the second day Evdokimov and I were at Lifshitz's dacha. We had no conspiratorial conversations, but Evdokimov kept stressing the need for close ties with Lifshitz, with whom we agreed on further meetings.

During one of these meetings, during a riding trip, Lifshitz said to me: "I heard from Evdokimov about you, frankly speaking, I did not expect that you were also with us, well done." I started talking to Lifshitz, but how are you? He replied: "Evdokimov told you that I was working." I also asked him, "Are you doing a lot of work?" He said that he was doing a lot of work, had a connection with the center through PYATAKOV, had a large number of people and did not break ties with the Ukrainians. At the next meeting, in

connection with the arrests of a number of Trotskyists that had begun, Lifshitz gave me the task, although I worked in the GUPVO and had no direct relation to operational work, to listen to what evidence the arrested Trotskyists give and to inform him.

In 1935, in the autumn, the wives of Ukrainian border guards ran to Moscow. Yagoda allowed me to arrange a reception for them at my dacha, and in the morning of the same day I rode on horseback with Lifshitz and told him about this reception. Lifshitz asked, who will you have? I say that I invite the heads of departments. Then he said - invite MOLCHANOV as well, and can I be at this reception. I said that there will be nothing special, come as if by chance. Lifshitz actually came to my dacha toward evening. MOLCHANOV also arrived. After dinner, Lifshitz and Molchanov sat side by side, drinking, and after that they went out into the garden for a walk. Lifshitz left when the rest of those present had not yet departed, and only ten days later I asked Lifshitz what you were talking about with Molchanov, had you told him anything about me? He replied that he had spoken to him about the Trotskyists. "You see, MOLCHANOV is also not a completely pure person, but he bred fanabery with me. I didn't have a direct conversation with him, but I felt for him what testimonies the Trotskyists give. In one

of the meetings in 1935, Evdokimov at his apartment told me about a number of people who he had attracted to work in Pyatigorsk. He named PIVOVAROV, a large group of Chekists: \*\*\*BOYAR, DYATKIN and SHATSKOY\*\*\*. Here he told me about his connections with Khataevich, and he praised him in every possible way as

village expert; with EICHE, about a part of the Leningrad group - CHUDOV, ZHUKOV, and he immediately warned me - to keep in mind not to meet with them especially, because Leningraders get drunk and in general are known in the Central Committee as people tarnished, decomposed on the basis of drunkenness.

On the same visit, Evdokimov said: is it possible somehow, through YAGODA, to stretch Dagin to the operational department. "Although PAUKER is a Yaginsky man, he is a fool, and if you entrust him with something serious, he will definitely fail," said Evdokimov. At the same time, he warned that if you try to stretch DAGIN to the first department, then you must do this very carefully, given the situation.

Evdokimov also spoke about the fact that in a number of regions of the North Caucasus he managed to lead insurgent groups with his people, and that the purge of the party that had been carried out before this helped in

the sense of recruiting people. During the trial of ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV and others, when it was published in the press about BUKHARIN, before the end of the trial, Evdokimov was in Moscow. He was very worried and, in a conversation with me, said: "The devil knows how to get out of this whole thing. I just don't understand Yagoda, what he is doing there, why he is expanding the circle of people for repression, or these hamstrings are weak - they give out. But it would be possible to stage the course of the

investigation in this way in order to secure oneself in every possible way. Immediately he asked me about LIFSHITZ: does LIFSHITZ go anywhere on the basis of Chekist materials? Lifshitz was not in Moscow at that moment, he was on vacation. I told Evdokimov that I was present at one of the operational meetings, where MOLCHANOV reported on the evidence against Lifshitz, and that these testimonies were coming from Ukraine. Evdokimov at the same time said: "LIFSHITS will soon return from vacation, you do not openly meet with him." At that time I was already preparing for a business trip to the Far East, and once on one of the rides, before his vacation, we talked with Lifshitz about a possible joint trip to the Far East.

I told Evdokimov that we were going to go to the Far East with Lifshitz. He said if you can

It's better to go alone in this situation. Evdokimov was interested in who of the Chekists was conducting an investigation and undercover work on Trotskyists and rightists. He himself was very

depressed. Before my departure for the Far East, Lifshitz returned from vacation, but I stopped seeing him, given the presence of evidence against him and my possible compromise.

When I was leaving for the Far East, YAGODA gave me a letter to DERIBASU, the contents of which I do not know, and, in addition, asked me to verbally convey to DERIBASU that the Central Committee was not entirely satisfied with the work of DERIBASA, that he was not doing well with regard to the strike against the Trotskyists, and immediately added: "You indicate to him that he wants it or does not want it, but he must do it, he will understand." I asked Yagoda, what if he asks about my attitude towards you and about your affairs? YAGODA answered me: "DERIBAS is an intelligent person, and I think that he will not do this, tell us what we experienced here after the murder

of Kirov." I had this conversation with DERIBAS, and DERIBAS was interested mainly in the names of people who had already been repressed and people who were following the materials. I told him about Lifshitz and Pyatakov, who were on the verge of exposure. On the way from the Far

East to Moscow, after my appointment as Deputy People's Commissar, on one of the railways. station, an agent came into my car and said that at the next station the deputy wanted to talk to me. People's Commissariat Lifshitz. And indeed, I met Lifshitz at the next station. I deliberately got out of the car so as not to talk to him in the car, since a number of employees were traveling with me. Lifshitz approached me together with RUTENBURG, the head of the road. Lifshitz asked for permission to travel through the same station with me. He said that he had been removed from the post of deputy people's commissar, that in Moscow he had face-to-face confrontations with those arrested. He scolded the people who betrayed him in every possible way, got nervous and asked me, as already the deputy people's commissar, to somehow do something so that he could get out of this case. I, in turn, asked him: "Well, if you hit, since things have gone so far, then hold on properly."

He left at the next station. Having met Lifshitz, I myself got a little scared, as if there were no troubles on this basis, and I made a plan that upon my arrival in Moscow I would tell Ezhov about it, and I would tell it in such a context that Lifshitz swore and swore that he innocent, terribly nervous, and by practical work tries to prove his devotion to the Central Committee. On my return to Moscow, I did just that. Shortly after assuming the post of deputy people's

commissar, Ezhov began to draw me closer to him, to single me out from the rest of the deputies, to have more frank conversations with me in assessing other deputies, to express some dissatisfaction with AGRANOV. Before the distribution of duties between deputies, in addition to the fact that I continued to be the head of the GUPVO, Ezhov suggested that I be interested in operational issues, and around 1937, after the arrest of Yagoda, he began to talk with me regarding my possible appointment as First Deputy People's Commissar. During one of these conversations, Ezhov told me: "I have predetermined this issue, but I want to talk to you, just come on - to be honest, there are some sins for you." At first, I was completely taken aback, thinking that the case was lost.

Seeing my confusion, Ezhov began to say: "Don't be afraid, tell me honestly." Then I told him about the history of the falconry business, about my connection with YAGODA, connection with Evdokimov and through him with Lifshitz. Then Ezhov said: "You have so many sins, even if you put you in jail now, well, nothing, you will work, you will be one hundred percent my man." I looked at him in confusion and tried to refuse the appointment to the post of first deputy. People's Commissar, but he said: "Sit down, work, we will work together and we will answer together."

Before the arrest of BUKHARIN and RYKOV, speaking frankly with me, Ezhov began to talk about plans for Chekist work in connection with the current situation and the upcoming arrests of BUKHARIN and RYKOV. Ezhov said that this would be a great loss for the rightists, after that beyond our desire, on the instructions of the Central Committee, large-scale measures for right-wing cadres could unfold, and that in connection with this, his and my main task is to conduct an investigation in such a way that, as much as possible, save right frames. Immediately he unfolded the plan of this case. Basically, this plan was as follows: "We need



to place our people, mainly in the SPO apparatus, to select investigators who would either be completely connected with us, or who would have some sins behind them and they would know that these sins are behind them, and on the basis of these sins hold them completely. Get involved in the investigation and lead it." "And this is," said Ezhov, "not to write down everything that the arrested person says, but for the investigators to bring all the sketches, drafts to the head of the department, and in relation to the arrested people, who in the past occupied a great position and occupy a leading position in the organization of the right, to draw up protocols with his sanction. If the arrested person named the members of the organization, then they had to be written down in a separate list and reported to him each time. It would be nice, said Ezhov, to take into the apparatus people who were already connected with the organization. "For example, Evdokimov told you about people, and I know someone. First of all, it will be necessary to pull them into the central apparatus. In general, we need to look closely at capable people, and from a business point of view, from among those already working in the central apparatus, somehow bring them closer to us and then recruit them, because without these people we cannot build work, but the Central Committee needs to somehow work

show".

In carrying out this proposal by Ezhov, we took a firm course of retaining Yagodin's cadres in leading positions in the NKVD. It should be noted that we succeeded with difficulty, since from various local authorities most of these persons received materials about their involvement in the conspiracy and anti-Soviet work in general. In order to preserve these personnel and their formal rehabilitation, those arrested

who gave such testimony were summoned to Moscow, where, through interrogation, they led them to renounce their testimony (the case of ZIRNIS, the case of GLEBOV and others). Along with this, instead of the arrested Yagodintsy (who could not be kept), at the

direction of Ezhov, North Caucasian cadres of Chekists were intensively recruited and appointed to leadership work in the central apparatus and local bodies of the NKVD.

A significant number of these Chekists, who made up the cadres of Evdokimov, were also taken to work in the security department of the NKVD. Like me

pointed out above, these personnel were used by DAGIN to prepare for the implementation by them, on the instructions of Ezhov, at the necessary moment, terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government. After PAUKER's arrest,

Ezhov raised the question of selecting the head of the first department and himself proposed KURSKI, who was appointed to the post of head of the 1st department. Soon after the appointment of Kursky, Evdokimov was in Moscow. Evdokimov asked me what was being done. I told him about establishing a connection with Ezhov. Evdokimov then immediately went on to the first section, saying that KURSKY had been unsuccessfully appointed to the first section, although this man was ours, he said, but he was neurasthenic and cowardly; I told you that DAGIN should have been appointed. I told him about Kursky's mood already in the process of work, that he wanted in every possible way to be relieved of the post of head of the 1st

department. Evdokimov proposed to take advantage of these sentiments and at all costs to appoint KURSK DAGIN to his place. Kursky was released, and Dagin was appointed.

At the same meeting with Evdokimov, he said: "With you, the Yaginsky line will also continue; we will destroy ourselves. How long will this continue?"

I told him about the conversation that had taken place with Ezhov and pointed out, that we are now taking measures, as much as possible, to save personnel.

Evdokimov advised me to quickly conduct cases against the Chekists arrested and planned for arrest. "You see," he said, "you can't hide Yagodin's cadres, they are known to everyone, not today, tomorrow each of them will be pushed out, just the collectives from the bottom will rise against them, so here we need to turn these things over as soon as possible."

Then he said that you need to be especially careful with BERRY. YAGODA is such a person that he will start talking absurd things during the investigation, and he advised that the investigation into the YAGODA case should be conducted by KURSKIY. I told Ezhov

about this conversation with Evdokimov. Ezhov said - it's good that you are telling me, but in vain you are telling Evdokimov about what we talked with you, let's better agree this way - you will tell Evdokimov only what I tell you.

After the October Plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, Evdokimov and I met for the first time at Ezhov's dacha. Moreover, the conversation was started by Evdokimov, who, turning to Ezhov, asked: "What is wrong with you, he promised to rectify Yagodin's situation, but the matter is deepening more and more and now comes close to us. It looks like you're in the wrong business." Ezhov was silent at first, and then declared that "the situation is really difficult, now we are taking measures to reduce the scope of operations, but, apparently, we will have to deal with the head of the right." Evdokimov swore, spat and said: "Can't I go to the NKVD, I will help more than others." Ezhov says: "It would be nice, but the Central Committee will hardly agree to transfer you to the NKVD. I think that the case is not entirely hopeless, but you need to talk to DAGIN, you have influence on him, he needs to start work in the Operations Department, and we should be ready to commit terrorist acts. I don't remember - Ezhov or Evdokimov

said that it was necessary to see how the frames were arranged at PAUKER and YAGODA, and remove them. Once people are left, without control they can do stupid things, take independent actions. Here Evdokimov said that it would be nice to have in the outer guard, directly in the dachas, people from the nationals of the North Caucasus, these people would serve honestly, because the Ingush guarded the tsar. After this, Ezhov again began to say that in no case should work be stopped and curtailed, but that it was necessary to go more underground and in no case should he himself (Yevdokimov) make additional connections along the edge. "You have people, let them slowly check and turn on people." Returning from Mongolia, I learned that there was a question about my

transfer from the NKVD to the People's Commissariat of Defense - Deputy. people's commissar. On the opening day of the plenum, I asked Ezhov about this. He says the issue is not yet resolved. To my question whether the talk in the apparatus about transferring ZAKOVSKY to Moscow to the post of First Deputy People's Commissar is true, Ezhov replied: We want to take ZAKOVSKY into the apparatus as head of a department with the right of substitution. This man, he said, is completely ours, but a man who needs to be looked after, and then he needs to be transferred from the Leningrad situation, because in relation to him

ties with CHUDOVY and KODATSKY there are big talks. The Central Committee is also talking about the

disintegration of ZAKOVSKY. After one of the sessions of the plenum, in the evening, Evdokimov, I and Ezhov were at Ezhov's dacha. When we arrived there, EIHE was there, but EIHE did not have any conversations with us. What happened before our arrival at Ezhov's with EIKHE - Ezhov did not tell me. After dinner, EIHE left, but we stayed and talked almost until morning. Evdokimov, mainly, stressed that they were picking up for us, in particular, he began to talk about himself and expressed dissatisfaction with why Ezhov sent DEYCH to him in the region, who was his materials.

During the same plenum, I had another meeting with Evdokimov. He kept pressing on the fact that Nikolai Ezhov had to be kept in his hands all the time, that "you can't cope with this matter, you take your own cadres and shoot them," and immediately Evdokimov suggested: "I would advise not to send the Leningrad arrested ( CHUDOV, KODATSKY, STRUPPE) to Leningrad because although ZAKOVSKY and our man are completely, and whoever works with him, the devil knows, no matter how they start to shake. Evdokimov continued: "I believe that you started awarding orders early. After all, people are awarded not only ours, but also others, the impulse to fight is growing, and this should be held back, orders are an incentive for people who are not organically and organizationally connected with us and therefore can expand operations. And here Evdokimov and Ezhov were already talking together about a possible reduction in operations, but since this was recognized as impossible, they agreed to deflect the blow from their own cadres and try to direct it at honest cadres betrayed by the Central Committee. Such was Ezhov's attitude.

I forgot to mention one circumstance that has significant value. In the

autumn of 1935, at the dacha near Lifshitz, a meeting was held between Evdokimov, myself, Dagin, and Lifshitz, at which Evdokimov, in an extremely irritated state, began to say that he did not quite believe in the success of the terrorist acts prepared by the Trotskyists and right-wingers against STALIN. At the same time, Evdokimov openly stated that only the forces of the NKVD security department could actually carry out a terrorist attack against STALIN.

Evdokimov intensely regretted that he had not succeeded in appointing DAGIN head of the security department, even when he was the head of the SOU OGPU, and suggested that I carefully recommend DAGIN instead of PAUKER if the opportunity was good. Soon Evdokimov

was transferred to work in Moscow. Meetings with us began to take place more often, both at Ezhov's directly with Evdokimov, and the three of us. Here I consider it necessary to

note the following: After the arrests of the members of the center of the right EZHOV and

in fact, they themselves became the center organizing:

1) to preserve, as far as possible, the anti-Soviet cadres of the right from defeat; 2) inflicting a blow on honest party cadres devoted to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; 3) the preservation of insurgent personnel both in the North Caucasus and in other territories and regions of the USSR, with the expectation of their use at the time of international complications; 4) intensified preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government; 5) coming to power of the right,

headed by N. Ezhov. Upon returning from the Far East, at the request of Ezhov, without stopping home, I went to the People's Commissariat. I have never seen Ezhov in such a dejected state. He said: "The case is rubbish" - and immediately turned to the question that BERIA was appointed to the NKVD against his wishes. It's going to be bad business, he said. I'm afraid that everything will be opened and our plans will collapse.

On August 27-28, 1938, Evdokimov called me and asked me to come to his apartment. Evdokimov reduced our entire conversation to the fact that if there are any imperfections that could begin to unfold our involvement in criminal cases, finish before BERIA arrives, and then Evdokimov said to me: "You check whether ZAKOVSKY was shot and whether they were shot all the people of Yagoda, because upon the arrival of BERIA, the investigation into these cases can be restored and these cases will turn against us. I checked and established that ZAKOVSKY, MIRONOV and a group of other Chekists were shot on August 26-27\*\*\*\*. I turn to the practical enemy work carried out

Ezhov, me and other conspirators in the NKVD.

Investigative work

The investigative apparatus in all departments of the NKVD is divided into "investigators-kolshchikov", "ordinary" investigators. What were these groups and who are they?

"Investigators-stallers" were selected mainly from conspirators or compromised persons, uncontrollably used beatings of those arrested, in the shortest possible time they obtained "testimonies" and were able to competently, colorfully draw up protocols.

This category of people included: NIKOLAEV, AGAS, USHAKOV, LISTENGURT, EVGENEV, ZHUPAKHIN, MINAEV, DAVYDOV, ALTMAN, GEYMAN, LITVIN, LEPLEVSKY, KARELIN, KERZON, YAMNITSKY \*\*\*\* and others \*\*\*\*. Since the number of those arrested who confessed under such methods of

interrogation increased from day to day and the need for investigators who knew how to draw up protocols was great, the so-called "investigator kollers" began, each with him, to create groups simply

"callers".

The group of "peelers" consisted of technical workers. These people did not know the materials on the person under investigation, but were sent to Lefortovo, summoned the arrested person and proceeded to beat him. The beating continued until the moment when the defendant agreed to testify. The rest of the investigating team was engaged in the

interrogation of less serious arrested persons, was left to its own devices, was not guided by anyone.

The further process of the investigation was as follows: the investigator conducted the interrogation and instead of the protocol made notes. After several such interrogations, the investigator drew up a draft protocol, which was sent for "adjustment" to the head of the relevant department, and from him, not yet signed, for "viewing" the former. People's Commissar Ezhov and, in rare cases, to me. Ezhov looked through the protocol, made changes and additions. In most cases, the arrested did not agree with the wording of the protocol and stated that they did not say this during the investigation, and refused to sign.

Then the investigators reminded the detainee about the "callers", and the person under investigation signed the protocol. "Adjustment" and

"Editing" of the protocols, in most cases, Ezhov carried out without seeing the arrestees in the eyes, and if he did, then during fleeting rounds of cells or investigation rooms.

With such methods of investigation, surnames were suggested.

In my opinion, I will tell the truth if, summarizing, I declare that very often The testimony was given by the investigators, not the

defendants. Did the leadership of the People's Commissariat know about this, i.e. me and Ezhov? - They knew. How did they react? Honestly, no way, and Ezhov even encouraged this. No one understood who the physical impact was applied to. And since most of the people using this method were enemies - conspirators, slander was clearly going on, false testimonies were taken and innocent people slandered by enemies from among those arrested and enemies - investigators were arrested and shot. The real investigation was blurred.

MARYASIN was arrested - ex. prev. State Bank, with which Ezhov was on close terms before his arrest. Ezhov showed exceptional interest in the investigation into his case. He personally supervised the investigation in his case, having repeatedly been at his interrogations. MARYASIN was kept all the time in the Lefortovo prison. He was beaten brutally and constantly. While other detainees were beaten only up to the moment of their confession, MARYASIN was beaten even after the investigation was over and no evidence was taken from him.

One day, walking around the interrogation rooms with Ezhov (moreover, EZHOV was drunk), we went to the interrogation of MARYASIN, and Ezhov told MARYASIN for a long time that he had not yet told everything, and, in particular, made MARYASIN a hint of terror in general and a terrorist attack against him - Ezhov, and immediately declared that "we will beat, beat and

beat." Or one more thing: during the first or second interrogation after his arrest, YAKOVLEV, in a drunken state, was asked to testify about YAKOVLEV's preparation of a terrorist act against Ezhov. YAKOVLEV said that this was not true, but he was beaten by Ezhov and those present, and after that Ezhov left without obtaining a confession. A few days later, evidence appeared about a terrorist attack being prepared against Ezhov - by YAKOVLEV. Ezhov's deliberately open line of falsifying the materials of the

investigation about the preparation of terrorist acts against him has gone so far that obsequious investigators from

a number of "kolshchikov" constantly sought a "confession" of those arrested about the imaginary preparation of terrorist acts against Ezhov. The arrested KRUGLIKOV (former chairman

of the State Bank) in his testimony also gave a terrorist group preparing the murder of Ezhov. I was present at the interrogation of KRUGLIKOV by Ezhov. KRUGLIKOV said that he had lied about the terrorist act against Yezhov. Ezhov, after this remark, got up, did not speak to Kruglikov, and went out. Behind him came the investigator, who interrogated KRUGLIKOV, went up to Ezhov. The latter said something to him, and Ezhov and I left for the People's Commissariat. I don't know what he said to the investigator, but I know that the next morning there was a statement from KRUGLIKOV in which he explained his refusal by the fact that when he saw Ezhov, he was "confused" and did not want to personally confirm his testimony to his face. Kruglikov was forced to confirm this testimony, and Ezhov

After that, he never once asked where the truth was.

During the investigation into the case of Yagoda and the arrested Chekist conspirators, as well as other arrested, especially right-wing ones, the procedure for "correcting" the protocols established by Ezhov pursued the goal of preserving the cadres of the conspirators and preventing any possibility of failure of our involvement in the anti-Soviet conspiracy.

Dozens and hundreds of examples can be cited when arrested persons under investigation did not betray persons associated with them in anti-Soviet work. The most illustrative examples are

the conspirators YAGODA, BULANOV, ZAKOVSKY, KRUCHINKIN and others, who, knowing about my participation in the conspiracy, did not testify about this \*\*\*\*\*.

How were those arrested prepared for face-to-face confrontations,

and especially for face-to-face confrontations, which were held in the presence of members of the government? The arrested were prepared specially, first by the investigator, then

by the head of the department. The preparation consisted in reading out the testimony given by the arrested person to the person with whom the confrontation was to be held, explaining how the confrontation would be carried out, what unexpected questions could be put to the arrested person and how he should answer. In essence, there was a conspiracy and a rehearsal for the upcoming



face-to-face rate. After this, Ezhov called the arrested man to him or, pretending that he accidentally went into the investigator's room, where the arrested man was sitting and talking to him about the upcoming headquarters, asked if he felt firmly, whether he would confirm, and, among other things, inserted that members of the government will be present at the confrontation.

As a rule, Ezhov was nervous before such face-to-face confrontations, even after talking with the arrested person. There were cases when an arrested person, during a conversation with Ezhov, made a statement that his testimony was not true, he was slandered.

In such cases, Ezhov left, and the investigator or head of the department was instructed to "restore" the arrested person, since a confrontation had been appointed. As an example, we can cite the preparation of a confrontation between URITSKY (head of the Intelligence Agency) and BELOV (commander of the Belarusian military district). URITSKY refused to testify against \*\*\*\*\*BELOV\*\*\*\*\* during his interrogation by Ezhov. Without starting to talk to him about anything, Ezhov left, and a few minutes later URITSKY, through Nikolaev, apologized to Ezhov and said that he had "become cowardly."

Preparing the Trial

of RYKOV, BUKHARIN, KRESTINSKY, YAGODA, and others Actively participating in the

investigation in general, Ezhov withdrew from the preparation of this trial. Before the process, there were confrontations of the arrested, interrogations, clarifications, in which Ezhov did not participate. He talked for a long time with Yagoda, and this conversation concerned mainly Yagoda's conviction that he would not be shot.

Ezhov spoke several times with BUKHARIN and RYKOV and also, in order to calm them down, assured them that they would not be shot under any circumstances.

Once Ezhov was talking to BULANOV, moreover, he began the conversation in the presence of the investigator and me, and ended the conversation one on one, asking us to leave. Moreover, BULANOV started talking at that moment about the poisoning of Ezhov. What the conversation was about, Ezhov did not tell me. When he asked me to come in again, he said: "Be good at the trial - I will ask you not to be shot." After the trial, Ezhov always expressed regret about BULANOV. During the execution, Ezhov suggested that BULANOV be the first to be shot, and he did not enter the room where they were being shot.

Of course, here Ezhov was guided by the need to cover up his ties with the arrested leaders of the right, going to a public trial. Essentially the poisoning of Ezhov.

The idea of his poisoning was suggested by Ezhov himself, declaring every day to all the deputies and heads of departments that he was not feeling well, that as soon as he stayed in the office, he felt some kind of metallic taste and smell in his mouth. After that, he began to complain that blood began to appear from his gums and his teeth began to loosen. Ezhov began to repeat that he had been poisoned in his office, and thereby inspired the investigators to obtain appropriate testimony, which was done using Lefortovo prison and beatings. Bulk operations. At the very beginning, Ezhov's directive was launched on mass operations in full accordance with the decision of the government, and the first months they proceeded normally.

It was soon established that in a number of territories and regions, and especially in the Ordzhonikidze region, there were cases of the murder of those arrested during interrogations, and subsequently the cases against them were drawn up through a troika as if they were sentenced to death. By the same period, data began to come in about outrages from other areas, in particular from the Urals, Belarus, Orenburg, Leningrad and Ukraine.

The outrages increased especially strongly when, in addition to the ongoing mass operations in the territories and regions, a directive was issued on the repression of foreign nationals suspicious of espionage, connections with consulates of foreign states, defectors. In the Leningrad, Sverdlovsk regions, the Byelorussian SSR, in Ukraine, they began to arrest the native inhabitants of the USSR, accusing them of having connections with foreigners. Often there were cases when there was no data on such a connection. The cases of this operation were considered in Moscow by a specially created troika. The troika was first chaired by TSESARSKII and then by SHAPIRO. The decision taken by Ezhov, me and Evdokimov

about the impossibility of stopping and deflecting the blow from our own - anti-Soviet insurgent cadres and the need to shift the blow to honest cadres loyal to the motherland and the party, practically found its expression in the criminal implementation of a punitive policy,

which was supposed to be directed against traitors to the motherland and foreign intelligence agents. Honest workers of the NKVD on the ground, not suspecting betrayal by the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR and many leaders of the UNKVD involved in the anti-Soviet conspiracy, mistook our enemy installations for the installations of the party and government and objectively turned out to be participants in the extermination of innocent honest citizens.

The mass signals that came to us about the so-called "excesses", essentially exposing our enemy work, were left without any response at the direction of Ezhov. In those cases when it was not possible, due to the intervention of the Central Committee, to cover up, muffle one or another revealing signal, they resorted to direct forgeries and falsifications.

So, for example, in 1938, on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Shkiryatov traveled to the Ordzhonikidzevsky Territory to investigate the materials received about criminal perversions during mass operations carried out by the NKVD in the region.

Ezhov, in order to show the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that he had already reacted in a timely manner to signals, handed Shkiryatov an "order", allegedly issued by him in the NKVD. In fact, he did not issue such an order. In other cases, in order to cover up the enemy work of the conspirators, ordinary workers of the NKVD were brought to justice. Deception of the

party and the government Ezhov, having come to the NKVD, at all meetings, in conversations with operational workers, deservedly criticizing the departmentalism existing among the Chekists, isolation from the party, emphasized that he would instill party spirit in the workers, that he did not hide and would not hide anything and never from the party and from STALIN. In fact, he deceived the party both in serious, big questions, and in trifles. Ezhov conducted these conversations for nothing more than to lull the vigilance of honest workers of the NKVD. Ezhov created for himself, and later his closest assistants, starting with me, the

halo of glory of the best of the best, the vigilant of the vigilant. Ezhov often said that if it were not for him, there would have been a coup in the country, as a result of his work and the opened cases, the war was delayed, etc. Criticized hostile and discredited individual members

Politburo. He spoke about a number of them openly as unreliable, staggering. Often, in the presence of a number of subordinate workers, he threw catchphrases about the close ties of individual members of the Politburo with exposed and repressed conspirators. He spoke of some as blind, not seeing what is happening around them, who missed the enemies in their environment. All these were phrases covering up his deception of the Party and the Central Committee and his criminal activities. It would be, perhaps, enough of the facts that I stated earlier, but I want to give a few more examples.

Ex. early RKKA intelligence officer URITSKY began to testify against the commander of the BVO - BELOV, who was summoned to Moscow, where a confrontation between BELOV and URITSKY was supposed. The confrontation was planned for the evening. Ezhov was summoned to the Kremlin to STALIN's apartment, and some time later he called me in my office and said: "We urgently need to find BELOV and ask him to come to the NKVD." To my question, where could he be, Ezhov answered in a raised tone: "Did I give you an order to set up an outdoor scene behind BELOV?" When I tried to tell Ezhov that he had not given me any instructions about this, Ezhov, without listening to me, hung up.

The audit established that no surveillance of BELOV had been established and that Ezhov had deceived the Central

Committee. The second fact that I became aware of after leaving the NKVD. Ezhov hid from the Central Committee and STALIN the testimony sent from the Georgian NKVD against LYUSHKOV and other conspirators when LYUSHKOV was appointed head of the NKVD department of the DVK.

On the instructions of Ezhov, I carried out a "verification" of these testimonies against LYUSHKOV by interrogating Yagoda. The interrogation was deliberately conducted in such a way that Yagoda did not confirm these testimonies against LYUSHKOV, while LYUSHKOV was one of his closest people. LYUSHKOV, as you know, fled abroad. Third fact. About a group of

conspirators and terrorists in the Kremlin (BRYUKHANOV, TABOLIN, KALMYKOV, VINOGRADOVA).

I don't know if it makes sense to write this, Citizen People's Commissar, since you know this, but I still consider it necessary to report that the protocol of testimony against BRYUKHANOV and others was

immediately after receiving them, it was handed over to Ezhov, left by him, allegedly for a report to STALIN and MOLOTOV. And there was a need for this, since BRYUKHANOV was the husband of VINOGRADOVA, and the latter worked to service STALIN and his secretariat. However, Ezhov, as it became known to me upon his return from the Far East, hid these materials from the party and the government for seven months.

This statement is by no means exhaustive of the facts.  
my criminal work.

In my subsequent testimony, I will fully tell the investigation everything that I know, and I will not hide a single enemy of the Communist Party and Soviet power known to me, and I will name all the people involved in anti-Soviet conspiratorial work, regardless of whether they are arrested today or not . M. FRINOVSKY April 11, 1939. Presidential

Administration of the

Russian

Federation. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 373. L. 3-44. Script. Typescript. There are Stalin's handwritten notes in the margins: \* the phrase "Roshal must be broken off" is circled, and in the margins it is written: "What does this

mean?"; \*—\* the phrase is circled, and in the margin it is written: "Who are they?"; \*\* last names are circled, and in the margin it is written: "Where are they?"; \*\*—\*\* the phrase is underlined, and in the margin it is written: "W  
\*\*\* the sentence is underlined and the margin reads "Who are they?"; \*\*\*—\*\*\* Surnames are circled and "Where are they?" written in the margin;  
\*\*\*\*

the words "shot on August 26-27" are circled, and on fields put the sign "xx".; \*\*\*\*—

\*\*\*\* the word is circled, and in the margin it is written: "What others?";

\*\*\*\*\*

the proposal is circled, and the margin reads: "Conspired? You're lying!"; \*\*\*\*\*—\*\*\*\*\*

The last name is circled, and at the end of the page it is written: "You're lying!"

**No.**

## **34 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the mine explosion**

**04/14/1939**

No. 1055

b Comrade. TO

STALIN In addition to our reports on the case of 19.III. 1939 explosion at mine No. 13 bis of the Sovetskugol trust, we send the protocols of interrogations of the arrested:

1. YASENEV Pavel Fedorovich, former head of ventilation of mine No. 13 bis, and 2.

IVANOV Vasily Nikolaevich, ex. chief mechanic of that or mines.

Yasenev testified that he was recruited into the anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist organization in 1934 by the former manager of the Uralmedruda trust, D.P. FEDORAYEV. (convicted).

On the instructions of FEDORAYEV, YASENEV organized a number of acts of sabotage at the Tsentralnaya mine of Uralmedrudy.

After being fired twice from work for sabotage in 1936, Yasenev moved to the Donbass and took the post of head. mine them. Kirov trust "Sovetskugol". Here, on enemy work, he

contacted b. manager of the trust "Sovetskugol" IVANOV S.A. (arrested), on whose instructions he again spent at the mine. Kirov a number of wrecking acts.

In May 1938, by order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, Yasenev was removed from work for the third time for not fulfilling the plan and moved to mine No. 19/20 of the same trust as an assistant to the head of the section.

However, even here Yasenev was fired after three months "how done the job."

In September 1938, through the former. pom. chief engineer of the trust "Sovetskugol" MIKHAILENKO S.E. (arrested in the same case)

Yasenev got a job as head of the ventilation of mine No. 13 bis of the Sovetskugol trust. At this mine, he contacted the participants

of the sabotage organization V.N. IVANOV. and MIROSHNICHENKO K.I. (arrested), together with whom he committed an explosion on March 19, 1939. IVANOV V.N. testified that he was recruited into the anti-Soviet organization by Sovetskugol Ivan Efimovich PRIMAKOV (not

arrested) in January 1939.

main

mechanic

trust

On the instructions of PRIMAKOV, and then b. Chief Engineer of Mine No. 13 bis ENA L.A. (arrested) IVANOV carried out several acts of sabotage on the mechanisms of mine No. 13 bis. March 17, 1939 IVANOV from PRIMAKOV received the task

organize an explosion with human casualties.

The testimonies of all the direct perpetrators of the act of sabotage - MIROSHNICHENKO, YASENEV and IVANOV - about the organization and conduct of the explosion coincide. The investigation continues. Appendix: according to the text.

People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs L. BERIA Published

without an appendix. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D.

374. L. 48-50.

Script. Typescript

**No. 35**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the renaming of the district of the city of Sverdlovsk**

**04/17/1939**

263 - On the renaming of the Yezhovsky district of the city of Sverdlovsk into the district named after V.M. Molotov

Satisfy the request of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to rename the Yezhovsky district of the city of Sverdlovsk into the area named after V.M. Molotov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1008. L. 59. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 1.



**No.**

**36 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the  
interrogation of the head of the security  
department of the NKVD of the USSR I.Ya. Dagina [12]**

***04/20/1939***

No. 1123 /

b To Comrade Stalin

At the same time, I am sending you the protocol of interrogation dated April 14, 1939  
the arrested head of the security department of the NKVD of the USSR Dagin  
I.Ya. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. BERIA AP  
RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 375. L. 1. Original. Typescript. Published without  
interrogation protocol.

**No.**

## **37 Post by L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about N.I. Yezhov with an interrogation protocol**

**04/27/1939**

No. 1268/b

Top secret Comrade STALIN

At the same time I am

sending you the protocol of interrogation of Yezhov dated April 26, 1939. The  
interrogation

continues. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria

### **INTERROGATION PROTOCOL**

OF THE ARRESTED EZHOV NIKOLAY IVANOVICH dated April 26,

1939 EZHOV N.I., born in

1895, a native of the mountains. Leningrad, a former member of the CPSU (b) since  
1917. Prior to arrest - People's Commissar of Water Transport. **QUESTION:** During the  
previous interrogation, you

testified that for ten years you were doing espionage work in favor of Poland. However,  
you have hidden a number of your espionage connections. The investigation requires you to  
provide truthful and exhaustive testimony on this matter.

**ANSWER:** I must admit that, having given truthful testimony about my espionage work  
in favor of Poland, I really concealed my espionage connection with the Germans from the  
investigation. **QUESTION:** For what purpose did you try to

divert the investigation from your espionage connection with the Germans? **ANSWER:** I  
did not want to show during the

investigation about my direct espionage connection with the Germans, especially since  
my cooperation with

German intelligence is not limited to espionage work on behalf of German intelligence, I organized an anti-Soviet conspiracy and prepared a coup d'etat by terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government.

**QUESTION:** Show about all your spy connections that you tried to hide from the investigation, and the circumstances of your recruitment.

**ANSWER:** As an agent of German intelligence, I was recruited in 1934 under the following circumstances: in the summer of 1934 I was sent abroad to Vienna for treatment to Professor

NORDEN. **QUESTION:** Who is

NORDEN? **ANSWER:** NORDEN, a German by nationality, who for reasons unknown to me moved from Frankfurt to Vienna, is a prominent specialist in medical science, is a co-owner of many sanatoriums not only in Austria, but also in some other European countries.

Patients from a number of countries of the world, including many senior officials from the USSR.

**QUESTION:** Who exactly?

**ANSWER:** How much I know, CHUBAR, GAMARNIK, YAKIR, \*WEINBERG\*, METALIKOV were treated by NORDEN.

**QUESTION:** Who recruited you?

**ANSWER:** I was recruited for cooperation with German intelligence by Dr. ENGLER, who is a senior assistant to NORDEN. **QUESTION:** It is not clear what relation

Dr. Engler has to the work of German intelligence? **ANSWER:** To answer this question in

detail, I ask permission to tell me about the circumstances under which I was recruited by ENGLER. **QUESTION:** Speak. **ANSWER:** Upon my arrival in Vienna at

the end of July 1934,

I was placed in the most comfortable cottage, a sanatorium. In the third week of my stay in the sanatorium, I entered

into an intimate relationship with a nurse, whose name I do not remember. Everything went well the first night, but on her next watch, Dr. Engler unexpectedly entered the room, found me in an obscene form with a nurse and raised a scandal. He immediately

I called my sister, she ran out of the room screaming, and Engler began to explain himself to me in broken Russian. He said: "We have never had

such a scandalous case in the sanatorium, this is not a brothel for you, you spoil the good name of our sanatorium. There are scientists from all over the world here, and you are doing such things. You will have to check out of the sanatorium, and we will bring this ugly fact to the attention of our authorities. I can't guarantee that this scandalous story will not appear in print." I begged Engler not to do this and offered him money. ENGLER flared up even more and defiantly left. On the second day, I

myself drove up to Engler to apologize for his rudeness, for the money that I offered him, declaring that I wanted to settle the whole matter amicably. In

a tone that allowed no objections, Engler suggested to me: "Either you will continue to cooperate with the Germans, or we will discredit you in the press. Choose."

Engler immediately told me that he knew perfectly well who I was, what I was doing in the USSR, and what position I occupied in the party (I was then the head of the industrial department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and deputy chairman of the

Party Control Commission). I was puzzled and realized that the nurse, according to a premeditated plan, had been substituted for me, and asked Engler for permission to think. He agreed. Since I was in no hurry to resolve

this issue, on the second or third day Engler himself came up to me and asked: "Well, have you thought about what you decide to do?" I again tried to beg him to settle it with kindness, without any scandalous stories. He flatly refused. ENGLER bluntly stated that he would report this story to the president of the police that same day, and tomorrow my ugly behavior would be reported in the Austrian press. "Please note," continued Engler, "that in addition to debauchery in the sanatorium, you were also engaged in bribing our employees."

I decided to agree to Engler's proposal. **QUESTION:** The stated circumstances of your recruitment of the German intelligence does not inspire confidence.

It is incomprehensible and strange that you went on recruitment only for fear of publicity in the foreign press of the fact of your intimate relationship with some woman.

Tell me straight, what did German intelligence pick you up on? **ANSWER:** By that time, I had just been promoted to major political work, but the publicity of this incident would have discredited me in the USSR and, possibly, would have led to the exposure of my everyday decay. In addition, before that, as the investigation knows, I had already been connected with Polish intelligence, so I had nothing to lose.

**QUESTION:** And you made a commitment to work for the Germans?

**ANSWER:** I had to. ENGLER demanded from me a brief written commitment to cooperate with German intelligence, which I did.

**QUESTION:** So you gave a written commitment?

**ANSWER:**

Yes. **QUESTION:** Have you been given a

nickname? **ANSWER:** No.

**QUESTION:** What's next? **ANSWER:** After the recruitment was completed, I asked ENGLER to inform me with whom and how I would be associated. Engler replied that he himself was a German military intelligence officer. Communication with me, in his words, he will maintain personally. **QUESTION:** It is not clear how Engler could keep in touch with you if he lived in Vienna and you in Moscow?

**ANSWER:** The fact is that Engler intended to move to work in Moscow, taking advantage of the fact that the Lechsan administration of the Kremlin back in 1932-33. raised the question of organizing in the USSR a special sanatorium similar to Nordenovsky.

As the head doctor of this sanatorium, it was supposed to invite one of the assistants of NORDEN. Engler told me that negotiations were underway with him, and he gave his consent to move to Moscow. However, the matter was dragged out because Moscow did not accept the conditions set by Engler.

**QUESTION:** You just said that negotiations had begun with Engler regarding his transfer to work in Moscow. Who led these negotiations?

**ANSWER:**

ENGLER told me that he conducted these negotiations with METALIKOV, ex. early The medical department of the Kremlin, who came to Vienna specifically on this occasion.

**QUESTION:** What tasks did ENGLER give you after recruitment? **ANSWER:** First of all, Engler gave me the task of rendering every possible assistance in the speediest resolution of the question of his invitation to Moscow. I promised Engler to take all possible measures to expedite this

matter. **QUESTION:** Did you fulfill this requirement of ENGLER? **ANSWER:** Upon arrival in Moscow, I immediately spoke with METALIKOV and recommended that he raise this issue for resolution in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

After some time, METALIKOV informed me that the Council of People's Commissars had rejected this proposal. Then I advised METALIKOV to raise

the issue with the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided not to invite Engler to the USSR, but instead to send a group of Soviet doctors to NORDEN for practice, in order to then select specialists from among them for

the position of chief physician of the newly created Norden-type sanatorium "Barvikha". Thus, Engler's visit to Moscow did not take place. **QUESTION:** Did you hand over to ENGLER for German intelligence any information representing a specially

guarded state secret of the Soviet Union? **ANSWER:** During my direct contact with ENGLER in Vienna, and then in Bad Gastein (radioactive water resort in Austria), where he twice came to contact me, I informed Engler only about the general situation of the Soviet Union and the Red Army, in which he was especially

interested. **QUESTION:** You evade a direct answer. The investigation is interested in the question, what kind of espionage information did you pass on to ENGLER?

**ANSWER:** Within the limits of what I knew from memory, I told ENGLER everything about the state of armament and combat readiness of the Red Army, especially emphasizing the bottlenecks in the combat readiness of the Red Army. I told Engler that the Red Army was far behind in terms of artillery, both in terms of the quality of artillery weapons and in quantity, and was significantly inferior to the artillery weapons of the advanced capitalist countries.

Concerning the general economic situation in the USSR, I told Engler about the difficulties of collective-farm construction and the big problems in the industrialization of the country, dwelling in particular on the slow development of newly built enterprises. I illustrated this by the example of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, where by the time production was mastered, a significant part of the valuable equipment had already been put out of action. Consequently, I declared to ENGLER, the successes in the field of industrialization of the USSR are doubtful.

Further, I informed Engler of the enormous disproportion in the growth of individual branches of industry, which had a strong effect on the general economic situation of the country. I especially emphasized the lag in the group of non-ferrous metals and special alloys, which hampered the development of the combat effectiveness

of the Red Army. **QUESTION:** You testified that you failed to organize Engler's entry into the USSR. How did you communicate with German intelligence after your return to the USSR?

**ANSWER:** I have already shown that a decision was made to send a group of Soviet doctors to practice with NORDEN. Upon their return from Vienna, one of the doctors who practiced at NORDEN, by the name of **\*\*TAITS\*\***, set up with me, on behalf of ENGLER, a spy

connection.

**QUESTION:** When and under what circumstances was your spy connection with this doctor established?

**ANSWER:** It was around the beginning of 1935. Doctor TAITZ was always present at the consultations of sick senior officials, so I knew him well even before that. The first conversation in which he established a spy connection with me on behalf of Engler took place at my apartment, where he appeared under the pretext of another inspection. After the usual inquiries about my health, he began to tell me about his trip to Vienna. Having told about his stay at the Norden sanatorium, he told me that he had become intimately acquainted with Dr. Engler, who asked me to say hello to me as his good friend.

In talking about ENGLER, TAITZ spoke cautiously about an incident that had happened between me and a nurse in Vienna. In a joking tone, I referred to my frivolity and asked him if he knew

whether any of the other doctors who practiced with NORDEN spoke about this incident. He reassured me by declaring that no one except him and Engler knew about this incident, adding that he was aware of the "good" relations established between me and Engler. It became clear to me that he knew everything, and I directly put before him the question of what order the doctor had asked me to convey.

ENGLER. TAITZ told me that ENGLER had instructed him to contact me on espionage work, to maintain this connection until the need for this was no longer necessary, and to pass on all the information of interest to ENGLER through him.

**QUESTION:** Where is this TAITZ now?

**ANSWER:** He was arrested in 1937 and, as far as I remember, shot.

**QUESTION:** How long did your relationship with him last? **ANSWER:** Approximately throughout

1935. **QUESTION:** Where did your

appearances take place? **ANSWER:** In all cases when it was necessary for me to transfer this or that espionage information, meetings took place at my apartment. THAI came to me under the guise of checking the status of my health.

**QUESTION:** What espionage assignments did you receive from the THAI?

**ANSWER:** According to TAITZ, ENGLER was mainly interested in secret information about the weapons of the Red Army and all data on the state of the USSR's defense capability. At that time I was in charge of the industrial department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and at the same time was deputy chairman of the Party Control Commission,

which I actually supervised. There was a military group in the Party Control Commission headed by N. KUIBYSHEV. The work of the group and its materials were of a strictly secret nature, and therefore the group was subordinate to me. The materials that were compiled by the CPC military group on the status or examination of one or another type of troops and weapons were sent only to the Defense Committee and to me. As a rule, I periodically took all these documents with me to the apartment and, during a visit to the TAITZ, handed him over to him for a short time, after which he told me and returned them.



I know that TAIZ photographed most of these notes and handed over by ownership.

**QUESTION:** Did he tell you about

it? **ANSWER:** Yes, once I asked how and where he transmits the information he receives from me. TAITZ told me that he was passing this information in a photographed form to a certain person in the German embassy, who was already forwarding these photographs to German intelligence.

**QUESTION:** And how did he get into the German

embassy? **ANSWER:** In addition to his main work in the Lechsan department of the Kremlin, the doctor TAITZ also served the employees of the German in

Moscow. **QUESTION:** Do you remember the nature of the information you gave to the

TAITS? **ANSWER:**

Yes, I remember. **QUESTION:**

Be specific. **ANSWER:** During my relationship with Dr. TAITZ, I have been handed over a large number of memorandums and inquiries on issues of armaments, clothing and food supplies, the moral and political state and combat training of the Red Army. These materials provided an exhaustive numerical and factual description of one or another type of troops, types of weapons and the state of military districts. During the same time, I transmitted

to TAITZ information about the progress and shortcomings of the rearmament of military aviation, about the slow introduction of new, more advanced models of aircraft, about the accident rate of military aircraft, the plan for training flight personnel and tactical and technical data characterizing the quality and quantity of aircraft engines produced by us and aircraft.

In addition, through TAITSA, I transmitted to the German intelligence the data available to the CPC on the state of the tank armament of the Red Army. I drew the attention of the Germans to the poor quality of Soviet armor and the failure to switch tanks to a diesel engine instead of the aircraft engine used at that time.

Further, I handed over to TAITZ comprehensive data on the major shortcomings in the field of clothing and food supply and storage facilities of the Red Army. On these issues, between

By the way, a special meeting was held in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the decision of which I also brought to the attention of German intelligence. The materials I reported gave a clear picture of the situation in this important branch of the military economy. From them it was clear that at the very beginning of the war the Red Army would face serious difficulties.

I handed similar materials to Tayts about the state of chemical, small arms, engineering weapons of the Red Army, in addition, individual materials characterizing the state of combat training and the political and moral state of parts of the Leningrad, Belorussian, Volga and Central Asian military districts, which were examined by the CPC.

**QUESTION:** What was the result of your further cooperation with German intelligence? **ANSWER:**

At the beginning of 1936, at the suggestion of the Lechsan department of the Kremlin, NORDEN was invited to Moscow to consult a number of senior officials, who stayed in the USSR for 15-20 days.

Of the large number of persons consulted by NORDEN, I remember exactly GAMARNIK, YAKIR, CHUBAR, PETROVSKY, KOSIOR, WEINBERG and METALIKOV. Norden advised me as well. **QUESTION:** Have you established contact

with NORDEN on espionage work? **ANSWER:** Yes, I contacted NORDEN.

**QUESTION:** Under what circumstances?

**ANSWER:** To undergo a special clinical study, I was sent to Barvikha, where I was given a separate apartment, where I stayed for 8-10 days. On one of these days, NORDEN came to me, who conveyed greetings from ENGLER,

declaring: "Engler is pleased with your attention and is very sorry that he was not able to come to the USSR. You definitely need to go abroad again to complete the course of treatment."

I told NORDEN that I was healthy and saw no need for a special trip abroad. Then NORDEN made it clear to me that the Germans needed my trip abroad and that the matter was not so much in my desire as in the demand of German intelligence.

Then I asked NORDEN to give an appropriate opinion on the state of my health, which he did later, indicating that I needed to undergo a course of treatment in his Viennese sanatorium and consult with a number of specialists abroad. On this basis, it was decided to send me abroad for treatment again. **QUESTION:** NORDEN speaks Russian?

**ANSWER:** No. **QUESTION:** How did you communicate

with him? **ANSWER:** I communicated with him through my wife Yevgenia Solomonovna Ezhova, who spoke German, English and French. **QUESTION:** Did you travel abroad?

**ANSWER:** In the summer of 1936 I left for Vienna and again settled in the Norden sanatorium. However, there was nothing for me to do there, since in fact I no longer needed any treatment. I asked NORDEN what should I do. He recommended me to go to a resort in Merano (Italy). Before the trip to Merano, Engler said that a man to whom Engler himself was subordinate in intelligence work would have a conversation with me there.

Three or four days after my arrival in Merano, the former trade representative in Germany, KANDELAKI, who suffered from diabetes, also

arrived there. **QUESTION:** KANDELAKI came to Merano for treatment? **ANSWER:** Merano is a resort where grapes are treated, which, of course, is contraindicated for KANDELAKI's disease. **QUESTION:** What, then, was the reason for KANDELAKI's

arrival? **ANSWER:** As I learned about it later, KANDELAKA's visit to Merano, like my arrival, was connected with espionage cases, which I will show below. **QUESTION:** Will

you continue your testimony? **ANSWER:** Soon after KANDELAKI, LITVINOV arrived in Merano, and then SHTEIN, the USSR plenipotentiary in Italy, who, after staying for a couple of days, left, leaving his car to LITVINOV.

On the fifth or sixth day of my stay in Merano, KANDELAKI informed me that the prominent German General Hammerstein, accompanied by the Polish Minister of Trade, whose name I now do not remember, had arrived at our sanatorium.

Following Hammerstein, Engler also arrived in Merano. Here I consider it necessary to note the following: while walking in the park of the sanatorium, I noticed how KANDELAKI greeted Hammerstein and entered into a conversation with him.

One evening Litvinov came to see me and invited me to go with him to a cafe. LITVINOV addressed in German to GAMMERSHTEIN, who was sitting at the table next to us, and exchanged greetings with him. The next day Dr. Engler introduced me to Hammerstein. **QUESTION:** How did this happen? **ANSWER:** ENGLER came into

my room and said: "I want to examine you," and immediately he informed me that Hammerstein was to meet with me. My meeting with Hammerstein was organized by Engler under the guise of a joint walk

with Engler in Merano Park. In one of the pavilions, as if by chance, we met Hammerstein, to whom Engler introduced me, after which we

The three of us continued walking.

HAMMERSTEIN at the beginning of the conversation stated: "We are very grateful for all the services you provide us." He declared that he was pleased with the information the Germans had received from me. But, said Hammerstein, it's all nonsense! Your position in the USSR such that we cannot be satisfied with the information you provide. You face other tasks, of a political nature." **QUESTION:** What are these "political" tasks?

**ANSWER:** Hammerstein, knowing that I had already been elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, declared: "You have the opportunity not only to inform us, but also to influence the policy of the Soviet government."

Further, HAMMERSTEIN informed me of a very serious, according to him, the connections that the Germans have in the circles of the high command of the Red Army, and reported the existence of several military conspiratorial groups in the Soviet Union.

HAMMERSHTEIN told me that a number of prominent military workers were dissatisfied with the situation that had developed in the USSR and set themselves the goal of changing the domestic and international policy of the Soviet

Union. The Soviet government, with its current policy, continued GAMMERSHTEIN, will inevitably lead the USSR to a military clash with the capitalist states, while this could be completely avoided if the Soviet Union, by making concessions, could "get used" to the European system. Since Hammerstein did not speak

Russian, I asked him through Engler, who played the role of an interpreter, how serious the ties between the leading circles of Germany and representatives of the high command of the Red Army were. Hammerstein replied: "Various circles of your military are connected with

us. They have the same goal, but, apparently, the points of view are different, they can't agree among themselves in any way, despite our categorical demand."

**QUESTION:** What tasks did Hammerstein give you?

**ANSWER:** HAMMERSTEIN suggested that I get in touch with these military circles, and first of all with EGOROV. He declared that he knew EGOROVA very well as one of the most important and influential figures among that part of the military conspirators who understood that without the German army, without a firm agreement with Germany, it would not be possible to change the political system in the USSR in the desired direction.

GAMMERSHTEIN suggested that I, through Egorov, be aware of all conspiratorial affairs and influence the conspiratorial groups existing in the Red Army in the direction of their rapprochement with Germany, while at the same time taking all measures to "unify" them. "Your position as Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks will help you with this," said

GAMMERSHTEIN. At this, HAMMERSTEIN said goodbye, warning that there would be a few more meetings with me.

**QUESTION:** On behalf of whom did Hammerstein speak to you?

**ANSWER:** From the Reichswehr circles in Germany. The fact is that even before Hitler came to power, an opinion was created about Hammerstein as a supporter of the rapprochement of the German army with the Red Army.

Army. In 1936-1937. HAMMERSTEIN was taken away from direct work in the Reichswehr, but since he, more than other German generals, had connections among the military workers of the USSR, he was entrusted with the conduct of the so-called. "Russian affairs".

**QUESTION:** Did you have further meetings with HAMMERSHTEIN?

**ANSWER:** Yes, I had

three more meetings with Hammerstein. At the second meeting, GAMMERSHTEIN was interested in the details related to the murder of S.M. Kirov, and the seriousness of the influence of the Trotskyists, Zinovievites and rightists in the CPSU (b). I

gave him exhaustive information, in particular, I noted the fact that confusion is now being observed among the Chekists and that Yagoda's position in connection with the murder of Kirov has been shaken. Then Hammerstein said: \*\*\* "It would be very good if you managed to take the post of BERRY" \*\*\*. I smiled, answering

that "it does not depend on me alone." My third conversation

with the German general concerned the conspiratorial work of the military in the USSR, since civil matters were of less interest to Hammerstein. The fourth and last meeting

with Hammerstein took place in a cafe. **QUESTION:** Please elaborate on your last

meeting with Hammerstein. **ANSWER:** One day KANDELAKI suggested that I go to

a typical German cafe. I agreed. Soon, at the same time, Hammerstein came into the cafe, with whom KANDELAKI greeted and then invited him to sit down at our table.

KANDELAKI about something spoke German with GAMMERSHTEIN, and then said: "It seems that you already know the general?" After my affirmative answer, Hammerstein declared that in Berlin he often met with KANDELAKI and "would be glad to convey all sorts of good wishes to me through him."

Before leaving, already saying goodbye, Hammerstein asked "Give my best regards to Alexander Ilyich" (Yegorov).

**QUESTION:** How did you understand the "good wishes" that Hammerstein decided to transmit through KANDELAKI?

**ANSWER:** I understood that KANDELAKI, like myself, was connected with HAMMERSTEIN for espionage work and would continue to serve as one of the channels of my contacts with German intelligence, especially since a few days after the departure of HAMMERSTEIN and KANDELAKI I went to Berlin, and during the time the whole stay at the resort was not treated at all.

After KANDELAKA's departure, LITVINOV began to visit me often and invite me for walks or to cafes. Once, sitting in

a cafe, LITVINOV asked me: "What impression did Hammerstein make on you?" I, somewhat embarrassed, replied: "The impression of an intelligent person." "Yes," said LITVINOV, "HAMMERSHTEIN is one of the most intelligent and far-sighted generals of the Reichswehr. The military circles of Germany are very strongly considered with him, Hammerstein enjoys great influence in the

army. I remember that the conversation with Litvinov took place in the presence of my wife, Evgenia

Solomonovna. After dancing the foxtrot, LITVINOV carried on with me a rather strange conversation. He said: "Here we are decomposing, we go to restaurants, we dance, and if the USSR finds out about this, a whole storm will rise."

To my perplexed question, LITVINOV replied: "There is nothing terrible here, but, you see, we have no culture, our statesmen have absolutely no culture whatsoever."

"So you made the acquaintance of General GAMMERSHTEIN," continued LITVINOV, "and what is in this acquaintance, except for the benefit to the Soviet Union? If our political leaders had a connection with European politicians, then many sharp corners in relations with foreign countries would be smoothed out. But you will return to Moscow, and you can be worked for getting to know HAMMERSHTEIN.

This ended the conversation with Litvinov. Soon I left Merano for Paris, from there I traveled by car to Rome and returned by train to Vienna.

**QUESTION:** Was this trip related to your espionage work?

**ANSWER:** No.

**QUESTION:** You have initiated your wife into the spying nature of your meetings with Hammerstein?

**ANSWER:** No, I didn't tell her that then, I spoke about the nature of the connection with Hammerstein later.

**QUESTION:** You will tell about this when you touch on the espionage activities of your wife Yevgenia Solomonovna EZHOVA, and now you will move on to your practical work in carrying out the assignments of HAMMERSHTEIN.

**ANSWER:** In a

conversation with GAMMERSHTEIN, it was stipulated that I would have to communicate with him through EGOROV and KANDELAKI during the latter's visits to Moscow. Shortly after returning to Moscow, I invited

Egorov to my dacha and began to probe him if he knew about my connection with Hammerstein, but since Egorov did not say anything specific, I did not open up to him this time.

However, in the winter of 1936, Egorov himself called me and said that he wanted to talk to me about one serious matter. On a day off,

he came to my dacha, and the first conversation took place between us, in which Egorov told me that he already knew about my meeting with GAMMERSHTEIN, with whom he himself had long connected.

Our conversation was interrupted by the unexpected appearance of guests at my dacha, in view of which we agreed with Egorov to continue the conversation we had begun in the next few days.

**QUESTION:** Did the next meeting with Egorov take place? **ANSWER:**

Yes. Three or four days later Egorov came to see me again and this time told me in detail about the existence in the Red Army of a group of conspirators, consisting of major military workers and headed by him - Egorov.

EGOROV further named to me as members of BUDENNY, DYBENKO, the KASHIRIN, FEDKO, groups: conspiratorial SHAPOSHNIKOV\*, commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District, and a number of other major commanders, whose names I will remember and name additionally. Further, Egorov said that in the Red Army there are two more competing groups: the Trotskyist group



Gamarnik, Yakir and Uborevich and the Bonapartist officer group of TUKHACHEVSKY.

**QUESTION:** You will tell in detail about the nature and composition of each group separately later, and now describe your further conversation with Egorov around Hammerstein. **ANSWER:** In a

conversation with Egorov, I told him in detail about all my meetings and negotiations with Hammerstein, warning him that I already knew from Hammerstein himself that there were several conspiratorial groups in the Red Army.

Immediately I conveyed to Egorov that Hammerstein sees as one of our main tasks the unification of all military conspiratorial groups into a single powerful organization for the more successful implementation of the plans of the anti-Soviet conspiracy. I said,

that I will do everything in my power to complete the task

HAMMERSTEIN.

EGOROV informed me that he, too, was connected in espionage work with HAMMERSHTEIN, that this connection was made through the military attache at the German embassy in Moscow, KESTRING. Then Egorov promised to connect me with Koestring, which happened in the same 1936.

**QUESTION:** How did you contact Koestring? **ANSWER:** At the end of 1936, shortly after my appointment as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Egorov came to me and said that Koestring, on behalf of Hammerstein, wanted to see me personally as soon as possible. Since I was always accompanied by security, I said that it was necessary to somehow prepare this meeting in order to avoid unnecessary suspicion. To do this, I decided to take advantage of the upcoming inspection of the dacha provided to me along the Leningradskoye Highway, which previously belonged to Yagoda. I agreed with Egorov that, having left with Koestring, he would make an emergency stop of the car near my dacha on the day of my inspection of this dacha, and I would accidentally invite him and Koestring to me for a bite to eat. Egorov approved my version of the meeting with Koestring.

On the appointed day, Egorov, together with Koestring, dressed in civilian clothes, drove up to my dacha and made an emergency stop nearby. Allegedly, having accidentally noticed Egorov at the car, I

invited him, together with Koestring, to inspect my new dacha. Egorov and Koestring agreed, and we went to the dacha.

At breakfast the following conversation took place between me and Koestring. Koestring, having introduced himself, declared: "I have received the task of speaking with you personally and establishing a complete mutual understanding of our common tasks."

**QUESTION:** KESTRING speaks Russian?

**ANSWER:** Yes, he is fluent in Russian. Then Koestring told me that my appointment as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs opened the prospects for "unifying all those dissatisfied with the existing system, that by leading this movement, I will be able to create an impressive force." Koestring said: "We,

the military, argue as follows: for us, the decisive factor is military force. Therefore, the first task that, as it seems to us, is before us is the unification of military forces in the interests of a common cause. It is necessary to strengthen your influence in the Red Army in every possible way in order to direct the Russian army at a decisive moment in accordance with the interests of Germany.

Koestring especially emphasized the necessity of focusing on the Egorov group. He said that "Alexander Ilyich is the most worthy figure who can be useful to us, and his group, in its aspirations, fully meets the interests of Germany."

This explains why later in my practical work in the NKVD I did everything possible to prevent the failure of the Yegorov group, and only thanks to the intervention of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) Egorov and his

group were exposed. **QUESTION:** That was the end of your conversation with Koestring? **ANSWER:** No, Koestring touched the NKVD. He said: "In the general plan of the tasks that confront us, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs must play a decisive role. Therefore, for the success of the coup and coming to power, you need to create in the NKVD a broad organization of your like-minded people, who must be united with the military. Koestring declared that these organizations, both in the army and in the NKVD, must be prepared in such a way as to ensure a united action for the purpose of seizing

power by the beginning of the war. **QUESTION:** What was Egorov doing at that time?

**ANSWER:** Egorov listened to Koestring and, together with me, agreed with his proposals.

The conversation lasted an hour and a half or two, after which Egorov took Koestring with him

and left. **QUESTION:** Did you communicate with German intelligence only through KESTRING?

**ANSWER:** No, I also maintained contact with German intelligence through KANDELAKI.

**QUESTION:** Tell us in detail about your meetings with KANDELAKI.

**ANSWER:** In

the spring of 1936, KANDELAKI came to Moscow from Germany, met with me, he conveyed greetings from Hammerstein and directly started a conversation with me that, being closely connected with the German government circles in the person of Göring, he heard from authoritative sources that great importance is attached to my political, as he put it, cooperation with the Germans and that the ruling circles of Germany place great hopes on my cooperation.

**QUESTION:** What specific tasks did German intelligence set before you through KANDELAKI? **ANSWER:** KANDELAKI

informed me in detail about the subversive work that he is carrying out as the trade representative of the USSR in Berlin, by concluding treaties unfavorable for the USSR with the German government. **QUESTION:** You are not

being asked about that. Do not twist, answer directly: did you carry out espionage communications with German intelligence through KANDELAKI?

**ANSWER:** Yes,

KANDELAKI was, as it were, the control link of the German intelligence with me. He asked me about my progress

fulfillment

delivered

before

assignments, GAMMERSHTEIN, and upon returning to Berlin, according to him, he passed the information received from me to GAMMERSHTEIN and GOERING.

**QUESTION:** What exactly did KANDELAKI tell you about his connection with GOERING?

**ANSWER:** In one of the meetings with me, at the end of 1936 or the beginning of 1937, KANDELAKI told me that he, through Hammerstein

contacted Goering.

GOERING instructed KANDELAKI upon his arrival in the Soviet Union to inform the Soviet government that he, KANDELAKI, allegedly managed to put pressure on the German government in the sense of granting a loan to the USSR and that the Minister of Economy of MINES, under pressure from German business circles, was ready to make some concessions and provide the Soviet Union loans. KANDELAKI further said that

GOERING had been informed by HAMMERSHTEIN about my collaboration with German intelligence and asked me to facilitate the conclusion of a loan agreement between the USSR and Germany. **QUESTION:** Why was your

assistance required in concluding this agreement? **ANSWER:** Because it fully corresponded

to the interests of Germany alone and was directed towards strengthening the export from the USSR of raw materials needed for the German war industry. **QUESTION:** What did you do to carry out the assignment of the

Germans? **ANSWER:** I promised KANDELAKI support and really talked with ROZENGOLTS about the expediency of concluding such an agreement. As a result, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade gave its positive opinion on this agreement.

**QUESTION:** How did your espionage work go on? **ANSWER:**

In the summer of 1937, after the trial of TUKHACHEVSKY, EGOROV, on behalf of German intelligence, put before me the question of the need to organize all conspiratorial work in the army and the NKVD in such a way that it would be possible, under certain conditions, to seize power without expecting war, as this was agreed upon in the original plan.

Egorov said that the Germans motivated this change by fear that the defeat of the anti-Soviet formations in the army that had begun would not reach us, i.e. before me and Egorov.

According to Egorov, the Germans offered our specific comments on this matter as soon as possible.

Having discussed the situation with Egorov, we came to the conclusion that the party and the masses of the people are following the leadership of the CPSU(b) and the ground for this coup has not been prepared. Therefore, we decided that it was necessary to remove STALIN or MOLOTOV under the flag

any other anti-Soviet organization in order to create conditions for my further advancement to power. After that, having assumed a more leading position, the opportunity will be created for a further, more decisive change in the policy of the Party and the Soviet government in accordance with the interests of Germany.

I asked EGOROV to convey to the Germans, through Koestring, our considerations and to request the opinion of German government circles on this matter. **QUESTION:**

What answer did you get? **ANSWER:**

Shortly thereafter, according to Koestring, Egorov informed me that the German government circles agreed with our proposal. **QUESTION:** What have you done to implement

your  
treacherous intentions?

**ANSWER:** I decided to organize a conspiracy in the NKVD and involve people in it, through whom I could carry out terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government.

**QUESTION:** Did you decide to put together a conspiratorial organization in the NKVD only after your conversation with Egorov?

**ANSWER:** No. In fact, the situation was as follows: long before this conversation with Egorov, when I was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, I took with me to the NKVD a group of workers who were closely connected with me in counter-revolutionary work. Thus, my testimony that I began to organize a conspiracy should be understood only in the sense that, in connection with

negotiations with HAMMERSHTEIN and the establishment of contact with the military conspirators, it was necessary in the NKVD to expand more widely, speed up, cobble together a conspiratorial organization in the NKVD itself. **QUESTION:**

Name

exactly which of the persons connected with you in counter-revolutionary work did you take with you to the NKVD? **ANSWER:** LITVIN,

TSESARSKY, SHAPIRO, ZHUKOVSKY  
and RYZHOV.

**QUESTION:** Which of the old workers of the NKVD was involved by you in anti-Soviet conspiracy?

**ANSWER:** Already being the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, after a certain period of time, from among the employees of the NKVD, I was

former members of the conspiratorial organization in the NKVD, both Yagodinetsy and North Caucasians, were approached, and many were promoted to

responsible work. All these three groups of conspirators were led by me. **QUESTION:** Name the members of these

conspiratorial groups in the NKVD. **ANSWER:** 1. The members of the group, which was created by me personally, were: LITVIN, TSESARSKY, SHAPIRO,

ZHUKOVSKY and RYZHOV; 2. The conspiratorial group of "North Caucasians" included: FRINOVSKY, DAGIN, YEVDOKIMOV (although YEVDOKIMOV was not an employee of the NKVD, I will especially give exhaustive evidence about him and his group of NKVD workers);

3. The third group of conspirators consisted of BELSKY\*, USPENSKY, ZHURBENKO\*, REIKHMAN, LYUSHKOV\*, PASSOV, GENDIN and YARTSEV\*.

Even before I involved them in anti-Soviet work, these persons were members of a conspiratorial organization headed by Yagoda and Balitsky. I kept these

cadres of conspirators and involved them at different times in the anti-Soviet work in the NKVD, which was carried out under my

leadership. About all the members of this group, I will give exhaustive testimony for each separately.

**QUESTION:** Have you brought the persons listed above up

to date? **ANSWER:** Yes, I informed each of these persons in one way or another about the organization of the conspiracy, the goals and objectives that we pursued. In general, they all knew about the existence of the conspiracy and carried out the instructions given to them in anti-Soviet conspiratorial work. I gave each of them the task of expanding our organization by involving people capable of unconditionally carrying out all our instructions on anti-Soviet work. As for

Evdokimov and Frinovsky, the latter were fully informed by me about the conspiracy, they knew absolutely everything, including my connections with a group of military conspirators of the Red Army and the military circles of Germany.

**QUESTION:** The investigation warns you that you will

interrogated separately, and now show how you subsequently maintained contact with German intelligence? **ANSWER:** I continued to communicate with the German intelligence service through Koestring.

**QUESTION:** Where

did your appearances with Koestring take place? **ANSWER:** At the secret apartment of the NKVD on Gogol Boulevard \*\*\* (the former mansion of BALITSKY) \*\*\*. **QUESTION:** How many visits to Koestring did you have, how were these visits organized? **ANSWER:** I had two visits to the safe house with Koestring.

By agreement with me, KOESTRING came to this apartment \*\*\* under the name "IVANOV" \*\*\*. The attendants of the apartment were warned in advance by me about the unimpeded passage of "IVANOV".

**QUESTION:** Did the attendants know who "IVANOV"?

**ANSWER:** No, no one knew about my meetings with Koestring.

**QUESTION:** Specify external signs of KESTRING? **ANSWER:**

KOESTRING - above average height, normal build, with a typical German face, even nose, prominent chin, shaves his beard, wears a mustache. **QUESTION:** Describe the content of your conversations

with Koestring. **ANSWER:** The fact is that not long before the second meeting with KÖSTRING, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks received a statement against EGOROV exposing EGOROV in anti-Soviet conversations. As a result of a specially conducted verification of this statement, Egorov was relieved of his post and transferred to work in the Transcaucasian Military District. Egorov was acutely worried about his dismissal of the First Deputy People's

Commissar of Defense and considered this fact as the beginning of his exposure. In a conversation with Koestring, I informed him of Egorov's removal from his post, to which

Koestring suggested that I keep Egorov from exposure at all costs.

I also informed Koestring that I had created a conspiratorial organization in the NKVD of the USSR, which was successfully carrying out its subversive work. Koestring approved my

events, after which we began to agree on the procedure and forms of our further communication.

**QUESTION:** What did you agree on?

**ANSWER:** KOESTRING offered me, if necessary, to resort to the mediation of FEDKO, who was also involved in espionage work and to whom KOESTRING had official access as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. **QUESTION:** Why did you need to keep in touch with KOESTRING through an

extra intermediate link if you were directly connected with him. You are not talking about something.

The investigation requires you to stop slacking off and give the truth.  
indication.

**ANSWER:** Such a proposal did not come from me, but from KOESTRING, and here's why. By agreement with Koestring, I maintained constant contact with him through Egorov, and only in exceptional cases could a direct meeting with me be arranged. This order of communication was dictated by considerations of secrecy. After Egorov's departure

for work in the Transcaucasus, KOESTRING wanted to use FEDKO instead of EGOROV to contact me, who, due to his position, had the opportunity to fearlessly meet with KOESTRING, but, since I did not even know FEDKO, he agreed to have, in principle, an intermediate person for communication with the Germans, nevertheless, he rejected the candidacy of FEDKO.

**QUESTION:** On whom did you stop? **ANSWER:**

I personally did not nominate anyone and asked before the next meeting to give me the opportunity to think and name the appropriate face.

**QUESTION:** Who did you target?

**ANSWER:** I didn't personally target anyone. At the next meeting with Koestring, which took place around July 1938, Koestring named several people through whom he considered it possible to establish contact with me. As signalmen, KESTRING suggested: Zakhar BELENKY, ZHUKOVSKY

(my former deputy) and KHOZYAINOV, deputy head of the Naval Directorate of the People's Commissariat for Water Transport.



**QUESTION:** Which of them did you use to communicate with Koestring?

**ANSWER:** I settled on the candidacy of Khozyainov.

**QUESTION:** Why?

**ANSWER:** Because I knew BELENKY as a talkative, disorganized person, and ZHUKOVSKY was known for his past connections with the Trotskyists. I preferred KHOZYAINOV to them, with whom I had the opportunity to meet at the Narkomvod at any time under the guise of business relations. **QUESTION:** That was the end of your conversation with

Koestring? **ANSWER:** No, I informed KOESTRING about further arrests among military workers, stating that it was not in my power to prevent these arrests, in particular, I informed about the arrest of EGOROV, which could entail the failure of the entire plot.

Koestring was extremely disturbed by all these circumstances. He sharply put before me the question that either now it is necessary to take some measures to seize power, or you will be defeated one by one. Koestring again returned to our old plan of the so-

called "short strike" and demanded its speedy implementation. **QUESTION:** You will be interrogated about your villainous intentions, and now continue your testimony about

further espionage connections with the HOST. Have you established contact with the OWNER?

**ANSWER:** Yes, I established a connection with HOSTIANOV. At one of my frequent service meetings with him, in my office at the People's Commissariat for Water Transport, I asked Khozyainov if he had been abroad. He answered in the affirmative, stating that through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade he worked in the London, and then in the Berlin trade missions. Since Khozyainov did not tell me anything else, I realized that he had not yet been warned by Koestring.

A few days later, while at my lecture, Khozyainov asked about the reasons for my interest in his work abroad. In the same conversation, Khozyainov informed me that he had instructions from the Germans to contact me. I gave my consent.

**QUESTION:** Did he name the OWNERS of KESTRING for you?

**ANSWER:** No, as far as I understood KOESTRING when listing the names of BELENKY, ZHUKOVSKY and KHOZYAINOV, the latter were connected with German intelligence through another employee of the embassy, but not KOESTRING, who carried out intelligence work only along the military line, the listed persons were used along the line of general espionage. **QUESTION:** Have you had more

meetings with KESTRING? **ANSWER:** Personally, I never met Koestring again. IN

further communication between us was carried out through Khozyainov.

**QUESTION:** Did KHOZYAINOV know about the terrorist acts you were preparing against the leaders of the party and government? **ANSWER:**

Yes, I knew. Khozyainov was informed about this not only by me, but also by German intelligence, since at the very first meeting after the establishment of communication between us, Khozyainov gave me the directive of the Germans: to speed up the commission of terrorist acts by all means.

In addition, KHOZYAINOV gave me instructions from German intelligence that, in connection with my release from work in the NKVD and the appointment of Beria as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, German intelligence considers it necessary to kill one of the members of the Politburo and, thus, provoke the new leadership of the NKVD. In the same

period, arrests of active participants in the conspiracy led by me began in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, and then we came to the conclusion that it was necessary to organize a demonstration on November 7,

1938. **QUESTION:** Who is

"we"? **ANSWER:** I AM EZHOV, FRINOVSKII, DAGIN and

EVDOKIMOV. **QUESTION:** What was the expression of your speech on November 7,

1938? **ANSWER:**

In the putsch. **QUESTION:** Specify

what kind of coup? **ANSWER:** The hopelessness of the situation led me to despair, pushing me to any adventure, if only to prevent the complete failure of our conspiracy and my exposure.

FRINOVSKII, Evdokimov, Dagin and I agreed that on November 7, 1938, at the end of the parade, during the demonstration, when

the troops will disperse, by appropriate formation of columns to create a "cork" on Red Square. Taking advantage of the panic and confusion in the columns of demonstrators, we intended to scatter bombs and kill one of the members of the government. **QUESTION:** How were the roles distributed among you?

**ANSWER:** I, EZHOV, FRINOVSKY and YEVDOKIMOV, were involved in the organization and leadership of the coup, but as for terrorist acts, their practical implementation was entrusted to DAGIN. Immediately I must make a reservation that I negotiated with each of them separately.

**QUESTION:** Who was to shoot? **ANSWER:**

DAGIN told me that for these purposes he prepared POPASHENKO, ZARIFOV and USHAEV, the secretary of YEVDOKIMOV, the former security officer of the "North Caucasian", about whom DAGIN spoke of as a fighting guy, quite capable of carrying out a terrorist act.

By agreement with DAGIN, on the eve of November 7, he was supposed to inform me about the specific plan and the direct perpetrators of the terrorist acts. However, on November 5, Dagin and other conspirators from the security department, including POPASHENKO and ZARIFOV, were arrested. All our plans collapsed. I immediately consider it necessary to note that when on November 5 L. BERIA raised the question in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks about the arrest of conspirators from the NKVD security department, including Dagin, POPASHENKO and ZARIFOV, I did my best to defend these people and delay their arrest, motivated by the fact that, allegedly, DAGIN and the rest of the conspirators from the security department are needed to ensure order during the days of the October celebrations. Despite this, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposed to arrest the conspirators. S plans.

**QUESTION:** Please note that the investigation will require you to extradite all the conspirators and terrorists. You will not be able to hide any of these traitors. Tell me

what steps you have taken to implement terrorist attacks after the failure of your insidious plans?

**ANSWER:** In the last days of November 1938, I was released from work in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Then I finally realized that the party did not believe me and the moment of my exposure was approaching. I started looking

a way out of this situation and decided not to stop at nothing in order to: either carry out the task of German intelligence, kill one of the members of the Politburo, or flee abroad and save his own skin.

**QUESTION:** How did you think to carry out these intentions of yours? **ANSWER:** Now I have decided to personally prepare a person capable of carrying out a terrorist act.

**QUESTION:** Who did you attract for these purposes?

**ANSWER:** LAZEBNY, former security officer, head of the port department of the

People's Commissariat for Water Transport. I knew that the NKVD had testimonies against Lazebny about his involvement in anti-Soviet work, and I decided to use this circumstance

to recruit Lazebny. During one of the meetings in my office in the People's Commissariat of Transportation, I informed LAZEBNY that there were compromising materials against him in the NKVD, that he would be arrested not today,

tomorrow, and that he was in danger of death. I said to LAZEBNY: "You have no choice, you still die, but by sacrificing yourself, you can save a large group of people." In response to appropriate questions from LAZEBNY, I informed him that the assassination of STALIN would save the situation in your consent.

**QUESTION:** What reason did you have to have such a frank conversation with Lazebny?

**ANSWER:** In general, Lazebny has recently been walking around as if lowered into the water, was in a state of hopelessness and more than once expressed the idea of suicide. So he accepted my offer without hesitation. LAZEBNY even agreed that after carrying out a terrorist act at the scene of a crime to commit suicide.

**QUESTION:** Who else,

besides LAZEBNY, have you recruited as terrorists? **ANSWER:** In addition to LAZEBNY,

I trained my old friends as terrorists - Vladimir Konstantinovich KONSTANTINOV, head of the Voentorg of the Leningrad Military District, and Ivan Nikolaevich DEMENTYEV - assistant chief

guards of the Leningrad factory "Svetoch", who gave me their full consent to commit a terrorist act on my instructions.

**QUESTION:** Why exactly on DEMENTIEVE and KONSTANTINOV you opted for terrorists?

**ANSWER:** In addition to a long personal friendship with KONSTANTINOV and DEMENTEV, I was connected with them by physical intimacy. As I already reported in my statement addressed to the investigation, I had vicious relations with KONSTANTINOV and DEMENTEV, i.e. pederasty. **QUESTION:**

You will be interrogated separately about the circumstances of the recruitment of KONSTANTINOV and DEMENTIEV and the specific tasks you gave them. Now tell me, in what way did you think to make your escape abroad?

**ANSWER:** In order to prevent my inevitable arrest, I instructed Khozyainov to raise the question before the Germans about organizing my flight abroad. A few days later Khozyainov informed me that the Germans did not agree to transfer me to Germany and offered to stay in the USSR and continue their anti-Soviet work. **QUESTION:** Well, did you agree with the

instructions of German intelligence? **ANSWER:** No, he did not agree, and,

having decided to leave for border, I decided to turn to the British for help.

**QUESTION:** What about the British? Are you connected with British intelligence?

**ANSWER:** It was not me, but my wife who was connected with British intelligence Evgenia Solomonovna Ezhova.

**QUESTION:** How do you know this?

**ANSWER:** In the spring of 1938, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks asked me about the nature of my relationship with KONARO. From this fact, I concluded that they were checking me, I began to get nervous and drink on this basis. My wife Yevgenia Solomonovna Ezhova asked me more than once about the reasons for drunkenness. Being confident in her devotion to me, I finally decided to open up to her and tell her about my anti-Soviet work and connections with Polish

and German intelligence. Reassuring me, Yevgenia Solomonovna EZHOVA informed me that she was also connected with the British intelligence agencies, th

she was involved in espionage work in favor of the British by her ex-husband GLADUN as early as 1926, when they were at work in England.

**QUESTION:** Where is GLADUN currently located?

**ANSWER:** As far as I remember, in 1937 GLADUN was head of the construction of one of the factories in Kharkov.

**QUESTION:** So GLADUN is also an English spy?

**ANSWER:** Yes, GLADUN - according to Evgenia Ezhova - is an old English spy and, as I showed above, he involved her in espionage work in favor of British intelligence.

**QUESTION:** What did Ezhova tell you about her connection with British intelligence?

**ANSWER:** EZHOVA told me that she is connected with the intelligence service of the British Foreign Office and covers the situation in the USSR, the political mood of the Russian intelligentsia. For her espionage purposes, Ezhova also used me, since I freely shared with her all the secret materials that I had.

**QUESTION:** You are lying. About your wife's connection - E.S. Ezhova and British intelligence were known to you long before 1938, and you not only knew about it, but also actively cooperated with your wife in favor of the British. On this occasion, you will have to answer before the investigation.

Tell me directly, with whom else was Ezhova connected in espionage work in the

USSR? **ANSWER:** With Zinaida GLIKINA and Mikhail KOLTSOV.

**QUESTION:** The investigation will return to the question of the nature of the espionage connection between Ezhova, Glikina and Koltsov, and now show how you wanted to resort to the help of British intelligence to organize your escape abroad?

**ANSWER:** Since my wife died in December 1938, and the Germans refused to transfer me to Germany, I myself took steps to establish contact with the British.

**QUESTION:** What steps did you take to establish contact with the English?

**ANSWER:** From the materials of the NKVD, I knew that the head of the Baltic Shipping Company in Leningrad, MELNIKOV, was associated with an English intelligence officer, a former Leningrad now convicted chief port, BRACKET. I informed

Evdokimov about these materials and suggested that he recruit MELNIKOV into a conspiratorial organization.

Soon Evdokimov informed me that he managed to recruit MELNIKOV, and he gave his consent to participate in the anti-Soviet conspiracy. Approximately towards the end of January or

the beginning of February of this year, MELNIKOV applied to me for permission to leave for England on business.

I decided to take advantage of this pretext and tell MELNIKOV about the materials known to me on his espionage connection with the British intelligence officer BRONSHTEIN. Further, I decided to tell him that I knew from the words

of Evdokimov about the participation of MELNIKOV in the anti-Soviet conspiracy, and instructed, when traveling to England, to contact the British government circles and ask on my behalf for assistance in transferring me to England, recalling that my wife E.S. . Ezhova was an employee of British intelligence. **QUESTION:** Did you have such a conversation with MELNIKOV? **ANSWER:** No, such a conversation did not take place, since by that time party

conferences had begun; I postponed MELNIKOV's assignment to England until the end of the 18th Party Congress, of which MELNIKOV was a delegate.

After the congress, I was arrested. **QUESTION:** Your testimony about MELNIKOV is unconvincing. You are completely in vain trying to hide your real connections with

British intelligence. **ANSWER:** I do not intend to hide anything from the investigation. I give me the opportunity to restore in memory everything that I know from this issue, and at the next interrogation to give truthful testimony.

**QUESTION:** The investigation established that the poisoning of your wife E.S. Ezhova, which resulted in her death, was the case

your hands.

Do you plead guilty to this? **ANSWER:** Yes,

I do. **QUESTION:** For

what purpose did you poison your wife? **ANSWER:** I was

afraid of her arrest and what she would give out during the investigation

everything she knows about my conspiratorial and espionage work.

**QUESTION:** How did you commit this poisoning? **ANSWER:**

After I was asked to divorce E.S. Ezhova and I warned her about this, she lost heart and repeatedly showed intentions to commit suicide. I arranged for her in a psychiatric sanatorium and attached to her, at her request, Zinaida GLIKINA and VIEM doctor Ekaterina GOLTS.

Soon Zinaida ORJONIKIDZE, who was visiting my wife, brought me a letter in which Ezhova informed me that she had firmly decided to take all measures to commit suicide and asked me to send her a sleeping pill. **QUESTION:** Did you fulfill Ezhova's request? **ANSWER:**

Through DEMENTYEV, mentioned by me in this

protocol, I sent her fruits, a figurine of a dwarf and a large amount of luminal, which DEMENTYEV handed over personally to E.S. Ezhova, in turn, having received a note from her to me.

**QUESTION:** What answer did DEMENTYEV give you from Ezhova?

**ANSWER:** DEMENTYEV brought me a note from Ezhova, in which she said goodbye to me.

In addition, through Zinaida Ordzhonikidze, I received the second a letter in which E.S. Ezhova said goodbye to me for the second time.

When I received this letter, Ezhova was already dead, having been poisoned by the luminal sent by me in large quantities.

**QUESTION:** Therefore, the direct culprit of the death of E.S. Ezhova are you? **ANSWER:** Yes, I

plead guilty to this. **QUESTION:** The investigation

states that you continue to stand on enemy positions and behave insincerely.

This is expressed in

what do you:

1. Keep silent about your connections with Polish intelligence after 1937

of the year;



2. Keep back on the question of your espionage work in favor of Germany; 3. You name either the  
dead or official employees of foreign embassies as persons involved in your conspiratorial  
and espionage work;

4. You hide the persons who, together with you, led the treacherous work of organizing  
a counter-revolutionary coup in the USSR. Please note that on all these issues you will be

interrogated, and you will have to give exhaustive testimony. The interrogation  
is interrupted. Written down  
from my words correctly, read by me. N. Ezhov was interrogated:  
early.

investigators

KOBULOV pom. early follow-up

SCHWARTSMAN st. investigator

SERGIENKO AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D.

375. L. 122-164. Script.

Typescript.

There are Stalin's handwritten notes in the margins: \* surname  
circled; \*—\* the surname is circled, and

in the margin it is written: "Trade union? Ask: 1. Weinberg = bastard. 2. Metalikov =  
scoundrel. 3. Where is doctor Thais? \*\*—\*\* The surname is circled, and in the margin it is  
written: "Where is he? In Barvikha";

\*\*\*—\*\*\* the phrase is underlined.

## **No. 38**

# **Decree of the Politburo of the KC of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on awarding employees of the NKVD with the appendix of a draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and a note by L.P. Beria [13]**

**04/29/1939**

81 - On the awarding of Kireev I.M., Rudakova A.G., Fedotova P.V., Balashova I.A., Loskutova P.A. and etc.

Approve the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (see Appendix).

DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR On the awarding of vol. Kireeva I.M., Rudakova A.G., Fedotova P.V., Balashova I.A., Loskutova P.A. and others.

For the successful completion of a special task to award: THE ORDER OF THE "RED BANNER" 1. Ivan

Maksimovich KIREEV, 2. Alexander Grigorievich RUDAKOV, 3. Petr Vasilyevich FEDOTOV. THE ORDER OF THE "RED STAR" 1. BALASHOV Ivan

Aleksandrovich, 2. LOSKUTOV Petr Alekseevich, 3. SOSHNIKOV Ilya Dmitrievich.

THE ORDER OF HONOR 1. Illarion Avksentieievich GAGUA 2. Vladimir

Matveyevich MALKOV 3. Yakov Naumovich MATUSOV, 4. Leonid Fedorovich RAYKHMAN

Chairman of the Presidium of the

Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. KALININ

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. GORKIN

Moscow, Kremlin  
April 29, 1939

Copy

Top Secret The Central  
Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN The NKVD of the USSR asks for your decision to award orders for the successful completion of a special task of the Government of the USSR to a number of NKVD employees who took a particularly active part in the search and arrest of a state criminal - the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR A.I. USPENSKY. , who went underground on November 14, 1938 and until April 16, 1939, was hiding in different cities of the Union under the surname SHMASHKOVSKY I.L.

THE ORDER OF THE "RED

BANNER" 1. KIRIEVA Ivan Maksimovich, sergeant of state security.

2. RUDAKOV Alexander Grigorievich, State Security. 3.                      sergeant  
Pyotr Vasilyevich

FEDOTOV, major of state security. THE ORDER OF THE "RED  
STAR" 1. BALASHOV Ivan

Alexandrovich, junior lieutenant of state security. 2. LOSKUTOV Petr  
Alekseevich,

lieutenant of state security. 3. SOSHNIKOV Ilya Dmitrievich, Captain of  
State Security. THE ORDER OF HONOR 1. GAGUA Illarion Avksentevich,  
major of state security. 2.

MALKOV Vladimir Matveyevich, State Security. 3. MATUSOV Yakov  
Naumovich, captain of state security. 4. RAIKHMAN Leonid                      sergeant  
Fedorovich, captain

of state security. In addition, 25 employees of the NKVD, who took  
an active part in the search for USPENSKY, by order of the People's  
Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, are awarded the badges of the  
"Honorary Chekist", an extraordinary assignment of a special rank, military  
weapons and a cash prize. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR  
L. BERIA No. 1153/b April 21, 1939

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1224. L. 36. Original. Manuscript; L.  
37-39. Script. Typescript. Protocol

No. 2. On the

first sheet there is a resolution: "For. I. St.", "V. Molotov. Poskrebyshev's  
hand: "T. Andreev - for, comrade Kalinin - for, comrade Mikoyan - for, comrade  
Voroshilov - for, comrade Kaganovich - for, comrade Zhdanov - for.

The first and last paragraphs are crossed out by Stalin's hand. Left: "For  
the successful completion of a special assignment," added by Stalin: "reward."

**No. 39**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union  
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the improvement of the NKID apparatus**

***05/03/1939***

92 - On the staff of the NKID (Decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR) Beria (chairman), Malenkov, Dekanozov and Chechulin to put things in order in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, find out defects in its structure, especially in its secret part, and report daily on the results of their work to

Comrades. Molotov and Stalin. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 28a. Script.

Typescript. Protocol number 2.

**No.**

**40 Special message L.P. Berii  
I.V. Stalin with the application of the  
dopors protocol to A.N. Babulina [14]**

**05/05/1939**

No. 1513/b

Sov. secret of the

Central

Committee of the CPSU

(b) Comrade. S T A L I N U At the same time, we are sending the protocols of interrogation of the arrested: 1. BABULINA A.N. April 18, 1939 - Ezhov's nephew, before his arrest - engineer of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Motors;

2. BABULINA V.N. dated April 17, 1939 - Ezhov's nephew, before his arrest, he was a student of the Promakademiya named after V.I.

L.M. Kaganovich. Appendix:

according to the text. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

***INTERROGATION PROTOCOL***

arrested BABULIN Anatoly Nikolaevich on April 18, 1939 BABULIN A.N., born in 1911, born Kalinin region, Russian, grn of the USSR, non-partisan. Prior to his arrest, he was a mechanical engineer at the Central Research Institute of Aviation Motors.

**Question:** You were arrested for active anti-Soviet activity and during the interrogation you stated that you wanted to testify on the merits of the charge brought against you. What are you going to testify about? **Answer:**

First of all, I want to say that I put my arrest in

direct connection with the arrest of N. Ezhov.

**Question:** Why?

**Answer:** I was arrested on April 10, 1939, at the apartment of N. Ezhov, when he was not at home, and I realized that Ezhov was also arrested. Since my connection with Ezhov was of an anti-Soviet nature, I want to tell you everything that I know, but before that I ask you to allow me to dwell in more detail on my personal relationship with Ezhov.

**Question:** What exactly do you want to

say? **Answer:** I am Ezhov's nephew, and he treated me, perhaps, better than his other relatives. From 1925 to

1931 I lived with the Ezhov family and was dependent on him. When Ezhov moved to a new apartment, he left me the old apartment at 2 Neopalimovsky per. d. No. 1, apt. 3.

In 1933-34. my brother Victor and his mother came to me from Leningrad.

Although from 1931-32 I lived separately from Ezhov, I continued to visit him with my brother Viktor, and we were considered in his family with their people.

Being in close relations with Ezhov, often visiting him at his apartment and at his dacha, I, of course, knew the everyday side of his life well and even then I noticed elements of domestic and moral decay in the Ezhov family.

**Question:** What exactly was it? **Answer:**

Ezhov and his wife Yevgenia Solomonovna had an extensive circle of acquaintances with whom they were on friendly terms and were easily received in their home. The most frequent guests in Ezhov's house were: PYATAKOV; ex. director of the State Bank of the USSR - MARYASIN; ex. head foreign department of the State Bank - SVANIDZE\*; ex. trade representative in England - BOGOMOLOV\*; editor of the "Peasant newspaper" - URITSKY Semyon; KOLTISOV\* Mikhail; A. V. Kosarev; RYZHOV with his wife; Zinaida GLIKINA and Zinaida KORIMAN. In 1936-37. the circle of

Ezhov's close people was replenished with a number of former senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Of these, I remember as frequent guests of Ezhov - YAGODA \*, MIRONOV, PROKOFIEV, AGRANOV, OSTROVSKII, FRINOVSKII, LITVIN, DAGIN.

Ezhov's friendly relations with these people were based on systematic drunken orgies, which usually took place with him.  
in the

country. All these persons in 1937-38. were exposed as enemies of the people. Yezhov's wife surrounded herself with politically dubious people from among the artists and journalists, I would say, the bohemian type.

They surrounded Ezhov's wife with great attention and often gave her various expensive gifts. All this, as

far as I could be convinced from my own observations, led Ezhov and his wife to complete everyday and moral decay.

From the autumn of 1938 I was struck by the suspicious nervousness that Ezhov began to show. **Question:** On the basis of

what facts do you speak about this? **Answer:** On one of the days off, at the end of October, when I was at Ezhov's dacha, FRINOVSKII came to see him. Ezhov's wife at that time was on vacation in the Crimea. After a fair amount of drinking, FRINOVSKII was left alone with Ezhov. As my brother Viktor later told me, whom they also soon removed from the room, FRINOVSKII brought some document to Ezhov. After reviewing this document, Ezhov began to get very worried. FRINOVSKII and EZHOV talked for a long time about something in private, and the next day Ezhov, having contacted his wife

by telephone, suggested that she immediately leave for Moscow. Since that time, Ezhov's mood has changed dramatically for the worse. He began to drink more and became very nervous. A few days later, in the first days of November, Ezhov unexpectedly, at about 2 o'clock in the morning, called me to his apartment in the Kremlin. I found DAGIN at Ezhov's, and when I came in, they broke off the conversation and Dagin immediately left. Then I noticed that Ezhov was very upset. That night, Ezhov got drunk, as they say, "to hell with it." I say this because, sitting with me in the dining room, he most seriously assured me that he saw

devils on the table and on the walls of the room. **Question:** What were Dagin and Ezhov talking about when you came to the apartment? **Answer:** The content of this conversation is unknown to me, since DAGIN immediately stopped the conversation with Ezhov as soon as I appeared on



doorstep of the room. But from Ezhov's depressive mood and nervousness, I realized that this conversation had an exceptionally unpleasant character for him. This conclusion

was further strengthened by the fact that in the following days Ezhov, citing illness, did not go to work, but in reality he was healthy and drank all day long.

I tried to ask Ezhov about the reasons for his such a depressed state, but he answered me that he had "a lot of troubles", and avoided further conversation on this topic.

During the celebration of the 21st anniversary of October, I was with my relative in Leningrad, Georgy Ivanovich KIRILLOV, a garage mechanic at the Kirov Plant. Upon returning to Moscow, I found Ezhov in an even more gloomy and depressed mood. He asked me if there were portraits of him at the demonstration on November 7 in Leningrad and was interested in whether there were rumors that he might be removed from work in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. I could not get an answer from Ezhov why he was interested in all this, and I was somewhat perplexed.

In the second half of November, Ezhov did not go to work for several days, and, as his friend \* Ivan DEMENTYEV \*, who lived with him from October to December 1938, told me, Ezhov was afraid of arrest. Soon, on this subject, I had a conversation with

Ezhov's guarantor, Efimov, whom he trusted very much. I assumed that EFIMOV was aware of the reasons for Ezhov's suspicious behavior, and indeed, he told me that Ezhov was extremely concerned that in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs after the arrival of L.P. BERIA arrested Dagin, Shapiro and a number of other senior officials of the NKVD of the USSR, who were close to Ezhov.

Ezhov's state of tension increased more and more, and I drew attention to certain clearly suspicious moments in his behavior.

**Question:** What did you notice?

**Answer:** Ezhov opened the windows at night and made a draft in the apartment, and then he took a hot bath and stood at the window in his underwear. I understood that he wanted to catch a cold and get sick. When I asked why he was doing this, Ezhov did not give a direct answer, declaring: "The disease takes others, but nothing is done to me."

In the evening of November 23, Ezhov summoned me and my brothers Viktor and Sergei BABULIN to his dacha. We did not find him at the dacha, and his mother told us that Ezhov's wife had poisoned herself and her funeral took place today.

Ezhov arrived from the city late at night with Dementiev, and at supper they got very drunk. The next day, Viktor BABULIN told me that when he asked Ezhov what explains the suicide of Yevgenia Solomonovna, Ezhov answered him: "Zhenya did well that she poisoned herself, otherwise it would have been worse for her."

Since that time, i.e. since the end of November, at the request of Ezhov, my brother Viktor and I have been with him almost constantly.

**Question:** What happened next? **Answer:**

At the end of November, Ezhov, in his words, was removed from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), and after that he finally sank - he began to drink heavily and debauchery. He drank all the time together with Ivan Dementiev and talked with him for a long time about something, but what exactly they talked about, I don't know, since I didn't go into their room at that time.

Ezhov was greatly embittered by his removal from work in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and in my presence he repeatedly scolded and vilified I.V. STALIN and V.M. MOLOTOV obscene street abuse.

I remember another fact. When in January 1939 Ezhov was reprimanded by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars for neglecting work in the People's Commissariat for Water Transport, he responded to this with selective abuse at MOLOTOV.

In December 1938, when a commission was created to hand over the cases of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Ezhov systematically avoided participating in the work of the commission, telephoned the Central Committee and L.P. BERIA, declaring that he was ill and therefore could not come to hand over his cases. In reality, he was perfectly healthy, and every time he had to go to a meeting of the commission, he was nervous, cursed obscenely, delayed the departure and in the end stayed at home, giving everything free time drinking and debauchery with different women of the lung behavior.

**Question:** How do you know this?

**Answer:** In my presence, a certain PETROVA Tatyana repeatedly came to Ezhov's dacha on his call, as I heard an employee

Narkomvneshtorg, and usually stayed overnight with him. In addition,

Ezhov turned to me with a request, as he put it, "to bring girls to him," and I brought him women I knew with whom he cohabited. **Question:** What kind of women did you bring to Ezhov? **Answer:** On New Year's Eve, I

brought my friend Valentina SHARIKOVA, an employee of the machine-tool plant named after Ezhov, to Ezhov's dacha. Ordzhonikidze. Ezhov arranged a drinking bout, and SHARIKOVA stayed with him for the night. At the end of February, I invited Yezhov SYCHEVA, a worker of the People's Commissariat for Water Transport, to Ezhov's dacha, whom Ezhov took to his apartment in the Kremlin. Ezhov's anger against the leaders of the party and government increased especially sharply when, at the

Moscow Regional Party Conference, he was not chosen as a delegate to the XVIII Party Conference.

Congress.

Ezhov continued to skimp on work, often did not appear for several days at the People's Commissariat of Transportation, walked from room to room, drank and cursed obscenely at I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In the first days of the congress, Ezhov went to meetings, then he stopped attending meetings of the congress, and, as I noticed, his fear of

arrest became more acute. This went on until the last days, and although Ezhov directly told me did not say anything, I understood that he was afraid of responsibility for some grave crimes.

**Question:** For what crimes? You know more than now told. Negotiate to the end.

**Answer:** Ezhov has never spoken frankly to me, and I do not know what exactly his crimes were. But from the sum of my observations and conversation with YEFIMOV, it was clear to me that these crimes related to his work in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and that there was some kind of criminal connection between Ezhov and the enemies of the people arrested in the People's Commissariat.

In addition, I drew attention to one, albeit fragmentary, conversation between Ezhov and Dementiev, before the latter's departure for Leningrad in December 1938. **Question:** What did Ezhov and Dementiev talk about?

**Answer:** Before leaving, DEMENTYEV was at Ezhov's apartment in the Kremlin and, saying goodbye to Ezhov, told him: "Don't be discouraged, Kolya, and don't forget that my fate also depends on you, we will still

we'll show you."

Ezhov made no answer to this, and DEMENTIEV left for the station.

**Question:** You are hiding your conspiratorial work and Ezhov's known crimes. We will interrogate you about this, and you think, is it worth it for you to hide what is already known to the investigation?

The interrogation is

interrupted. Written down from my words correctly,  
read by me.

BABULIN

INTERROGATED: pom. early  
investigator of the NKVD of the  
USSR captain of the  
state. security VLODZIMIRSKIY st.

Investigator of the Investigative  
Department

of the NKVD of the USSR Lieutenant of the State. Security NEMLIHER  
AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 375. L. 61-70. Script. Typescript. On the first page  
there is Stalin's note: "Who is

Yezhov's friend Ivan Dementiev?"

\* Last name circled. \*—\* The surname is underlined, and there is a note in the margin: "V

**No. 41**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the  
state mark, refinery and management of precious metals"**

**05/10/1939**

Top secret 159

— About Goznak, the Refinery and the Administration of Precious Metals. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of

the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks To instruct the NKVD, under the personal responsibility of Comrade Beria, to urgently check the state of Goznak, the Refinery and the storerooms of the Office of Precious Metals, taking into account the facts reported by Comrade Bulganin about the disorder at these enterprises, check personnel of the entire managerial and middle level of these enterprises and prepare within 2 weeks all the necessary conditions for the transfer of these three enterprises to the

jurisdiction and responsibility of the NKVD. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162.

D. 25. L. 30.

Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 2. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Bolshakov, Bulganin.

**No.**

**42 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the  
head of the 5th department of the  
NKVD of the USSR**

**05/10/1939**

No. 1373/b

Sov. secret of the

Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN In connection with the transfer to work in the NKID and the release from work in the NKVD of the USSR Comrade. DEKANOZOV V.G., NKVD of the USSR asks to approve the head of the 5th (Foreign) department of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Fitin Pavel Mikhailovich.

Tov. FITIN currently works as a deputy head  
this department.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA  
RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1225. L. 6. Original. Typescript. There  
are resolutions on the sheet: "For. I. St.", "V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov.

"T. Mikoyan - for, comrade Kalinin - for, comrade Andreev - for,  
Comrade Kaganovich is in favor, Comrade Zhdanov is in favor." (P2 / 165 dated 12.5.39). Kalinin

**No.**

## **43 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the mine explosion**

**05/11/1939**

No. 1431/

b Sov. secret

of the

Central Committee of

the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrade STALIN In addition to our reports on the case of the explosion that took place on March 19, 1939 at

mine No. Zhirov Alexander Sergeevich, former chief engineer

of the same

trust, ENA Leonid Alekseevich, former chief engineer of mine No. 13-bis. head of capital works of the mine. Schmidt of the same trust. 1.

VASILCHIKOV testified that he was recruited into the anti-Soviet organization of the "Shakhtinites" back in 1925 by his father-in-law, a Russified German, now working as a professor at the Industrial Institute in the mountains. Stalino, - MELLER Emmanuil Fedorovich. On the instructions of the anti-

Soviet wrecking organization "Shakhtintsy" VASILCHIKOV carried out a number of wrecking acts in the mines of Donbass. In 1938, VASILCHIKOV

went to work at the Sovetskugol trust, where he established an anti-Soviet connection with the deputy. the chief engineer of the trust - MIKHAILENKO, with the chief engineer ZHIROV, and with the chief mechanic of the trust PRIMAKOV I.E.

In January 1939, wishing to expand his anti-Soviet ties through wrecking work in the Sovetskugol trust, VASILCHIKOV reestablished contact with MELLER. From MELLER

VASILCHIKOV learned that MELLER, in turn, was connected with German intelligence. VASILCHIKOV received from MELLER the task of organizing a sabotage with human casualties at mine No. 13-bis, timed to coincide with the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b).

This task VASILCHIKOV handed over to ZHIROV, MIKHAILENKO and PRIMAKOV.

In order to prepare the sabotage, the participants of the anti-Soviet organization operating at mine No. 13-bis (the chief mechanic of the mine IVANOV and the deputy chief engineer - MIROSHNICHENKO), through MIKHAILENKO and PRIMAKOV, were given the task of bringing mine No. 13-bis to an emergency by means of sabotage in the ventilation and mechanisms state, so that the explosion could later be explained by objective reasons.

March 17, 1939 VASILCHIKOV through PRIMAKOV handed over to IVANOV the task of carrying out the explosion on March 19th.

2. ZHIROV testified that MIKHAILENKO was recruited into the anti-Soviet organization at the end of 1938; together with MIKHAILENKO and VASILCHIKOV, at mine No. 13-bis, he carried out a series of wrecking acts that led the mine to an emergency state.

With regard to the preparation and implementation of the explosion, testimony ZHIROVA and VASILCHIKOVA completely coincide.

3. ENA confessed to being a member of an anti-Soviet organization that existed at the 13-bis mine, in which MIKHAILENKO was involved.

On the instructions of MIKHAILENKO, together with MIROSHNICHENKO and YASENEV, he carried out sabotage work at the mine, disrupting the coal mining plan. Thus, the testimonies of VASILCHIKOV, ZHIROV and ENA coincide with the testimonies of MIROSHNICHENKO, MIKHAILENKO, YASENEV and IVANOV sent to you earlier. IN

due to the fact that the investigation has fully established the involvement in the organization of the explosion at mine No. 13-

bis 1. \*PODDUBNY\* Fyodor Tikhonovich, assistant head of the section of mine No. 13-bis of the Sovetskugol trust (MIROSHNICHENKO, YASENEV and IVANOV are exposed as being involved in the explosion); testimony

2. \*PRIMAKOVA\* Ivan Efimovich - a lie of the chief mechanic of the Sovetskugol trust (convicted by the testimony of VASILCHIKOV,



IVANOV and ZHIROVA), the

NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to arrest these persons. As for

\* MELLER \* Emmanuil Fedorovich, professor at the Industrial Institute in the mountains. Stalino, then the materials regarding him are checked. I ask for your instructions. APPENDIX: according to the text.

People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR - Commissar

of State Security of the 1st rank L. BERIA of the AP RF. F. 3. Op.

58. D. 333. L. 194-197. Script.

Typescript.

Published without attachment. On the

first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Beria. For the arrest of Poddubny, Primakov, and also Meller. St.". There is also a note: "I gave the order for the arrest. 13/V.39. Beria. \*—\* Surnames are underlined in pencil with two lines. \* Put the sign x), and

at the end of the text there is a note: "Sent to Beria No. 181 on 13.5.39."

**No. 44**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the renaming of the ship Dalstroy**

***05/13/1939***

170 - On the renaming of the steamer Dalstroy

Approve the proposal of the NKVD to rename the steamer Dalstroy "Nikolai Yezhov" to "Felix Dzerzhinsky".

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1009. L. 35. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 2.

**No. 45**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union  
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the wives of traitors to the Motherland**

**05/13/1939**

Strictly secret

171 - Question of the

NKVD Approve the following proposal of

Comrade Beria: 1. A particularly dangerous contingent of prisoners of special departments of wives of traitors who knew about the counter-revolutionary activities of their husbands or were seen in anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary activities during their stay in the camp, transferred for further detention to the North-East, Vorkuta, Norilsk camps of the NKVD and to the camps of the Komi ASSR. 2.

Transfer the rest of the prisoners of the special departments to the general camp regime and use them for general work and for specialties.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 31. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No.

2. In the text there is a typewritten note about the mailing: "The extract was sent to Comrade Beria."

**No.**

**46 From the resolution of the Council of  
People's Commissars of the USSR "on the  
establishment of a prohibited border zone in  
the Sevastopol fortified area"**

**05/15/1939**

Strictly secret 192

— On the establishment of a forbidden border zone in the Sevastopol fortified region Approve the following draft

resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR:

"The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:

<...>

2. Introduce in the specified forbidden zone the regime established for the border regions, with all the ensuing restrictions on the entry and residence of the population.

3. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR within 2 months to expel all persons who do not have the right to reside in the restricted zones (persons not connected with work in local organizations and institutions, foreign nationals with a criminal record) from the indicated restricted area. Instruct the NKVD of the USSR to clarify the list of categories of persons subject to deportation.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 33. Original. Typescript. Protocol

No. 2. The text

contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kuznetsov, Beria, Bolshakov.

# No. 47 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about A.M. tamarina with the application of the protocol of interrogation <sup>[15]</sup>

**05/23/1939**

No. 1677/b

Sov. secret of the

Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

comrade. At the same time, I am sending to STALIN the minutes of the interrogation of the arrested former trade representative of the USSR in Poland and Iran Anton Moiseevich TAMARIN dated May 20-21, 1939.

Before the arrest of A.M. TAMARIN worked as deputy director of the literary museum of Narkompros. Appendix:

according to the text. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

## **INTERROGATION PROTOCOL**

TAMARINA Anton Moiseevich dated May

20-21, 1939 TAMARIN A.M.,

born in 1884, Jew, citizenship of the USSR, ex. member VKP(b) since 1904, until the arrest of the deputy. director of the Literary Museum of the Narkompros (until 1938, the trade representative of the USSR in Persia).

**Question:** During your previous interrogations you had the opportunity to make sure that the investigators had sufficient materials to expose you for anti-Soviet espionage work. Do you intend to testify truthfully about your crimes and betray your

accomplices? **Answer:** I am ready to give exhaustive testimony on the merits

the charges against me.

**Q:** What exactly do you want to testify about? **Answer:**

In 1934 I betrayed my homeland and became an agent of the Polish intelligence. On the instructions of this intelligence, I conducted espionage work.

**Question:** Did your wrecking anti-Soviet work consist only in espionage?

**Answer:** No, already

being a spy, I entered the right-wing Trotskyist organization operating in the system of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and carried out subversive work on the instructions of this organization.

**Question:** You obviously joined the right-wing Trotskyist organization on the instructions of Polish intelligence?

**Answer:** No. I was recruited into the anti-Soviet Right-Trotskyist organization in 1935 by ROSENGOLTS, the former year of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. However,

I must admit that, having become entangled in espionage connections, I agreed without any objections to ROSENGOLTS' offer to join this organization.

**Question:** Let's start with your espionage work. Tell me when and by whom were you recruited as a Polish intelligence agent?

**Answer:** In the fall of 1934, I was recruited into espionage work by a representative of the Polish intelligence service, Julian Brigiewicz.

**Question:** Who is BRIGEVICH and how do you know him?

**Answer:** Julian BRIGEVICH is the chairman of the Polish Soviet Chamber of Commerce in Warsaw and a representative of Polish metallurgical firms. I met BRIGEVICH in 1933

during my

trips to Poland as part of the delegation of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

He, along with other representatives of Polish industry and the Ministry of Trade, accompanied our delegation during trips around Poland, which we made in order to get acquainted with Polish industry. **Question:** How did he get you into espionage work?

**Answer:** In May 1934 I was appointed USSR trade representative to Poland and

arrived in Warsaw. Here I again ran into BRIGEVICH.

At first, our meetings were purely official, since I had to deal with him as a representative of Polish metallurgical firms and a representative of the Polish-Soviet trade

chambers.

In the future, good personal relations were established between us.  
relationship.

This led to the fact that I began to meet with BRIGEVICH not only in an official setting at the Trade Representation, but also at his apartment or in a cafe. BRIGEVICH

provided me with a number of informal services in business matters. This consisted in the fact that he informed me about the prices at which Polish metallurgical firms would agree to fulfill the orders of the Soviet Union for metal, about the possibility of increasing the export from the USSR to Poland of furs and other goods, the import of which was limited by the Polish government.

With the assistance of BRIGEVICH, I obtained permission from the Polish Ministry of Trade for additional imports into Poland of the above goods.

In turn, BRIGEVICH was interested in some information related to our trade with Poland. This information was not of a secret nature, and I considered myself obliged, by way of reciprocity, to report it to BRIGEVICH. **Question:** What information are you talking about? **Answer:**

BRIGEVICH was interested in the question of the possibility of increasing our orders to metallurgical firms, of which he was a representative. Wishing to show a courtesy to BRIGEVICH, I contacted the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Trade by telephone and gave him accurate information. **Question:** We are not interested in business, but in your espionage connections with BRIGEVICH.

**Answer:** At first I gave BRIGEVICH some information on the issues mentioned above, but then BRIGEVICH began to be interested in information of a secret nature, which was of interest to Polish metallurgical firms.

Not wanting to spoil good business and personal relations with BRIGEVICH, I considered it possible to inform him about something, but BRIGEVICH was not satisfied with this and began to demand more extensive information from me.

**Question:** What information?

**Answer:** BRIGEVICH demanded from me information that was a state secret. I had to inform him of our

export-import plans in trade with Poland, about the marginal prices at which the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade planned the sale of our goods on the Polish market, etc.

I saw that this information was of interest to the Polish government, and it became clear to me that BRIGEVICH was not acting on his own initiative, but on the instructions of Polish intelligence.

**Question:** Tell me straight, how did you know that BRIGEVICH is a Polish intelligence officer?

**Answer:** I repeat that I was convinced of this from the information that BRIGEVICH demanded of me.

This information went beyond the interests of metallurgical firms and was undoubtedly of significant value for exploration.

**Question:** Do not evade a direct answer and tell me when BRIGEVICH told you that he was a representative of Polish intelligence? **Answer:** BRIGEVICH never

told me about this, but on the basis of the above facts, I understood that he was working on assignments from Polish intelligence. **Question:** You undoubtedly knew

about this from BRIGEVICH himself and carried out espionage work for Polish intelligence on his direct assignments. **Answer:** I affirm that BRIGEVICH did not

have direct conversations about espionage work with me, but I knew that I was carrying out his espionage assignments, and, fearing exposure, carried on this work until my departure from Poland at the end of 1936.

**Question:** You acknowledged that, being the trade representative of the USSR in Poland, you were engaged not only in espionage, but also carried out subversive work as a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization into which you were

recruited by ROSENGOLTS. Tell me, under what circumstances did ROSENGOLTS

involve you in this organization? **Answer:** Upon my arrival to work in Poland in 1934, I got acquainted with the work of the Trade Representation and became convinced that our trade turnover with Poland could be significantly expanded on favorable terms for the Soviet Union.



Our exports to Poland were clearly underestimated despite the fact that we could sell a number of goods on the Polish market at higher prices than in other countries, such as

Germany. It was also more profitable for us to buy a number of imported

goods in Poland. I repeatedly addressed the chairmen of Soviet export and import associations who came to Poland and directly to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, pointing out the need to expand export-import operations with Poland by reducing our trade turnover with Germany and other countries, where we overpaid on imports and received less on exports. However, the situation remained the same, and to

my official appeals to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade I received stereotypical answers with reference to the export-import plan, which supposedly must be carried out.

In the autumn of 1934, I approached ROSENGOLTS personally with this question. To this, he told me that the existing order of trade with Poland and with other countries was dictated by trade and political considerations, and suggested that I strictly fulfill the export-import plan.

**Question:** Did you agree

with these instructions of ROSENGOLTS? **Answer:** I was not satisfied with ROSENGOLTS' explanation, since I considered it inexpedient to adhere to the export-import plan to the detriment of the trade interests of the Soviet Union. **Question:** How did

you do it? **Answer:** I had to

carry out these instructions of ROSENGOLTS. In the summer of 1935, when ROSENGOLTS stopped in Warsaw on his way to one of the foreign resorts, I again raised the question of the incorrectness of planning our trade with Poland and argued the need to expand it. However, ROSENGOLTS very insistently repeated to me his previous instructions, referring to the fact that the existing export-import plan of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade was dictated by "trade and political considerations." **Question:** What "trade and political considerations"

were you talking about?

**Answer:** To my request to put me in more detail on the above considerations, ROSENGOLTS replied that upon his return from the resort he would call on Berlin, where he would call me, and there he would discuss these issues with me in detail.

**Question:** Did ROSENGOLTS summon you

to Berlin? **Answer:** Yes, two or three months later, in the autumn of 1935, I received a call from ROSENGOLTS from Berlin. When I arrived in Berlin, ROSENGOLTS invited me to the

apartment where he was staying and offered to give him information about our commercial operations in Poland. After listening to me, ROSENGOLTS began to prove the incorrectness of my point of view on the need to expand trade turnover with Poland, emphasizing in every possible way the advantage of trade with Germany. ROSENGOLTS said that it is much more profitable for the Soviet Union to conduct foreign trade with such large countries as Germany, rather than disperse export-import operations among small countries, since in the end, despite some difference in prices for a number of goods, we gain by speeding up trade and sooner receipt

currencies.

At the end of the conversation, ROSENGOLTS invited me to come to his another day.

**Question:** And you met with ROSENGOLTS again? **Answer:**

Yes, the next day I went to ROSENGOLTS and had a detailed conversation with him, in which he drew me into the right-wing Trotskyist organization operating in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. **Question:** Describe

in detail the content of this conversation with ROSENGOLTS. **Answer:** ROSENGOLTS began

the conversation with the difficulties in the foreign trade of the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the share of our foreign trade on the European market was declining, and that this was reducing the commercial and political importance of the Soviet Union, and it was becoming more and more difficult for us to carry out trade transactions with individual countries.

ROSENGOLTS explained this situation by the incorrect policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, primarily in matters of the country's economic

development. **Question:** Namely?

**Answer:** ROSENGOLTS said that the Party's policy in the field of industrialization and collectivization of the country did not justify itself. He argued that the collective form of economy does not provide the country with a sufficient amount of raw materials for industry and export.

"From here," concluded ROSENGOLTS, "it is clear that the pace of industrialization taken by the Party is unrealistic, since, with the existing commodity base of agriculture, our industry cannot produce a sufficient amount of products both for domestic consumption and for foreign trade, and this creates in country sharp dissatisfaction with the policy of the party.

ROSENGOLTS declared that this point of view was shared by many leading party and Soviet workers in the USSR and that he, as head of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, was pursuing a special line in trade relations with foreign states.

In conclusion, ROSENGOLTS expressed the hope that I would carry out all his instructions.

**Question:** How did you react to this proposal by ROSENGOLTS?

**Answer:** I agreed.

**Question:** How to explain such frankness of ROSENGOLTS in the very first conversation with

you? **Answer:** I must say that back in 1933-1934, when I worked in the Sector for Verification of the Execution of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, I had anti-Soviet right-wing hesitations on questions of industrialization and collectivization of the country, which, obviously, was known to

ROZENGOLTS. **Question:** How did he

know this? **Answer:** The fact is that I shared my right-wing views with ROSENGOLTS's deputy, Sergei Kirillovich Sud'in, and the head. Organizing Sector of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade DAVYDOV Zinovy Markovich. SUD'IN partially agreed with me, and DAVYDOV expressed clearly right-wing sentiments on the question of the pace of industrialization and

collectivization. As I understood from the above conversation with ROZENGOLTS, he was aware of my anti-Soviet sentiments and this gave him grounds for recruiting me into a right-wing Trotskyist organization.

**Question:** What directives on enemy work did you receive from ROSENGOLTS?

**Answer:** ROSENGOLTS told me that my task, as a member of an anti-Soviet organization, would be to strictly carry out his instructions aimed at limiting the trade turnover between the USSR and Poland in every possible way. ROZENGOLTS also informed me that in his subversive work in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade he relies on a number of responsible employees of the People's Commissariat, who carry out all his instructions.

**Question:** Which of the members of the right-wing Trotskyist organization in the People's Commissariat for

Foreign Trade did ROSENGOLTS tell you? **Answer:** ROSENGOLTS did not use the term "participant in an organization." He said that a number of senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade were his "guards" and through them he pursued a "trade and political line" in the interests of the organization. Among these persons, he named his deputy SUDYIN, the chairman of Exportles KRAEVSKY, the chairman of Soyuzpromexport KALMANOVSKY, the chairman of Exportkhleb chairman of KISIN, Technoexport POLISHUK, the chairman of the Nefteexport SHINDEL, an employee of Soyuzpromexport GARIBOV and the chairman of Soyuzmetimport ROZOVA.

**Question:** With which of the named participants in the anti-Soviet organization you were personally involved in enemy work?

**Answer:** At the end of 1935, while on a business trip in Moscow, I established an anti-Soviet connection with

SUD'IN. **Question:** How?

**Answer:** Knowing from the words of ROSENGOLTS that SUD'IN was a member of our organization, I told him in detail about my conversation with ROSENGOLTS in the autumn of 1935 in Berlin and about the directives that I had received from him for wrecking work.

**Question:** Why did you have to open up to the JUDGE? **Answer:**

As I have already shown, back in 1933-1934 I shared with SUD'IN my anti-Soviet right-wing views and then found some support from him. On the other hand, I understood that by carrying out ROZENGOLTS' sabotage instructions for work in Poland, I put myself in danger of being exposed, and I wanted to verify the correctness of ROSENGOLTS' report about involvement in SUD'IN's organization, especially since my wrecking work was visible, no doubt, to him. I thought that even if SUDIIN did not

is a member of the organization, he still will not extradite me, and in that case, if the information of ROSENGOLTS is correct, in a direct connection with SUDIN will strengthen my position. So it came out.

SUDIN confirmed his belonging to our anti-Soviet organization and said that he was fully aware of the wrecking plans of ROSENGOLTS. Subsequently, I maintained an anti-Soviet

connection with SUDIN until my departure for work in Iran in November 1935. **Question:** With which of the members of your organization did you contact besides SUDIN? **Answer:** Of the members of the

right-wing Trotskyist organization known to me from the words of ROSENGOLTS, I only contacted SUDIN in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, in addition, I tried to recruit the chairman of Raznoexport DAVYDOV, Zinovy Markovich, into our organization.

**Question:**

And you recruited him?

**Answer:** No, because when I tried to recruit DAVYDOV he let me know that he was already a member of our organization.

Since DAVYDOV shared my anti-Soviet right-wing sentiments back in 1933-1934, when I met him in Moscow at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and at his apartment, I told him in detail about my conversation with ROSENGOLTS in the autumn of 1935 in Berlin.

After listening to me, DAVYDOV said that all this was nothing new to him, and from further conversation with him I realized that he was already carrying out wrecking work in

Raznoexport. **Question:** Now turn to the testimony about your enemy

work in Poland. **Answer:** On instructions from ROSENGOLTS, I carried out work aimed at narrowing the trade turnover between the USSR and Poland. Specifically, this consisted in the fact that I reduced the purchase of iron, steel and metal products in Poland, which made it possible for our organization to transfer orders to Germany, despite the higher prices of German industry. In

1935-1936, despite the fact that Poland insisted on selling a large amount of manganese ore to it, we increased

export of ore not to Poland, but to Germany, although Poland offered more high prices.

The same situation, with my participation, was created in the question of the sale of fur raw materials, for which Poland offered prices higher than those existing on the European market. However, fur raw materials were mainly sold to Germany and other countries, and Polish fur firms often purchased our furs in Germany.

Such a trade policy had as its consequence the worsening of relations between the Soviet Union and Poland and led to its rapprochement with Germany. **Question:** Did you involve any of

the employees of the trade mission in this wrecking work? **Answer:** In carrying out the wrecking installations of

ROZENGOLTS

I was assisted by my deputy BLOEMBERG Anya Ansovich.

**Question:** How exactly did you contribute? Were you connected with him as a member of a right-wing Trotskyist organization? **Answer:** I did not

have direct conversations with BLOEMBERG as a member of the organization, but he actively assisted me in the enemy work, which I conducted on the instructions of ROSENGOLTS. **Question:** How could you attract BLOOMBERG

without knowing how member of your organization?

**Answer:** Back in 1934, when I was appointed trade representative to Poland, ROSENGOLTS recommended BLOEMBERG to me as one of the best employees of the trade mission, whom I can rely on in my work. After my recruitment by ROZENGOLTS, I realized

that BLOOMBERG was our man, although ROSENGOLTS did not directly tell me anything about him. This assumption of mine was confirmed a little later, at the end of 1935 or the beginning of 1936, under the following circumstances: Until the end of 1935, we sold barrel staves to the Sonenberg company in Danzig on very favorable terms. At the beginning of 1936, Bloomberg,

on the orders of Exportles, stopped selling staves to this company. In 1936, while on a business trip in Moscow, I had a conversation with ROZENGOLTS on this issue, and he told me that trade

riveted by BLOEMBERG at the direction of the chairman of "Exportles" KRAEVSKOY.

Since I knew from the words of ROSENGOLTS that KRAEVSKY was involved in our organization, I understood that BLOEMBERG was connected with him in enemy work. Therefore, I did not hesitate to involve Bloomberg in carrying out the wrecking instructions of ROSENGOLTS.

**Question:** Why were you recalled from work in Poland?

**Answer:** In connection with my appointment as a trade representative to Iran, I must say that in 1935-1936 I repeatedly raised the question of recalling me from work in Poland to ROSENGOLTS. This was explained by the fact that I wanted to break off my espionage ties with BRIGEVICH, which weighed heavily on me.

Wrecker work in Poland in the above direction I saw me off until I was recalled to Moscow at the end of October 1935.

**Question:** You informed ROSENGOLTS of your espionage work for Polish intelligence?

**Answer:** No, I did not tell ROSENGOLTS about my espionage work and motivated my desire to leave Poland by the fact that I wanted to leave my work abroad and that my deputy BLOEMBERG, who had long claimed the position of trade representative, could completely replace me.

**Question:**

It is not clear why you had to hide your espionage work from ROSENGOLTS, if you were already organizationally connected with him?

**Answer:** I expected that after leaving Poland I would be able to break off espionage ties with Polish intelligence and gradually move away from wrecking work, since the threat of exposure and arrest grew ever more real before me.

**Question:** Do you mean to say that after leaving Poland you stopped your espionage and wrecking work?

**Answer:** I had such intentions, but in reality it turned out differently.

**Question:** How else?

**Answer:** At the end of October 1935, ROSENGOLTS recalled me from Poland to the USSR and announced that I was being appointed to the post of trade representative in Iran. This appointment did not suit me, since from 1928 to 1930 I had already worked in Iran as a trade representative, but ROSENGOLTS said that my candidacy was most acceptable for the position of trade representative in Iran

precisely for the reasons that I used to work there and know the local conditions well. As a result, I was forced to agree with ROSENGOLTS' proposal, and then he told me about the real motives for my appointment to Iran. **Question:** What

motives did ROSENGOLTS tell you about? **Answer:**

ROSENGOLTS told me that he recalled the trade representative in Iran, SHOSTAK, since he had been in Iran for 4 years, and, besides, some other considerations make it necessary to replace him. Exactly what considerations ROSENGOLTS did not tell me, and I did not ask him about it. On November

8 or 9, 1936, ROZENGOLTS informed me that the passport previously issued to him for leaving the USSR had been taken away from SHOSTAK and that I would have to leave alone and take over the affairs of the trade mission from the deputy. trade representative Sadovsky.

In connection with this circumstance, I realized that SHOSTAK was a member of our organization, and since he obviously failed, ROSENGOLTS decided to send me to take his place.

Indeed, before my departure for Iran, ROSENGOLTS gave me direct instructions on wrecking, subversive work.

**Question:** What exactly were the enemy instructions from ROSENGOLTS?

**Answer:** In a conversation with me at the beginning of November 1935, ROSENGOLTS reminded me of my conversation with him in 1935 in Berlin and asked: "Do you remember our conversation in Berlin?", I replied that, of course, I remember, and then ROSENGOLTS finished what he did not say in the autumn of 1935 when I was recruited into the right-wing Trotskyist organization.

**Question:** What exactly was it about? **Answer:** ROSENGOLTS said that the wrong policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government led the country to bankruptcy both in the field of industry and agriculture. He stressed that at this time the discontent of the population was growing in the country and that therefore now we should strive not to make adjustments to the policy of the party, but to radically change the Soviet system. When I asked in what sense he was talking about this, ROSENGOLTS directly answered that it was about replacing the Soviet system with a capitalist form of government, moreover, ROSENGOL



the current situation urgently requires the use of the most extreme means in this struggle.

Further, ROSENGOLTS directly raised the question - will I continue to work in Iran strictly carry out all his tasks. I assured ROSENGOLTS that he could fully count on me and that I would try to fully justify his confidence.

In conclusion, ROSENGOLTS gave me the following specific guidelines for enemy work in Iran:

1) not to allow in our trade relations with Iran active balance in favor of the Soviet Union;

2) to concentrate all trade operations in the hands of the Iranian "sharkets" (Iranian state trading organizations and monopoly merchant associations under state control). In practice, this attitude was supposed to bring

monetary damage to the Soviet Union, since in transactions with Iranian merchants who were not included in the Sharkets, we could receive higher prices for our goods;

3) to restrain the implementation of technical exports, expanding the sale of consumer goods, which was supposed to undermine the economic and political authority of the USSR in the eastern, agrarian countries.

**Question:** Did ROSENGOLTS indicate to you the persons you owe were involved to carry out this enemy work in Iran?

**Answer:** ROSENGOLTS recommended that Pavel Yakovlevich Sadovsky, the deputy trade representative in Iran, and Boris Yakovlevich, the authorized trade representative in Mashedi, be involved in the implementation of

these installations. **Question:** More precisely, did ROSENGOLTS suggest that you get in touch with SADOVSKII and KORAK as members of a right-wing

Trotskyite organization? **Answer:** ROSENGOLTS did not name SADOVSKII and KORAK as members of our organization, but said that SADOVSKII was well versed in the Iranian situation and I should keep this in mind when carrying out the instructions given to me for wrecking work. It was clear to me that I could establish direct contact with SADOVSKII on enemy work, especially since I knew him

as a close friend of LOGANOVSKY and ROZENGOLTS and SHOSTAK, for whom he was deputy for 2 years.

ROSENGOLTS recommended Korak to me as a person whom I could rely on in my work in Tehran, and I understood this as a direct order to establish anti-Soviet relations with him.

**Question:** Did you get in touch with SADOVSKII and

KORAK? **Answer:** I did not establish a direct anti-Soviet connection with SADOVSKII and KORAK, but both of them unconditionally helped me to carry out wrecking work in accordance with the instructions of ROSENGOLTS. I quickly established exactly the same relationship with my second deputy, MATISON Abram Abramovich.

**Question:** Why didn't you establish direct anti-Soviet connections with these individuals? **Answer:** I had

in mind to negotiate directly with SADOVSKII, KORAKO, and MATISON and hand over to them ROSENGOLTS' instructions for enemy work, but in connection with the arrest of SHOSTAK at the beginning of 1937, I decided to refrain from this, fearing that if any of them were arrested in connection with the case SHOSTAK I may be in danger of being

exposed. **Question:** What kind of wrecking work did you carry out in Iran together with SADOVSKII, KORAK and

MATISON? **Answer:** In accordance with ROSENGOLTS' guidelines, we almost the entire trade turnover of the USSR with Iran was transferred into the hands of the Sharkets.

In order to narrow the sales of technical goods in Iran, we did not report to Moscow information about the demand for these goods in the Iranian

market. Despite the fact that the merchant clientele of the trade mission was littered with brokers and insolvent merchants, we did not take measures to eliminate brokerage operations for export and import, which increased the price of imported goods and reduced our foreign exchange earnings from exports.

Along with this, we deliberately did not take measures to accept export goods of a sufficiently high quality, and in import operations we did not take into account the quality of the goods supplied. This discredited our trade operations with Iran and caused material damage to our import organizations.

In the summer of 1937, I learned about the arrest of ROSENGOLTS and, fearing a failure, I stopped wrecking work. For

the sake of reinsurance, I quickly reorganized myself and began to send memorandums to Moscow criticizing the directives of ROSENGOLTS on agreements with Iran and proposed a number of measures to correct the sabotage we had carried out.

**Question:** Is it only with SADOVSKII, CORAK and MATison?  
were you connected on joint enemy work in Iran?

**Answer:** I still have to say about my anti-Soviet connection with the trade

**Question:** What mission Nikolai Aleksandrovich BELGORODSKY.  
was your anti-Soviet

connection with BELGORODSKY? **Answer:** It was a spy connection.

**Question:** Through  
Polish intelligence? **Answer:** No,

BELGORODSKY was a Japanese

intelligence agent. **Question:** How did you establish a spy connection with

BELGORODSKII? **Answer:** I have already shown above that I expected to  
stop my espionage

work after my departure from Poland. However, in the spring of 1937, in  
Tehran, a representative of Japanese intelligence established contact with me.

**Question:** How? **Answer:** Approximately in April 1937, a person unknown to  
me telephoned me at the

trade mission, who identified himself as a representative of the Marchesi  
society, and said that he was asking to receive him immediately on a very  
important personal matter.

On the same day, at the end of classes, this man (I don't remember his last  
name now) came to me and, in a private conversation, stated that it was he who  
spoke to me on the phone as a representative of the Marchesi society.

When I asked how I could be useful to him, he replied without any preamble  
that he knew what information I had given BRIGEVICH about the work of the  
trade mission in Poland, and that he suggested that I give the same information  
about the work of the Soviet trade mission in Iran for Japanese. **Question:** How  
did you react to this

proposal? **Answer:** I was extremely taken aback by  
such impudence and tried to declare indignantly that no information

I did not tell BRIGEVICH and, in fact, I do not consider it possible to continue this conversation. Then a representative of Japanese intelligence said that I was trying in vain to deny my espionage connection with BRIGEVICH, and emphasized that if I did not fulfill his requirements, my connection with Polish intelligence would be brought to the attention of the relevant Soviet authorities. I must say that at that time I was in a very tense state, fearing the discovery of my wrecking work, and the threat to expose my connection with the Polish intelligence frightened me greatly. I then asked a representative of Japanese intelligence what he wanted from me. He replied that I would have to pass on some information about the work of the Soviet trade mission to the member of the board of the Marchesi society, SUJAI.

**Question:** How did you establish contact with SUJAYI?

**Answer:** I met SUJAYI twice in an official setting, when I was visiting the board of the Marchesi Society, and I knew that he had previously been the director of a private Japanese firm in Tehran. I personally did not establish a spy connection with him, but carried it out through a consultant of the trade mission of BELGORODSKY. A week after the above-described conversation with a representative of Japanese intelligence, BELGORODSKY somehow came into my office and reported in a confidential form that SUJAI was asking to start transferring the information that had been agreed upon to him.

**Question:** What espionage information did you pass on to the Japanese intelligence through BELGORODSKY?

**Answer:** Approximately once every 3 months, I transmitted to BELGORODSKY for SUJAI information about the plans of the trade mission for export and import, as well as about the prices at which we planned to trade with Iran. Thanks to this, the Japanese knew in advance exactly what kind of goods and at what prices we intended to export to Iran, and what articles of import from Iran were of interest to the Soviet Union.

**Question:** Why did Japanese intelligence need to involve you in espionage work, if its agent BELGORODSKY was in the trade mission?

**Answer:**

BELGORODSKY independently transmitted a number of espionage information to Japanese intelligence, but he did not have access to quarterly and annual export and import plans, in the know

which were only me and my deputies. These plans were strictly secret, and the Japanese were extremely interested in receiving them. **Question:**

Where is BELGORODSKY now? **Answer:**

BELGORODSKY now lives in Tehran. I left Tehran in September 1938, and from MATison, who arrived in the USSR at the end of December 1938, I heard that BELGORODSKY, having received an offer to leave for the USSR, left his job in the trade mission and refused to return to the Soviet Union.

**Question:** Until when did you carry out

espionage work on assignments from Japanese intelligence? **Answer:** Before my departure from Iran

to the Soviet Union, i.e. until September 1938. **Question:** With whom did you contact on

espionage work upon your arrival in the USSR? **Answer:** After my return

to the Soviet Union, no one established espionage communications with me, and my espionage and wrecking work ended there.

**Question:** You are clearly keeping back about your espionage and anti-Soviet work and are trying to hide from the investigation the members of the right-wing Trotskyist organization in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade known to you.

**Answer:** I told everything about my wrecking and espionage work and named all the members of the right-wing Trotskyist organization known to me.

True, I also know a number of close people of ROSENGOLTS, about whom I have reason to believe that they were, if not members of the organization, then, in any case, accomplices of ROSENGOLTS in enemy work. **Question:**

Name these people and tell us what you know about them. connections with ROSENGOLTS and practical, hostile work?

**Answer:** Among the people close to ROSENGOLTS, whom I suspect as members of our right-wing Trotskyite organization, I include: former. trade representative in Belgium HAZOV; ex. Chairman of Technoimport KISELYOV; ex. trade representative in England BOGOMOLOV; ex. People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade KANDELAKI and FRIEDRICHSON; ex. head of the export department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade RABINOVICH; ex. deputy trade representative in England MOSIN; ex. trade representative in America BOEV. These people are nobody to me

I did not name them as participants in the right-wing Trotskyist organization, but judging by their closeness to SUDIN and ROSENGOLTS and his trust in these persons, I believe that they could be involved in the enemy work of the right-wing Trotskyist organization in the People's Commissariat

of Foreign Trade. **Question:** What grounds do you have to claim involvement of the persons you named to enemy work in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade?

**Answer:** I judge this on the basis of the facts known to me of the close personal and business ties of the listed persons with ROSENGOLTS, SUDIN and LOGANOVSKY. **Question:** What were these

connections? **Answer:** I'll start with Khazov - he enjoyed great confidence in ROSENGOLTS, who nominated him for work. Being a deputy Export Administration, KHAZOV was presented by ROSENGOLTS for the award of the Order and in 1933-1934. appointed to the post of trade representative in Belgium. KISELEV was very close to LOGANOVSKII and enjoyed the unlimited confidence of ROSENGOLTS, who, like Khazov, introduced him to the order.

In addition, back in 1933 KISELEV traveled with me to Poland as part of a trade delegation led by BOYEV. The composition of this delegation was personally selected by ROSENGOLTS, and its leader BOEV was a trusted person of ROSENGOLTS.

BOGOMOLOV until 1934 headed the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. As far as I know, ROSENGOLTS placed the members of the organization through the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade in the Soviet Union and abroad, and, naturally, could not arrange our cadres without the help of BOGOMOLOV. In 1937, ROSENGOLTS nominated Bogomolov to the post of trade representative in England.

ROSENGOLTS maintained especially close, friendly relations with KANDELAKI, who worked as a trade representative in Belgium and then in Germany, and his deputy FRIEDRICHSON.

MOSINA in 1934 at one time headed the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade and, like BOGOMOLOV, could not help but be aware of the placement of members of our organization in leading work in the USSR and abroad.

In 1935-1936. ROSENGOLTS nominated MOSIN as deputy. trade representative in England, and it should be noted that she was in close relations with the ROSENGOLTS family, where she was considered her own person. RABINOVICH, as far as I know, became friends with ROSENGOLTS while still working with him in England, when ROSENGOLTS was an adviser to the embassy. At the suggestion of ROSENGOLTS, in 1932 or 1933 Rabinovich received the order. Recently, he headed the export department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and was undoubtedly aware of the enemy work that we were doing in foreign trade with other countries, in particular in exports.

**Question:** You have not shown everything about your sabotage and espionage work and continue to hide members of your organization known to you.

At the next interrogation, we will interrogate you about this and expose you with the materials available to the investigation.

The interrogation is interrupted. The protocol was written down from my words correctly

and read by me:

TAMARIN IS INTERROGATED:

Investigator of the Investigative Department of the NKVD of the USSR Lieutenant

Gosud. security ZIMENKOV investigator of the NKVD investigator of the USSR lieutenant state. security

ROMANOV AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 376. L. 12-46. Script. Typescript. On the first page there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "According to Vneshtorg, to arrest: 1. Zinovy Markovich Davydov, 2. Kalmanovsky, 3. Kisin, 4. Polishchuk, 5. Shindel

# No. 48 Memo to V.P. Zhuravleva I.V. Stalin [\[16\]](#)

*05/26/1939*

Comrade.

Stalin! I earnestly ask you to accept me for a few minutes. I beg  
don't refuse it.

With regards.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 734. L. 13. Original. Manuscript. The  
note was written on the letterhead of the Head of the NKVD Department for  
the City of Moscow and the Moscow Region.



**No.**

**49 Note by A.Ya. Vyshinsky I.V. Stalin  
about violations in the procedure for  
coordinating arrests**

**05/31/1939**

No. 215

hp Comrade Stalin

Comrade Molotov By

the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938, the NKVD bodies were forbidden to make

arrests without the preliminary sanction of the Prosecutor's Office. This resolution fully meets

the requirements of Article 127 of the Constitution of the USSR. Meanwhile, in the practice of the NKVD, there continue to be cases of arrests of individuals without prior authorization from the Prosecutor's Office of the Union. So, for example, Frinovsky M., Belenky Z., Kedrov and others were arrested without prior authorization from the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

Reporting this, I ask the NKVD of the USSR to instruct the NKVD of the USSR to strictly observe the procedure for arrests established by Article 127 of the Constitution of the USSR and the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ) of

November 17,

1937. VYSHINSKY AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 185. Copy. Typescript.

**No.**

# **50 Note by A.Ya. Vyshinsky I.V. Stalin about a special meeting at the NKVD of the USSR**

**05/31/1939**

No. 216

LSS Sov. secret

In the Central Committee of the All-  
Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

- comrade. STALIN SNK USSR - comrade. MOLOTOV Recently, a large number of cases have been passed through the Special Conference under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and at each meeting of the Special

Conference, from 200 to 300 cases are considered. In this state of affairs, the possibility cannot be ruled out of making wrong decisions.

On this occasion, I presented my views to Comrade. Beria with a proposal to establish such a procedure for the work of the Special Conference so that its meetings are convened more often and with consideration in each meeting fewer cases.

I would consider it expedient that on this occasion the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs receive special instructions from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

A. VYSHINSKY RGANI. F. 89. Op. 18. D. 2. L. 1. Original. Typescript. There are resolutions and notes on the sheet: "T. Beria. How to be? V. Molotov"; "A message was sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrade Stalin, to the Council of People's Commissars to comrade Molotov. 10.6.39 No. 2016/b".

1 June 10, 1939 L.P. Beria sent a message to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, in which he called the conclusion of A.Ya. Vyshinsky that due to the large number of cases considered at the OSO of the NKVD of the USSR, the possibility of making erroneous decisions is not ruled out.

Recalling the activities of the Special Conference in the period 1937-1938, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs noted numerous violations in

the work of this body. The conference did not meet in a legal composition, cases were considered on a poll basis on the basis of lists, certificates and materials from peripheral bodies without preliminary verification. "Despite such a "order" for the consideration of cases," Beria noted, "comrade. VYSHINSKY in the past signed the minutes of the Special Meeting without objection. Further, Beria emphasized that after the adoption of the

resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation" of November 17, 1938 and the staffing of the Special Meeting with workers sent from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the work of this body is taking place in close contact and with the most active participation of prosecutors, including Vyshinsky. At the same time, Beria noted that during the period from December 1938 to May 1939, 13 meetings were held, 2079 cases were considered, and "there was no case that Comrade. VYSHINSKY made some remark about the procedure for conducting meetings of the Special Conference. Some meetings, he stressed, were even postponed, because "Comrade. VYSHINSKY was ill or busy at lectures, and without comrade. VYSHINSKY, we avoided holding conferences. As a result, Beria, in his message to Stalin and Molotov, stated: "I had with Comrade. VYSHINSKY conversation after writing a letter to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and comrade. VYSHINSKY acknowledged that his letter was essentially wrong" (CA FSB. P.

**No. 51**

**Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union  
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the expulsion of Italian citizens**

**06/03/1939**

Strictly secret 89

- NKID question 1.

To release and deport from the USSR, in addition to 10 Italian citizens and 2 Soviet citizens, about which there is a PB decision of January 26 of this year, 5 Italian citizens: 1) De Blasi Filomena, 2 ) Ciufetti Leonia, 3) Giacomelli Alesandro, 4) Munujos Michael, 5) Munter Giovanni. 2. Allow Alidova-Lavrenchich

Pelageya, the wife of an Italian citizen, to renounce Soviet citizenship with subsequent departure from the USSR.

3. To instruct the NKID, together with the NKVD, to consider the proposal submitted by the Italian embassy on April 5 of this year. a list of persons for whom it petitions, for subsequent raising before the PB the question of the possibility of replacing a number of persons named in it with the arrest or punishment applied to them by deportation from the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 49. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No.

3. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Molotov, Beria - everything, Gorkin - point 2.

**No.**

**52 Special message L.P. Berii I.V.  
Stalin about the arrest in Chita of an  
"agent" [17] of Polish intelligence**

**06/07/1939**

No. 1958 /

b TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC AUCP(b), comrade S

TA LIN U The NKVD Office for the Chita Region in January 1939 in Chita arrested an agent of Polish intelligence DAVIDOVICH L. F., head of the planning department of the Chita construction trust.

During interrogation on January 31, 1939, Davidovich L.F. showed that in the mountains. He arrived in Chita in March 1938 from Moscow on the instructions of G.P. Zharkovsky, a resident of the Polish intelligence service. to collect spy information in the border zone. Davidovich further testified that Zharkovsky gave him an appearance and a letter of recommendation to the wife of the secretary of the Chita Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. Murugov - to Johanna Alexandrovna Murugova, who was connected with Zharkovskiy in espionage work.

Upon arrival in Chita, Davidovich L.F., according to him, contacted Murugova I.A. and with her active assistance, he entered the circle of local senior officials who were in the Murugovs' house, widely using acquaintances in this circle to collect espionage information.

So, Davidovich testified that in the Murugovs' house he met and contacted on anti-Soviet work with a former white officer - Belsky N.A., head of the design bureau of the Chita Construction Trust, and Tamm L.A., head of the regional department of public utilities, with whom he organized subversive work in the Chita construction trust, as a result of which construction plans in the mountains were thwarted. Read.

The arrested Davidovich L.F. requested by us for interrogation at the NKVD of the USSR. at first he retracted his testimony, and then reaffirmed it.

On May 3, 1939, the NKVD of the USSR arrested G.P. Zharkovsky, who, confessing to spying for Polish intelligence and espionage communications with L.F. Davidovich, confirmed the fact that he had sent a letter of recommendation to Davidovich to Murugova in March 1938 IA, denying, however, her involvement in espionage work. In this regard, between

Davidovich L.F. and Zharkovsky G.P. On May 29, 1939, we held a confrontation, at which the arrested Davidovich L.F., having confirmed his testimony on the espionage work of Zharkovsky G.P. with Murugova AND.A., additionally testified that according to Zharkovsky he knew that Murugova AND.A. she cohabited with him and, in the interests of espionage work, was specially substituted by him for IV Murugov, who at that time worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Despite the testimony

of Davidovich L.F., the arrested Zharkovsky G.P. continues to deny a direct connection in espionage work with Murugova I.A., however, showed that Murugova I.A. really is an agent of Polish intelligence and was recruited by Davidovich's brother L.F. for espionage work. - the former White Guard counterintelligence officer - Davidovich Yuri Fedorovich, who works in Leningrad as the director of the Lenpromptorg store. I gave instructions to the NKVD Directorate for the Leningrad

region to arrest Davidovich Yew.F. and send to the NKVD of the USSR.

According to a telegraph message from the NKVD Directorate for the Chita region dated June 1, 1939, as a result of intelligence development associated with Murugova I.A. the above-mentioned former white officer Belsky N.A. - it was established that Belsky is a convinced fascist. Belsky let slip to the agent of the NKVD Directorate that, being a prisoner in Poland, he studied at the intelligence school. Further, Belsky said that on May 29 he was with the secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU (b) Murugov I.V., who informed him that the arrested Davidovich L.F. confessed to German espionage. According to Belsky, Murugov's wife, two days after the arrest of Davidovich L.F. in alarm left for Moscow. Murugova is really currently in Moscow, and it has been found out that she is now pregnant at the 7th month.

Belsky also told the agent about his closeness to I. V. Murugov, who, allegedly in connection with the arrest and confession of Davidovich, suggested that he leave the Chita region.

In this regard, Belsky expressed the idea of the need to commit suicide.

The NKVD of the USSR also has undercover information about the close connection of Murugov I.V. with the director of the hall of the Chita region at the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition - Belova N.A., expelled from the CPSU (b) for hiding her husband's past - ex. white army officer Belov is being developed by us on suspicion of anti-Soviet work and espionage.

According to the same information, Belova N.A., taking advantage of her proximity to Murugov, when leaving for the Chita region in early 1939, she collected secret information about special factories, airfields, border facilities and made acquaintances with military pilots and engineers of defense enterprises. Undercover information of

the NKVD of the USSR about Belova's behavior during a business trip to the Chita region was confirmed by a message that the Balaisky regional NKVD recorded a suspicious interest on her part in the department of location of Red Army units, frontier posts and the construction of defense enterprises.

Investigation in the case of Davidovich L.F. and Zharkovsky G.P. continues.

Murugova I.A., Belova N.A. and Belsky N.A. agents are being developed. People's Commissar

of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op.

58. D. 255. L. 79-83. Script. Typescript. On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "T-schu Beria. Murugova, apparently, is not Russian (toadstool!), why don't they find out Murugova's nationality? Murugova, Belova and Belsky must be immediately arrested and then through them to uncover the nest of spies in Chita. I. Stalin.

**No.**

## **53 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the liquidation of "anti-Soviet" groups in the schools of Moscow and Leningrad**

**06/07/1939**

No. 1973/

b Sov. secret

to the SECRETARY of the Central Committee

of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comrade. S T A L I

N U \* Bodies of the NKVD of the USSR among students of individual universities and students of senior classes of secondary schools in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Ivanov, Saratov

and other cities of the USSR, a number of anti-Soviet groups were opened and partly liquidated \*. Members of anti-Soviet formations among young people, as a rule, set as their task an active struggle against Soviet power, discuss plans for terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government, produce and distribute anti-Soviet leaflets and slogans calling for the overthrow of the

corresponding system in the USSR. So, for example: 1. In December 1938, the NKVD of the USSR liquidated a terrorist group of students of the Moscow Historical, Philosophical and Literary Institute, consisting of: Shatilova I.M. - born in 1915, expelled from the Komsomol; Ulitina P.P. - born in 1918, non-partisan; Sukhova N.P. - born in 1918, non-party Mazur - born in 1917, member of the Komsomol.

The group set itself the task of organizing the "Lenin People's Party" in order to unite in its ranks all those dissatisfied with the Soviet power and the CPSU (b), preparing an armed uprising and terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and Soviet power. The

members of the group conducted active anti-Soviet agitation among the students, developed the "Program of the Leninist People's Party"



and carried out recruiting work to expand the organization.

2. In October 1938, the NKVD of the USSR arrested an anti-Soviet group of students of the 1st Moscow State Pedagogical Institute, consisting of: Melnikova M.S. - born in 1914, expelled from the Komsomol for concealing the social. origin; Vinogradova A.G. - a member of the Komsomol; Moshenkova B.M. - a member of the Komsomol; Golyshkina V.S. - 1915 year of birth, member of the Komsomol, Semenov D.I. - born in 1910, a member of the Komsomol, and Savushkin L.P. - Born in 1914, non-partisan.

The group produced and tried to distribute during the October holidays of 1938 fascist leaflets calling for an active struggle against Soviet power.

3. In February 1939, the Department of the NKVD of the Moscow Region arrested an anti-Soviet group of students from secondary school No. 336 in Moscow, consisting of: Lazich I.G. - born in 1922, the son of a member of the CPSU (b); Andreeva V.A. - born in 1922; Gordeeva N.P. - Born in 1922, non-partisan.

The group produced and distributed 40 leaflets in Moscow slogans of Trotskyist-fascist content.

4. In March 1939, a fascist group of students from various universities was liquidated in Leningrad, consisting of: Karu I.I. - born in 1916, non-partisan; Kazachevsky - born in 1914, non-partisan, and Mazunin F.S. - non-partisan. The group developed a program to create a fascist organization, produced a number of fascist leaflets and tried to distribute them.

5. In February 1939, in the city of Krasnodar, a counter-revolutionary group was arrested among young students - children of repressed parents, consisting of: Gladilina E.K. - born in 1923, the son of a repressed for anti-Soviet work; Goryagina G.I. - born in 1922, a former pupil of an orphanage, and Katz E.K. - Born in 1921, the son of a repressed Trotskyist.

The members of the group set as their task the preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government and prepared the release of anti-Soviet leaflets calling for an uprising against Soviet power. The ideological inspirer of the group was the former provocateur of the tsarist secret police Chistyakov G.V., a boiler worker of the railway station. Caucasian (arrested).

6. In March 1939, a terrorist group of students of local universities from the children of repressed enemies of the people was arrested in Ivanovo: Mikhailovsky, 18 years old; - 20 years old, the son of a white officer arrested for anti-Soviet work, and Kostyukov - 23 years old, the brother of an enemy of the people who was shot.

The group set itself the task of preparing terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government, establishing links with anti-Soviet organizations within the country, as well as establishing links with fascist intelligence and illegal passage to Finland. The members of the group prepared

and distributed 11 counter-revolutionary slogans calling for terror against the leaders of the CPSU(b), for the overthrow of Soviet power and the establishment of a fascist dictatorship. The group developed a plan to carry out a

terrorist act during a demonstration on Red Square by bombing a government podium. 7. In March 1938 in the mountains. In Barnaul, a sabotage terrorist group of

former students (Estonians) of a pedagogical school in Leningrad was liquidated: Kive A.I. - born in 1914, ex. teacher of the Estonian secondary school, Mihkli R.A. - born in 1918, ex. director of the Estonian secondary school, expelled from the Komsomol for anti-Soviet work, and a number of other students and teachers of the Estonian Pedagogical College, a total of 7 people.

The group set the task of raising an uprising against Soviet power, organizing sabotage at defense enterprises and railway transport, and preparing terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government.

8. In February 1939 in the mountains. Sumy of the Poltava region of the Ukrainian SSR liquidated an anti-Soviet group of senior students of the local secondary school: Knysh N.F. - born in 1922, expelled from the Komsomol for anti-Soviet manifestations; Savchuk V.A. - mechanically retired from the Komsomol and Abakumov D.M. - Born in 1918, the son of a repressed enemy of the people.

The group called itself a "secret society", adopted the program and charter of the Narodnaya Volya party as the basis for its anti-Soviet work, intended to acquire weapons for terrorist purposes through military personnel, and discussed the issue of setting up an underground printing house for the production of anti-Soviet leaflets. As a result of the

investigation, it was established that the inspirers of the group were: the former head of the library of the Sumy Chemical Technical School, Ukrainian nationalist Kulish I.V. (convicted) and ex. Narodnaya Volya, Social Revolutionary Serdyuk N.N. (arrested). 9. In December 1938,

an anti-Soviet terrorist group of high school students from among the children of repressed parents was arrested in the Tulchinskaya secondary school in the Vinnitsa region: Kadyk A.N. - Born in 1919, Cherny I.V. - born in 1920, Renzhin V.A. - born in 1920, Oleinik G.G. - born in 1922. According to the plan of this group, its most strong-willed and resolute members were to establish

contact in Moscow with the Kremlin guards, infiltrate the Kremlin and commit terrorist acts against members of the Politburo. 10. An anti-Soviet group of children of repressed parents was arrested in the Nemirovsky orphanage in the Vinnitsa

region of the Ukrainian SSR: Pronashko V. - 16 years old, Ladis G.G. - 16 years old, Svidzinsky Yu.K. - 17 years old, Sochivo V.A. - 17 years old, Skopelidis G.G. - 16 years. Members of the group terrorized the Komsomol members, organized a strike, mocked children of Jewish

and Ukrainian nationality, destroyed portraits of the leaders of the CPSU (b), painted fascist swastikas on the walls and agitated the pupils to "avenge" the Soviet authorities for their repressed parents.

11. In January 1939, Levin-Sobolensky, a former student of secondary class school No. 8, was arrested in the city of Kovrovo, who was preparing terrorist acts against public teachers.

During interrogation, Levin-Sobolensky testified that, under the influence of anti-Soviet sentiments in the family, he came to the idea of the need to fight against Soviet power. To this end, he wrote a letter to the German ambassador to the USSR, in which he offered his services in espionage and sabotage work against the USSR. On your own initiative

at school, he poisoned drinking water and tried to set off a makeshift grenade. Along with this, the NKVD of the USSR

is currently developing the following anti-Soviet groups among young people in the mountains. Moscow:

\*1. A counter-revolutionary group of children of repressed enemies of the people, students in various educational institutions in the mountains. Moscow: 2nd year student of the 1st Medical Institute Bessonova Tatyana, Medvedeva Tamara, born in 1921, student of the technical school at the Moscow Conservatory - Lomova Nina, born in 1919, student of the preparatory courses of the Moscow Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages, Krestinskaya Natalia - born in 1920, student 1 Medical Institute, Smilga Tatiana - born in 1919, student of the preparatory courses of the Moscow Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages, Rukhimovich Elena - student of the Tsvetmetzoloto Institute \*. The members of the group conduct anti-Soviet agitation, slander the leaders of the party and government, set the task of forming similar groups of children of repressed enemies of the people in other

cities of the Soviet Union and are looking for an opportunity to contact the anti-Soviet underground for active participation in the fight against the Soviet regime and the CPSU (b). \*\*2. In secondary school number 125 in the mountains. In Moscow, an anti-Soviet group of students of the 9th grade is revealed, the leaders of which are students of the same school: Papin L.M. - born in 1921, the son of an accountant, and Mongushev V.A. - born in 1922,

the son of a former NKVD worker, uniting around him up to 10 people of anti-Soviet school students \*\*.

The members of the group systematically gather in each other's apartments, where they hold anti-Soviet conversations in which they discuss the policy of the party and government, praise Trotskyism and read the confiscated works of the enemies of the people by Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek.

\*\*\*3. At school No. 114 of the Soviet district, on the initiative of the son of a convict for PhD. Gavrilenko's activities, an anti-Soviet group of students in grades 8 and 9 was formed, setting the task of organizing a "society of anarchists" \*\*\*. The group develops the "constitution" of society and tries to

organize an illegal newspaper to promote the ideas of anarchism.

Members of the group made a "society" seal with a skull and crossbones design, which they put on the slogans pasted at the school.  
and posters.

It is noted that recently among the anti-Soviet youth there is a tendency to create illegal circles with the involvement of working youth to "study" the classics of Marxism in order to criticize them from an anti-Soviet position and attempt to revise the foundations of Marxism.

The NKVD of the USSR gave instructions to intensify intelligence and operational work among young people and, first of all, among the repressed enemies of the people. People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 206. L. 159-168.

Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T-schu Beria. See text for suggestions. St. ";  
litter: "From Comrade Beria".

On the margins are Stalin's resolutions: \*—\* "These  
all should be arrested and sent to different camps." \*\*—\*\* "Arrest, deport  
to different places." \*\*\*—\*\*\* "Ar[test], expel."

**No. 54**

**From the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of  
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the dining room of the Sanupra Kremlin**

**06/09/1939**

145 - About the dining room of the Sanupra Kremlin and the rest houses "Sosny" and "Barvikha"

I. About the canteen of the Sanupra of the

Kremlin 1. The canteen of the Sanupra of the Kremlin (for military workers) shall be transferred from July 1 to the jurisdiction of the NKVD.

2. Reduce the contingent of persons entitled to use the canteen to 400 people. Instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Poskrebyshchev, Shkiryatov, Vlasik and Khlomov to determine the personal composition of persons entitled to use the dining room.

3. Set a fee for meals in the dining room in the amount of 12 rubles. per day ...  
RGASPI.

F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1010. L. 39. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 3.

**No. 55**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee  
of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks  
"on the Spaniards who are in the flight schools  
of Kirovabad and Lipetsk, in the amount of 192 people"**

**06/10/1939**

Strictly secret

159 - About the Spaniards who are in the flying schools of Kirovabad and Lipetsk, in the amount of 192 people

1. Allow the NPO and the NKVD to select 50 people for special work, from there were 30 of them along the line of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 20 people along the line of the NKVD.

2. Those wishing to leave the USSR (63 people) are allowed to leave. To release 30 thousand US dollars for the costs of sending them. The organization of the shipment is to be entrusted to the NPO together with the NKVD.

3. To instruct the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to distribute 79 people who have expressed a desire to stay in the USSR to their rest homes, in which the Spaniards who have arrived from abroad are currently staying, and in the future to assign them to work on an equal footing with last.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 52. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 3.

The text contains

a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Voroshilov, Beria - all; Molotov, Zverev - 2, Shvernik - 3.

**No. 56**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the camps of the NKVD"**

**06/10/1939**

Strictly secret 164

- On the camps of the

NKVD Approve the proposal of the NKVD to carry out the following activities:

1. Abandon the system of parole for camp contingents. A convict in the camps must serve the term of his sentence established by the court in full.

Instruct the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the courts to stop

considering cases on parole from camps, and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to stop the practice of offsetting one working day for two days of the term of serving a sentence. 2. To establish the main incentive for increasing labor productivity in

the camps - improved supply and nutrition of good production workers, giving high labor productivity indicators, monetary bonuses for this category of prisoners and a lighter camp regime with a general improvement in their everyday life.

provisions.

In relation to individual prisoners, excellent workers, who for a long time in the camps give high labor indicators, allow them to be released on parole by the decision of the Collegium of the NKVD or the Special Meeting of the NKVD at the special request of the camp commander and the head of the Political Department of the camp.

3. In relation to truants, refusers of work and disorganizers of production, apply severe coercive measures - an enhanced camp regime, punishment cell, worse material and living conditions and other disciplinary measures. To the most malicious disruptors of camp life and production, apply

more severe, judicial penalties, in some cases up to and including capital punishment.



About all cases of application of these measures of influence widely  
notify campers.

4. To supply the camp labor force with food and industrial clothing in such a way that the physical capabilities of the camp labor force can be used to the maximum in any production. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to revise and approve the norms for supplying food and clothing to the camp workforce of the

People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 54-55. Script.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 3. The

text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Pankratiev, Molotov, Rychkov p. 1, Gorkin p. 1, 2, 3.

## **No. 57**

# **From the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the state mark, refineries and the management of precious metals" [18]**

**06/15/1939**

Strictly secret 214 —

About Goznak, refineries and precious metals administration (PB dated 10.V.39, pr. No. 2, p. 159). (Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of

People's Commissars of the USSR.) Take the following decision (see Appendix).

APPENDIX To clause 214 (o.p.) pr. PB No. 3

### ***ABOUT GOZNAK, REFINERY AND PRECIOUS METALS DEPARTMENT***

Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council  
People's Commissars of the USSR

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR note that a survey conducted by the NKVD of the USSR revealed serious shortcomings in the work of the Goznak Administration, its Moscow Printing Factory, the Administration of Precious Metals and the State Depository (GOKhRAN) of the Narkomfin of the USSR and Refinery No. 171 of the Narkomsvetmet:

I. The personnel of these enterprises are littered with alien and  
questionable items.

Accounting and control in separate areas of the Goznak printing factory  
poorly placed....

II.... The pantries of the State Repository do not meet modern requirements for protection  
against air attack and

digging.

III .... For the period from 1937 to the present, about 38 kg of gold have been received through the buying points of the State Bank (of which 14 kg for 4 months of 1939), which turned out to be gold stolen from the Refinery. The Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

decide: 1. To propose to the NKVD of the USSR Comrade. Zverev: a) to ensure the organization of work at the printing factory of Gostizdat, excluding any possibility of theft of banknotes, bank notes, bonds, loans and other government documents; <...>...

10. Transfer to the jurisdiction of the NKVD of the USSR the State Depository (GOKHRAN) of the People's

Commissariat of Finance of the USSR. 11. Establish that the NKVD of the USSR is in charge of storing state stocks of precious metals (gold, platinum, platinoids, silver), precious stones and other valuables, as well as the diamond fund of the USSR.

12. Establish that the precious metal coming from refineries, as well as from other organizations, is accepted by the State Depository of the NKVD of the USSR for storage only from the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR. 13.

Assign dismantling

and sorting to the Gokhran of the NKVD of the USSR incoming valuables (confiscations, bought gold) ...

15. Establish that precious metals, precious stones and other valuables in the storerooms of the GOKHRAN are simultaneously accounted for by the Precious Metals Administration of the Narkomfin of the USSR. Financial settlements both

with suppliers and with recipients of precious metals and other valuables are made by the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR. 16. To oblige the

People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR to hand over, and the NKVD of the USSR to accept the State Depository, organizing a thorough quantitative and qualitative check of the entire state stock of precious metals, precious stones and other valuables during acceptance and delivery. Finish the acceptance within two months and submit the acceptance certificate to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

17. Propose to the NKVD of the USSR to develop and submit to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR measures to improve storage

state reserves, precious metals and other valuables.

18. To manage the work of the State Repository (GOKHRAN), organize a department in the NKVD system of the USSR under the name "5th Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR." Approve the structure and staff of the 5th Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR (attached). Approve comrade as the head of the department. Vladimirova V.N. 19. Introduce the

institution of NKVD commissars at Goznak, a printing factory in Moscow, paper mills in Leningrad and Krasnokamsk, and at the refineries of the USSR People's Commissariat of Colors, entrusting them with the supervision of order, the fight against all kinds of possible abuses and theft, and the implementation of Chekist operational work at these enterprises . 20. For the Chekist-operational service of the enterprises of Goznak and refineries, as well

as for the management of the NKVD commissars, organize a special department as part of the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR under the name "4th Department of the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR", heading this department as deputy head of the Main Economic Directorate. Approve the structure and staff of the 4th department of the GEM NKVD of the USSR (attached). To approve the head of the department, concurrently, the deputy head of the GEM comrade. Andreeva.

21. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to release the necessary additional appropriations to the NKVD to increase the number of military guards of Goznak enterprises, refineries and GOKHRAN.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks J. STALIN Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.

MOLOTOV Sov. secret.

### ***STRUCTURE AND STAFF***

5th SPECIAL DEPARTMENT of the NKVD of the  
USSR (for the leadership of the  
GOKHRAN) Head

- 1 Deputy. chief - 1

Secretary - 1

typist - 1 4 people

Operative. - 2 Chap. controllers

- 1 controllers - 11 TOTAL:

18 people

### ***STRUCTURE AND STAFF***

4th DEPARTMENT of the GEM NKVD of  
the USSR (for monitoring Goznak and refineries) Head - 1, he is also  
deputy. early GEM Deputy chief - 1 Secretary -  
1 typists - 2 5 people.

Operative. - 3  
Commissars of the  
NKVD

under Goznak - 9 under  
Leningrad. paper mill — 5 Krasnokamsk paper  
mill — 5 refinery in Moscow — 5 refinery  
in Sverdlovsk — 3 30 people TOTAL: 35 people  
RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 56, 71-74. Script.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 3.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria,  
Bulganin, Zverev, Samokhvalov, Khlomov - all; Denisov - 3, Malenkov - 8, 9, 18, 19, 20.

## **No. 58**

# **Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on providing labor for the work carried out by the NKVD of the USSR in**

**06/16/1939**

11 - On the provision of labor force for the work carried out by the NKVD of the USSR in 1939

Approve the following resolution of the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR: "In order to ensure the implementation of the work plan for the capital construction of the most important construction projects carried out by the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR in 1939, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides :

1. Allow the NKVD of the USSR to stop issuing orders for the allocation of the GULAG workforce for other people's commissariats and departments.

2. To provide manpower for construction projects carried out by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR in the Far East, to allow the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR during June and July of 1939 to transfer 120 thousand people to the Far East by: a) removing 60

thousand prisoners from work in other people's commissariats, according to the application;

b) transfer to camps from corrective labor colonies sentenced to up to 2 years.

3. To propose to the NKPS that, at the request of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the transportation of 120 thousand people to the Far East in accordance with Art. 2 of this resolution.

4. In connection with the implementation of these measures, to propose to the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR, together with the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, to review the plan for financing the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR for 1939 and submit it within 10 days for approval by the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

5. Allow the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR to remove from January 1, 1940, the entire workforce of the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR from other people's commissariats,

departments and organizations. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1011. L. 4. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 4.

**No. 59**

**Decree of the Politburo of the KC of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the reorganization of the courier communications of the NKVD of the USSR"**

**06/16/1939**

12 - On the reorganization of the courier communications of the NKVD of the USSR

reorganization of the courier communications of the NKVD of the USSR (see Appendix).

***APPLICATION***

to paragraph 12, pr. PB

No. 4 ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

(Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 16, 1939) The Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR decides: 1. To produce by August 1, 1939 reduction in the strength of the courier communications of the NKVD of the USSR to 2000 people, leaving behind the courier communications of the NKVD of the USSR the transportation of secret and top secret correspondence of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Defense, the People's Commissariat of Military Fleet and the

NKVD of the USSR from Moscow to republican, regional and regional centers and back.

2. Establish that the correspondence of the institutions and organizations listed above, addressed to the remaining points, is transported by the People's Commissariat of Communications.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1011. L. 5, 46. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 4.



**No. 60**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on  
the abolition of the conditional early release of convicts"**

**06/16/1939**

Strictly secret 17

- On the abolition of the parole of convicts

(PB dated 10.VI.39, pr. No. 3, p. 164)

In addition to the decision of the Central Committee of June 10, 1939, to accept the proposal of comrade. Beria on the abolition of parole also for convicts serving sentences in corrective labor colonies and prisons. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25.

L. 75. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 4. The text contains a typewritten note

about the distribution: "Extracts

sent t.t. Beria, Pankratov, Gorkin, Khlomov, Rychkov.

**No.**

## **61 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the arrested N.A. Bogomolov**

**06/17/1939**

No. 2154/

b of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade S TALIN I am sending the protocol of interrogation of the arrested, former trade representative of the USSR in England -

Nikolai Alexandrovich BOGOMOLOV dated June 15, 1939. Of the persons exposed by BOGOMOLOV in anti-Soviet work, in order to further develop the investigation, the NKVD of

the USSR considers it necessary to arrest: 1. MOSINA Nina Vasiliievna, former deputy. Trade Representative of the USSR in England, currently editor of the Press Department of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign

Countries (pp. 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 25, 27, 28). In addition, according to the testimony of the now convicted former Deputy People's Commissar SUDIN, he was associated with MOSINA as a member of a right-wing Trotskyist organization.

As a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization MOSINA by denounced by Also the testimony of former employees the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade - TAMARIN, LEVIN and MASHKEVICH.

2. Ivan Mikhailovich KOTELNIKOV - Deputy

Chairman of Exportkhleb (pp. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27).

Now convicted, the former head of the Main Directorate of the Knitting Industry of the People's Commissariat of Light Industry of the USSR - GUREVICH testified that he was personally connected with KOTELNIKOV as a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization.

3. ROTHLEIDER Mikhail Abramovich - former head of the Press Department and the Economic Department of the USSR Trade Representation in

England, and currently the head of the planning department of the Tea Industry Administration (pp. 10, 11, 12, 14). 4. Efim

Yakovlevich BELITSKY, the former authorized representative of Exportles in England, and at the present time the head of the Financial Department of Glavavtoprom (pp. 9, 10, 11).

In addition, the testimony of the arrested SUDYIN - BELITSKY is exposed as a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organizations.

5. Max Abramovich KLEBANOV—former chief accountant of the USSR Trade Mission in London, and currently an auditor-accountant in Exportles (pp. 21, 22).

I ask for your instructions.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 376. L. 91-92. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "To Molotov, Mikoyan. Arrest all five. I. St. "For - Molotov"; "For - Mikoyan."

**No. 62**

**Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of  
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on  
the exchange of arrested German citizens for Soviet sailors**

**06/28/1939**

Top secret 114

— Question of the

NKID Release and expel from the USSR in exchange for 7 sailors from the Komsomol crew, the captain of the Tsyurupa comrade Solovyov, junior commander Mosolov A. and lieutenant Boyko N.A. the following German citizens arrested and serving sentences in the USSR: 1. Harry

Buchengein 2.

Johann Binenstein 3.

Vyacheslav

Goering 4. Victor

Panzer 5.

Pausch Paul 6.

Maximilian Rissock

7. Francis Stosse. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 79. Original.

Typescript. Protocol number 4.

**No. 63**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the Spaniards in Odessa"**

**07/01/1939**

Strictly secret

126 - About the Spaniards in Odessa

Approve Comrade Beria's proposals for the following activities:

1. to relocate the Spaniards (fascists) leaving abroad to another room;
2. Deliver the

Spaniards traveling to Spain in groups to Istanbul on Soviet ships, ensuring that they obtain visas for transit through Turkey. Send the Nazis last; 3. for Spaniards traveling to other countries

(except Spain), to provide entry visas and also send them on Soviet ships to the points closest to these countries;

4. reconsider the use of Spaniards working as laborers; 5. through the All-Union Central Council

of Trade Unions, to ensure political and educational work among the Spaniards remaining in the USSR and to assist them in learning the Russian

language. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 80. Original.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 4. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Beria, Molotov, Dukelsky, Shvernik.

# **No. 64 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about specialist prisoners used in a special technical bureau under the NKVD of the USSR [19]**

**07/04/1939**

No. 2561 /

b Top secret of the

Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade S T A L I N U Organized in 1938 under the NKVD of the USSR, the Special Technical Bureau currently consists of seven main production groups: 1) aircraft construction, 2) aircraft diesel industry, 3) shipbuilding, 4) artillery, 5) gunpowder, 6) poisonous substances, 7) armor steels.

These groups employ 316 specialists arrested by the NKVD in the period 1937-1938. for participation in anti-Soviet, wrecking, espionage, sabotage and other counter-revolutionary organizations.

The investigation into the cases of these arrested persons was suspended as early as 1938, and they are kept in custody without any sentences in the position of investigators.

It is not advisable to resume the investigation of these cases and refer them to the court in the usual manner, since, firstly, this will distract the arrested specialists for a long time from the design of the most important objects and, in fact, disrupt the work of the Special Technical Bureau, and, secondly, the investigation will not give essentially positive results due to the fact that the arrested, being in mutual communication for a long time during work, agreed among themselves on the nature of their testimony during the preliminary investigation. Meanwhile, the guilt of the arrested was confirmed during the preliminary investigation by the personal confessions of the arrested,

testimonies of accomplices (many of whom have already been convicted) and witnesses.

Proceeding from this, the NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary: 1) the arrested specialists in the amount of 316 people used at work in the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR, without resuming the investigation, should be brought to trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR; 2) depending on the severity of the crime committed, divide the arrested into three categories: those subject to conviction for terms of up to 10 years, up to 15 years and up to 20 years; 3) assignment to the categories to entrust to a commission consisting of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the prosecutor of the USSR and the chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR; 4) in order to encourage the work of arrested specialists in the Special Technical Bureau, to secure them in this work and to create an incentive for further work on the design of the most important objects of defense significance, to grant the right to the NKVD of the USSR to enter with a petition to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on application to convicted specialists who have shown himself at work in the Special Technical Bureau, both full parole and reduced sentences. I ask for your instructions. APPENDIX: List of those arrested used at work in the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 142. L. 84-86. Script. Typescript. Published without attachment. On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "T-schu Beria. Agree. I. Stalin.

specialists,

# **No. 65 SPECIAL MESSAGE L.P. Berii I.V. STALIN**

ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE "DIVERSION AND PREDICTION ORGANIZATION" IN THE TRUST "SOVIETSKUGOL"

July 6, 1939 No. 2584/6

of the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - comrade. TO STALIN \* On March 19, 1939, in the Donbass \* (Khanzhenskovo station) at mine No. 13 of the BIS of the Sovetskutol trust \* an explosion occurred,

as a result of which 95 miners died. The investigation of this case established that the explosion was prepared and carried out by members of an anti-Soviet sabotage and sabotage organization that existed in the Sovetskutol trust and at Mine No. 13 of the BIS of the same trust in the following composition\*:

1. \* MELLER Emmanuil Fedorovich \*, born in 1875, non-partisan, \* former professor at the Industrial Institute of Stalino \*, son of a gendarme general, head of the gendarme department in the city. Thule. Arrested twice: in 1919 for living on someone else's documents, sentenced to one year in prison, but was released by the whites; in 1931 as a member of a counter-revolutionary military insurgent organization. A son and two sons-in-law are arrested for anti-Soviet work. He confessed that in 1918-1919 he informed the German occupiers about the moods of the workers of Donbass, since 1923 he was a member of the Shakhtintsev organization, since 1928 he was an agent of German intelligence. He is the initiator of sabotage at mine No. 13 BIS.

2. \* VASILCHIKOV Mikhail Savvich \*, born in 1891, married to the daughter of MELLER, \* former head of the technical department of the Sovetskutol trust \*. He confessed

that since 1925 he was a member of the Shakhtintsev organization, a member of the sabotage and sabotage organization in the Sovetskutol trust, the organizer of the explosion at mine No. 13 BIS.



3. \*ZHIROV Alexander Sergeevich\*, born in 1908, former member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1929, \*former chief engineer of the Sovetskutol trust\*. He confessed

that since 1938 he was a member of a sabotage and wrecking organization in a trust and participated in the preparation of the explosion. 4. \*PRIMAKOV Ivan

Efimovich\*, born in 1902, former member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1924, \*former chief mechanic of the Sovetskutol trust\*. He confessed that he was a member

of an organization in a trust and that he was preparing an explosion.

5. \*MIKHAILENKO Semyon Evstigaevich\*, born in 1888, former member of the CPSU (b) since 1929, \*former tunneling engineer of mine No. 13 BIS\* "Nikopol-Mariupolskaya" of the trust "Kuibyshevutol", we are on trial for embezzlement of public funds.

Confessed to being a participant in the organization and prepared explosion at mine No. 13 BIS.

6. \*ILINYKH Alexander Yakovlevich\*, born in 1903, former member of the CPSU (b) since 1925, \* deputy. head mine No. 13 BIS\*.

He confessed that since 1929 he has been on the right-wing Trotskyist positions, since 1936 he has been a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization; deliberately harmed, along with other pests, created an emergency situation at mine No. 13 BIS.

7. \* MIROSHNICHENKO Kuzma Ivanovich \*, born in 1898, non-partisan, \* former deputy. Chief Engineer of Mine No. 13 BIS\*, convicted twice for blockages and accidents in mines. Confessed to being a participant in a wrecking

sabotage organization and participated in the preparation of the explosion.

8. \* YASENEV Pavel Fedorovich \*, born in 1896, former member of the CPSU (b) since 1930, \* former head of ventilation of mine No. 13 BIS \*. Four times he was in office with the wording "as not doing his job."

He confessed that since 1934 he had been a member of a right-wing Trotskyist organization, in 1934 he contacted a sabotage and wrecking group at mine 13 BIS and was the main organizer of the explosion. 9. \*IVANOV Vasily Nikolaevich\*, born in 1908, non-partisan, \*former chief

mechanic of mine No. 13 BIS\*, on trial for

domestic crimes. He

confessed that since 1938 he was a member of a sabotage and sabotage organization, harmed BIS at mine No. 13 and supervised the preparation of the

explosion. 10. \*PODDUBNY Fedor Tikhonovich\*, born in 1910, non-partisan, \*former head of the section of mine No. 13 BIS\*, tried in 1926 for theft, in 1928 for banditry. He did not

confess, but was exposed by the testimony of IVANOV, YASENEV and MIKHAILENKO, as a participant in the

preparation of sabotage. \* The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to organize a hearing of this case by a public process, at the scene of the crime, i.e. at Art. Khanzhenkovo, Makeevsky district, Stalin region of the Ukrainian SSR, with the involvement of the persons

listed above as accused

\*. I ask for your instructions. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 333. L. 190-193. Copy. Typescript. On the first sheet there is a resolution: "I agree. I.

Stalin", litter: "From Comrade Beria". \*—\* Underlined in pencil.

**No. 66**

**Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the deportation of arrested Iranian citizens from the USSR**

**07/10/1939**

Strictly secret 33

- NKID question 1.

Instruct the NKID to propose to the Iranian government within 10 days to finally resolve the issue of accepting all 2,126 arrested Iranian citizens to be deported from the USSR, together with members of their families.

At the same time, warn the Iranian government that otherwise the appropriate Soviet authorities will deal with the indicated Iranian subjects in accordance with the decision of the court, to which they will be transferred in the usual manner.

2. Instruct the NKVD in case the Iranian government refuses to accept the arrested Iranian nationals with their families, send them to the northern regions of Kazakhstan.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D 255. L. 126. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 5.

**No. 67**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on a special  
regime for the Manchurian consuls in the cities of Chita and Blagoveshche**

**07/23/1939**

141 - On the special regime for the Manchurian consuls in the years. Read and Blagoveshchensk

In connection with a number of incessant police and White Guard provocations in Harbin against the Soviet consulate, as well as at the Manchuria station in relation to the workers of the Soviet consulate and the workers of the Molotov railway. road to carry out the following activities in relation to the Manchurian consuls in the years. Chita and Blagoveshchensk:

1) Surround both consulates with security and not let anyone through outsiders.

2) Break off the telegraph connection between these consulates and Manchukuo.

3) Turn off all phones. 4) Do not accept any telegrams to Manchuria from both consulates due to the telegraph being busy. 5) Each employee of the consulates, including the consuls themselves, leaving the premises of the consulates, must be accompanied by two agents of the NKVD, who must not let him out from under close supervision.

6) Restrict Consulates to Supply Food Items half. 7) Stop

issuing gasoline for consular cars. RGASPI. F. 17. Op.

162. D. 25. L. 114-115. Script.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 5.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extract was sent to comrade. Molotov."

**No. 68**

**Circular of the NKVD of the USSR, the Prosecutor's Office  
of the USSR and the People's Commissariat  
of Justice of the USSR on investigative work [\[20\]](#)**

**07/25/1939**

No.

136 Sov. secret

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS, TO THE HEADS OF THE REGIONAL AND REGIONAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE NKVD, TO THE PROSECUTORS OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS, TERRITORIES AND REGIONS, TO THE CHAIRMANS OF THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE UNION AND OF AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS, CHAIRMANS OF TERRITORIAL AND REGIONAL COURTS, CHAIRMANS OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS Despite a number of instructions and

directives The NKVD of the USSR, the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR on the procedure for implementing the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938, are still in the investigative work of the NKVD bodies, in the work of the Prosecutor's Office for the implementation of supervision and in the work of the supreme, regional, regional, district courts and military tribunals for the consideration of cases of counter-revolutionary crimes, there are serious shortcomings. Separate NKVD and UNKVD have not yet completed the investigation of old stale investigative cases. In the process of investigation, the NKVD bodies do not always take the necessary measures for a comprehensive and complete investigation of cases, which often leads to their return by the Prosecutor's Office and the courts for further investigation. In turn, the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office and the courts return cases to the bodies of the NKVD for additional investigation without sufficient grounds or for unimportant reasons, setting sometimes impossible requirements (on the interrogation of persons convicted of CMN, who left the USSR, actively developed, etc.). For the period from January 1 to

additional investigation by the NKVD of more than 50% of investigative cases. In some territories and regions, the percentage of returned cases is even higher. So, in the Chelyabinsk region, out of cases sent to the courts and the Prosecutor's Office for the same period, cases for 1559 people were returned cases for 1599 people. The NKVD for the Altai Territory sent cases to the court and the Prosecutor's Office for 661 people, but received returned cases for 787 people (the surplus of cases returned are cases sent to the Prosecutor's Office and the judicial authorities before January 1, 1939).

A similar situation with the return of cases for additional investigation takes place in the Ordzhonikidze Territory, Moscow, Leningrad, Tula and other regions. Bodies of the Prosecutor's Office

could significantly reduce the return of cases to additional investigation if they took an active part in the investigation and pointed out to the investigators in time the circumstances

subject to investigation.

Courts often remand cases for further investigation on circumstances that, with the active conduct of the trial, could be clarified in court.

Along with this, there is a long delay in the consideration of investigative cases by the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office and the court, as a result of which they currently have a significant number of arrests.

In order to decisively eliminate shortcomings in the implementation by the NKVD bodies, the Prosecutor's Office and the court of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938, WE ORDER: In the course of the investigation with the necessary completeness to clarify the circumstances of the case on all counts of the

accusation. 2. In accordance with the norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office should take into account all pending cases, ensure real supervision over the course of the preliminary investigation, familiarize themselves more thoroughly with the cases and be constantly aware of them in order to eliminate the noticed shortcomings of the investigation in a timely manner, while still in the process of investigation, speed up the completion of investigative cases, direct them to jurisdiction and prevent the return of cases for further investigation.

3. Bodies of the Prosecutor's Office, if necessary, themselves carry out additional investigative actions on investigative cases received from the NKVD. 4. The

chairmen of the supreme, regional, regional, district courts and special courts should pay serious attention to the full use of their rights in the course of the court session to investigate the circumstances of the case and supplement the data of the preliminary investigation with new materials of the judicial investigation. The courts should return for further

investigation only those cases in which the shortcomings of the preliminary investigation cannot be made up for in a court session.

Prosecutors acting

in courts must also take all measures to clarify all the circumstances of the case, initiating protests in the prescribed manner in the event that the court issues an unreasonable verdict of acquittal or a ruling on the return of the case for further investigation. People's Commissar int.

Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

Prosecutor of the USSR PANKRATIEV People's

Commissar of Justice of the USSR

RYCHKOV July 25, 1939 No. 136 of the  
Administrative

Code

of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 7. L. 18-19. Copy. Typescript.

**No. 69**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the German citizen V. Geisthuizen**

***05/11/1937***

189 - Question of the

People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to replace the German citizen V. Geisthuizen with capital punishment (execution) - 10 years in prison.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 143. Copy. Typescript.  
Protocol No. 49.



**No. 70**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union**

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the crash of the DB-3 aircraft" [21]**

**07/29/1939**

Top secret 194 —

On the crash of the DB-3 plane To

instruct the NKVD to conduct a strict investigation into the circumstances of the crash of the DB-3 plane, in which comrade was killed. Kholzunov and others.

Report the results of

the investigation to the Central Committee and the

Council of People's Commissars. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 121.

Original.

Typescript. Protocol No. 5. In the text there is a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to Beria, Molotov."

**No. 71**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union**

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the Primorsky Territory" [22]**

**07/31/1939**

Strictly secret

210 — On the Primorsky

Territory To approve the following proposals of the NKVD on the procedure for

clearing the Primorsky Territory: 1. Instruct the NKVD of the USSR to carry out the cleansing of the Primorsky Territory from the anti-Soviet, alien and suspicious elements living in it (former whites, former Harbin residents, former kulaks and merchants , persons who lived abroad in the past or who have connections with

foreign countries, etc.). 2. Establish the following procedure for the cleansing of the region: a) the most malicious of the persons indicated in paragraph 1, passing through the materials of the NKVD of the Primorsky Territory, are arrested, and, depending on the results of the investigation, their cases are transferred to the courts or put on a Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR

b) lists of persons submitted to the Special Meeting, with a summary of the material established by the investigation, are carefully considered by the secretary of the Primorsky Territory Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. Pegov and the head of the NKVD comrade. Gvishiani, with the participation of the regional prosecutor and with their conclusion, are sent to a Special Meeting to decide on the appropriate punishment (imprisonment

in camps, exile and expulsion); c) all other persons passing through the materials, as well as the families of those repressed by the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR, are expelled from the Primorsky Territory in accordance with the application of existing regulations and instructions on living in border and sensitive areas to them. Materials about these persons are also considered by vol. Pegov and Gvishiani with the participation of the prosecutor, and the issue of them is resolved on the spot.

3. Complete all work on cleaning the edge within two months.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 123. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 5. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent to Comrade Beria, Primorsky Regional Committee Comrade Pegov - in code.

**No.**

**72 Cipher telegram Ya.A. Chubina I.V.  
Stalin about People's Commissar of Internal  
Affairs T.M. Borshchev [23]**

*08/05/1939*

No. 802 sh

Moscow, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN The Central Committee of Turkmenistan received a statement from Onopchenko, a senior accountant of the Ashgabat railway, that she was given the task by the People's Commissar of the NKVD Borshchev to determine which of the wives of the arrested NKVD officers wrote a collective letter to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in your name and the content of the letter, right there appointed her for tomorrow an intelligence meeting on the street near his apartment on August 1st.

Onopchenko, having appeared at the turnout, was invited by Borshchev to his apartment for a conversation, where Borshchev, according to Onopchenko, kept her until two in the morning and tried to rape her twice.

I, in the presence of the third secretary of the Central Committee, Ionychev, and the authorized CPC, Fonina Onopchenko, was summoned, where she fully confirmed her statement, she and her husband, communists, insist on an immediate investigation and analysis. Please instruct

Comrade Beria urgently sent a special commissioner to investigate.  
Secretary of the Central Committee of

Turkmenistan CHUBIN RGASPI. F.

558. Op. 11. D. 66. L. 8. Original. Typescript. On the sheet there is Stalin's resolution: "T-schu Beria. Note. I. Stalin.

**No.**

## **73 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the release of low-quality military products**

**08/10/1939**

No. 3456 /

b of the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN In

March and June 1939, the NKVD of the USSR reported that fuses of the KT type were dangerous in handling and

storage, as there were cases of their explosion in warehouses. By a resolution of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 13, 1939, the NKVD was entrusted with establishing the causes and culprits for the

introduction of low-quality KT-type fuses into production. \*Industrial investigation established\*: In 1930, the designer Vasiliev M.F. (now a military engineer, head of the faculty of the Art Academy of the Red Army, doctor of technical sciences) the semi-safety wartime fuse "KAT-1" was developed, designed for 45 m / m and 76 m / m guns and named after completion "KT-1"

In 1931, at the suggestion of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, the designer of the Central Design Bureau No. 22 (Leningrad) Kondratiev (condemned to VMN as a participant in the anti-Soviet military conspiracy) and Ponomarev (now working as a designer of TsKB-22) reworked the CAT-10 fuse into the CT-1 "for use \* not only in guns, but also in howitzers by reducing the resistance of the claw fuse from 20 kg to 14 kg \*, which created the danger of an explosion of the fuse during storage and transportation (sharp shocks, falling). Another serious drawback of the KT-1 fuse was

the jamming of the impact rod, as a result of which premature ruptures at the muzzle of the gun were obtained during firing.

From 1931 to 1938, 35 cases of such gaps were registered in the Red Army during practical firing. Despite the

design flaws, in 1931, by order of the former head of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army \*Simonov\* and the head of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Artillery Directorate \*Rogovsky\* (both sentenced to VMN), the KT-1 fuse was \*introduced to gross production\*. In parallel with the KT-1 fuse, the designs of the KT-2 and KT-3 fuses were developed and introduced into production, differing from the KT-1 only in the size of the external thread.

From 1931 to 1933, KT type fuses were manufactured at the plants named after M. Gelts and F. Engels in Leningrad with the above defects. Only in

1933, the Red Army Artillery Directorate made the necessary design changes to the drawings of the KT fuses, but \* did not provide all manufacturing plants with these drawings \*, so Plant No. 10 of the People's Commissariat of Munitions in Perm continued to produce fuses of the \* KT type according to unfinished drawings until 1935 \*. Thus, from 1931

to 1936, low-quality fuses were supplied from factories to the arsenal of the Red Army. During this time, a total of

**\*\*5,464,000\*\*** fuses of the KT type were manufactured. In addition, at the

manufacturing plants there were gross violations of technical specifications, the technological process of manufacturing and acceptance of KT-type fuses, both by employees of the technical control department and by the military

representative's office. As a result of this, fuses with a cocked percussion mechanism fell on the equipment, which led to three explosions with human casualties in military depots Nos. 34, 35, 39 in 1936

and 1939. One of the grossest violations of the technological process for the manufacture of fuses was the use of \* etching the claw fuses with a mixture of nitric \* and sulfuric acids in order to select the required resistance, which \* caused the mass destruction of these parts discovered in the middle of 1938 \*. The destruction of the pawl fuse makes the fuses of the KT type dangerous for storage in warehouses, during transportation and during the delivery of the projectile into the gun channel.

In view of this, at present, in order to replace the destroyed fuses, all the KT-type fuses available in the Red Army in the amount of 5 million pieces are being sorted.

In addition, the use of etching before 1939 in KTM-type fuses, manufactured since 1937 instead of KT and having fuses similar to KT, indicates the need to check these fuses as well. Such work to replace and check fuses and fuses of the KT and KTM type requires

more than 45 million rubles and deprives the Red Army of a complete shot. As early as 1934, industry workers and the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, in particular Khasin, Zapolsky and Ivanov,

knew about the cracking of clawed fuses during storage as a result of etching them with acid.

According to the materials received in 1934 from the Lysvensky plant (Lysva) about the cracking of the pawl fuses by the indicated workers of industry and the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, no measures were taken, and the etching of parts KT-1, 2, 3 continued until 1936, and in fuses of the KTM type until 1939. The culprits in the armament of the Red Army for the introduction of low-quality fuses on KT-1, 2, 3 are:

1) the former head of the AU of the Red Army

Simonov; 2) the former head of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army Rogovsky (both sentenced to VMN), who introduced structurally unfinished KT fuses into gross production;

3) Stafeev Fedor Evstafievich, now works at a typewriter factory in the city of Ligovo, Leningrad Region, former head of the assembly and electrolysis shops of the plant named after M. Geltsa, from 1930 to 1936, who handed over low-quality fuses for equipment, including the fuses that exploded in warehouses No. 34 and 39 (Kalinin Military District);

4) Razdobarin Tikhon Illarionovich, former military representative of the plant. M. Gelts and F. Engels, currently an engineer at the Artillery Research Experimental Range in Leningrad, from 1932 to 1936, who received for the Red Army clearly poor-quality KT-type fuses that exploded during storage in warehouses No. 34, 35 and 39 (Kalinin Military District );

5) Khasin Fridman Ruvimovich, military engineer of the 2nd rank, former head of the 10th sector of the Ammunition, Aviation and Artillery Directorate of the Red Army Artillery Directorate from 1931 to 1936, is currently seconded at the expense of a thousand to the People's Commissariat of Munitions, where he works as the head

of the Technical Department of the 6th Glaukus; 6) Sergey Alekseevich Zapolsky, military man, seconded at the expense of a thousand to the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, former deputy head of the 10th sector of the UBAA AU RKKA from 1931 to 1936, now works as a senior project engineer at the State Construction Design Institute No. 4; former cadet of the Mikhailovsky Artillery School; from 1917 to January 1918 he served in the old army on the Romanian front with the rank of ensign.

Khasin and Zapolsky did not ensure the introduction of modified drawings of KT-1, KT-2, KT-3 to all manufacturers and did not take measures to prevent the massive destruction of claw fuses, although they had material on cracking parts back in 1934.

7) Ivanov Georgy Alekseevich, military engineer of the 1st rank, ex. military representative of the AU of the Red Army at the factories. M. Gelts and F. Engels from 1931 to 1932 and former. head of the gross sector of the Aviation and Artillery Ammunition Directorate of the AU RKKA, currently the senior military representative of the Zlatoust plant, from 1932 to 1936 he headed the acceptance of KT-1, 2, 3 fuses, manufactured according to unfinished drawings, and did not take action on received cracking signals details. The NKVD

considers it necessary \* Khasin F.R., Zapolsky S.A. arrest and investigate. \*I ask for your instructions\*. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 343. L. 123-128. Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "From comrade Beria." On the last sheet there is a resolution: "I agree. I. St. "; litter: "Instruction was given to arrest Khasin. 18 August. L. Beria.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil. \*\*—\*\*

Underlined in pencil with two lines.



**No. 74**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union  
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the exchange of teams of Japanese and Soviet  
courts**

**08/11/1939**

Strictly secret 75

- Question of the NKID

1. Instruct the NKID and the NKVD to expel 12 Japanese ships and 21 people from the USSR. team, subject to the simultaneous release by the Japanese of the boat "D-30" and its team of 15 people. 2.

Propose to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to instruct the Embassy in Tokyo to take measures to repair the boat "D-30"

located in "Nanao". 3. Organization of delivery of the boat to the Union after its repair to assign to the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

4. To instruct the NKID after the exchange to discuss the issue of the monetary claims of the Japanese for the rescue of the D-30 boat and present them with counterclaims for our expenses related to the detention in 1937/38. Japanese ships in our waters. RGASPI. F.

17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 157. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 6. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Beria, Molotov.

**No.**

**75 Special message L.P. Berii  
I.V. Stalin about the invention  
of A.A. Vinokurov**

**08/14/1939**

No. 3517/

b Sov. secret

of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrade STALIN Since December 1938, Comrade. Vinokurov A.A. over the manufacture of a model of the invention he proposed - a gas aircraft turbine with a capacity of 16 thousand horsepower at 30 thousand revolutions and a machine weight of no more than 250 kg. The turbine must run on aviation gasoline gases. For the work of Comrade

Vinokurov, all the necessary material and technical conditions were created. By the beginning of July 1939,

Comrade Vinokurov had produced a sample machine (without a technical design and calculations), which was a gas turbine with an original shaft, at the end of which there is a powerful cone with grooves. The manufactured machine was tested from July 31 to August 7 this year. During testing, the turbine shaft was rotated by an electric motor at 1500-3000 revolutions, after which it was planned to rotate the shaft with compressed air from cylinders with pressure in the chambers up to 20 atmospheres. However, under air pressure, the shaft could not be rotated.

Prominent specialists of the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR were involved in testing the machine of Comrade

VINOKUROV. As a result of repeated tests of the machine and a thorough check of the reasons that delay the scrolling of the shaft, carried out with the participation of Comrade Vinokurov, it was found that the design of the shaft cone requires a long and thorough revision in the direction of changing the configuration of the blades. To this end, it has been deemed necessary to

lengthy experimental work in order to establish the correct angles of inclination of the blades, as well as the correct direction of the nozzles that give a gas jet from the combustion chamber. I entrusted the

organization of further experimental work on Comrade Vinokurov's machine to the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR. Tov. VINOKUROV will be provided with the necessary conditions to continue his work at OTB. At the same time Comrade VINOKUROV will be employed to study at the thermal engineering faculty of the Moscow Power Engineering Institute. V.M. Molotov. People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA Sov. secret

## **CONCLUSION**

ON THE INVENTION TOV. VINOKUROV (gas turbine) In

December 1938 Comrade. VINOKUROV in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR began to manufacture the invention he proposed - a gas aircraft turbine with a capacity of 16 thousand horsepower at 30 thousand revolutions, the weight of the machine should not exceed 250 kg. The working fluid of the specified engine should be aviation gasoline, for which all material and technical conditions were created for it. At the beginning of July 1939 Comrade. VINOKUROV

presented a model of the machine made according to his plan (technical design and calculations are not available), which is a gas turbine with an original shaft, at the end of which there is a powerful cone with milled grooves, which should be

shoulder blades.

Since the completion of the machine with a high-pressure pump for supplying air was not designed by the author by the time of readiness, it was planned to test the machine in air.

The manufactured machine was tested from 31.07 to 7.08 after the shaft was scrolled by an electric motor at 1500-3000 revolutions with compressed air from cylinders with pressure in the chambers from 3 to 20 atmospheres. However, it was not possible to turn the shaft under the air.

After a thorough study of the reasons that hinder the scrolling of the shaft, we came to the conclusion that the design of the cone with the milling of the blades of this configuration on it and at these angles requires a long work on them and experimental selection of the angles of inclination, as well as the direction of the nozzles that give the gas jet. Based on this, we believe that the machine should be put into long-term experimentation by the author and finalized,

respectively, with the acquisition of an additional unit (high-pressure pump) in a special laboratory organized for it.

August 11, 1939

VINOKUROV

LAPSHIN

DAVYDOV AP

RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 142. L. 102-105. Script.  
Typescript.

**No.**

**76 Special message L.P. Berii  
I.V. Stalin about the head of the  
UNKVD in the Perm region**

**08/14/1939**

No. 3531/b

Sov. secret of the

Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrade STALIN The head of the UNKVD for the Perm region is Comrade. SHAKHOV D.A., nominated for this job from among the employees of the Sverdlovsk Directorate of the NKVD in the organization of the

Perm Region. Tov. SHAKHOV, during his work in the Sverdlovsk region, made a number of serious mistakes in the past and is currently unable to provide leadership to the Perm NKVD. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the

USSR asks to dismiss comrade Dmitry Alexandrovich SHAKHOV from the post of head of the NKVD department for the Perm region and approve comrade Nikolai Stepanovich SAZYKIN as head of the NKVD department for the Perm region. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1233. L. 170. Original.

Typescript.

**No.**

**77 Special message L.P. Berii I.V.  
Stalin on the review of  
cases of those administratively  
expelled from central cities with the  
application of a draft order of the  
NKVD and the USSR prosecutor**

**08/17/1939**

No. 3630/b

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU(B.) TO COMRADE

STALIN During 1937-1938. when relatives of enemies of the people were evicted from the central cities of the USSR, a number of perversions were committed. As a rule, the expulsion was carried out without an investigation, without a decision of the judiciary or a Special Conference, no deadlines were set expulsions, a significant number of those evicted are classified as socially dangerous elements without proper grounds. Party and Soviet bodies,

the NKVD, the prosecutor's office, and the courts receive numerous complaints from this category of persons about their incorrect expulsion.

In the process of considering complaints of those expelled, cases were identified clearly unlawful expulsion.

In 1937, an employee ZHILINSKY was expelled from Leningrad with his family because in 1935 he was expelled from the CPSU (b) "for passivity".

In 1937, the seventy-year-old old man WEISFELD Ilya was expelled from Leningrad, who came to visit his stepdaughter, who was soon arrested. In 1938, c. SUMLIS Alexandra together

with 4 children aged from 11 months to 10 years for association with

husband, who has not yet been convicted and on May 9 of this year. released from custody due to lack of evidence of the charges.

The regime was indiscriminately extended to all those expelled, applicable to persons sentenced to exile for c.-r. crimes.

At the same time, among the persons deported in such a mass order, there are active enemies who hid from arrest and investigation due to their obviously insufficient checks at the time of mass deportations. The NKVD of the

USSR considers it necessary: 1. Before

January 1, 1940, to reconsider the cases of persons deported without determining the period of expulsion on the basis of instructions, separate orders of the NKVD and on the decisions of the Special Conference for 1935 year.

2. In order to review cases for the above category of deportees, organize a group of qualified employees in the NKVD of the USSR with the involvement of prosecutors, who should be instructed to carefully study the materials that served as the basis for the expulsion, and obtained during the time elapsed from the moment of expulsion. On the basis of these materials, depending on the degree of social danger of each deportee, to arrest active K.-R. elements, determine the terms of restriction in the rights of residence for socially dangerous elements and release from exile incorrectly

expelled.

3. Decisions on determining the period of expulsion and on restrictions on the rights of residence - to issue through a Special meeting at the NKVD of the USSR.

4. Instruction of the NKVD of the USSR of 15.VI.37 on the expulsion from the central cities of persons expelled from the CPSU (b) and family members of the repressed as contrary to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee

of the CPSU (b) of 17.XI.38. - cancel. The NKVD of the USSR asks to approve the attached draft order, agreed with the Prosecutor of the USSR.

I ask for your instructions.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank BERIA TOP

SECRET

<b>ORDER</b>
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"On the review of cases of administratively expelled from central cities" TO ALL

PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS, HEADS OF THE UNKVD OF THE TERRITORIES AND REGIONS

TO ALL PROSECUTORS OF THE ALLIED AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC, TERRITORIES AND

REGIONS In the course of mass operations to identify socially dangerous elements from Moscow, Leningrad and other central cities, the former enemy leadership of the NKVD made a number of perversions: the expulsion, as a rule, was carried out without a differentiated approach, the expulsion terms were not determined, a number of persons were classified as socially hazardous elements without good reason.

By the Circular of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR No. 80 dated April 13, 1938, the same regime was indiscriminately applied to all those deported: the passports were taken away from the deportees, they live on certificates for administrative exiles, with the extension to them of all restrictions applied to persons sentenced to exile for k.-r. crimes.

At the same time, among those deported in such a mass order, there are active enemies who eluded arrest and repression due to their insufficient verification at the time of mass expulsion. 1. Instruction of the NKVD of the USSR dated June 15, 1937

on the procedure for the expulsion from the central cities of persons expelled from the CPSU (b) and members of the families of the repressed and a circular of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office USSR No. 80 dated 13.IV.38 - cancel.

2. Not later than January 1, 1940, review cases of administrative expulsion of the following categories: according to the orders of the

heads of the UNKVD, on the basis of the instructions of the NKVD of the USSR of June 15, 1937, from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog, Sochi and areas adjacent to Sochi - excluded from the CPSU (b) and family members repressed; b) expelled from Moscow without orders in April 1938, relatives of convicted enemies of the people,

living in the Government House on the street. Serafimovich, house. 2;



c) wives of repressed enemies of the people who were expelled in April 1938 from the city of Alma-Ata and settled in remote regions of Kazakhstan;

d) expelled in 1935 by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR from the city of Leningrad - without specifying the term, the so-called "former people". 3. The People's

Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union and Autonomous Republics, the heads of the UNKVD of the territories and regions on whose territory the deportees live, within a month, carefully check them and start records for all, in which to concentrate the materials received on the deportees during the time they served their sentences, send detailed descriptions of their behavior in exile and with their conclusions to those UNKVD from whose territory these persons were expelled. 4. Last, within 2 decades from the date of receipt of the cases, supplement the

records with the materials that served as the basis for the expulsion, check whether the indicated persons are following the verified testimonies of the arrested, undercover and other materials, and, together with their conclusions, submit the cases to the 1- th special department of the NKVD of the USSR - for consideration. 5. In the NKVD of the USSR, to consider these cases, allocate a group of qualified employees

from the Investigative Unit and the 1st Special Department under the leadership of Deputy. early The investigative unit of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. MAKAROVA and deputy. early 1st Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. BASHTAKOV. To instruct the indicated group, by means of a detailed study of the incoming materials and

assessment on their basis of the degree of social

dangers of each individual to draw up and agree with

The USSR Prosecutor's Office's conclusions on the release from exile of those incorrectly deported, on the determination of the term for restricting the rights of residence for socially dangerous elements, and on the arrest of active K.-R. elements who took refuge during the mass eviction

enforce through the 1st Special Department of the NKVD, about arrest - through the Investigative Department of the NKVD of the USSR, about determining the period of expulsion and restrictions on the rights of residence - through a Special Conference.

For all those released from expulsion, to remove watchlists from the address bureaus and destroy them. People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR L.P. BERIA Prosecutor of the USSR PANKRATIEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 376. L. 141-147. Script.

Typescript.

**No.**

**78 Note by I.V. Stalin I.I. Proskurov [24]  
about intelligence personnel**

***08/25/1939***

Tov. Proskurov

There is a government decree not to have Poles, Finns, Latvians, Estonians, Germans, etc. in the service of intelligence. Who recommended this Finn to you, who for some reason bears the name Voroshilov. I. St. AP RF. F. 3. Op.

58. D. 255. L. 127. Copy. Typescript.

**No. 79**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union  
Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on appointments for the NKVD"**

**09/02/1939**

261 - On appointments by the  
NKVD a)

Approve: 1. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR comrade Serov I.A., now working as deputy head of the Main Directorate of State Security and head of the Secret Political Department of the NKVD of the USSR, with his release from work in the NKVD of the USSR. 2.

Head of the 2nd department of the NKVD of the USSR - comrade P.V. Fedotov, now working as deputy head of this

department. 3. Head of G.E.U. NKVD of the USSR - comrade Kobulov B.Z., with his release from the duties of deputy head of the GUGB and head of the Investigative

Department of the NKVD of the USSR. 4. Head of the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR - comrade Davydov M.A., who

is currently working as the deputy head of this bureau. b) Authorize the reorganization of the Investigative Unit of the NKVD of the USSR and the formation of investigative units: a) the Main Directorate of State Security; b) the Main Economic Department and c) the Main

Transport Department. c) Approve: 1. Head of the Investigative Unit and Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR Comrade V.T. Sergeenko, now working as an assistant to the head of the Investigative Unit of the NKVD of the USSR

2. Head of the Investigation Department of the Main Economic Directorate - comrade Meshik P.Ya., now working as an assistant to the head of the Investigative Department of the

NKVD of the USSR. 3. Head of the Investigative Department of the Main Transport Directorate - comrade Sinegubov N.I., who worked as a deputy

Head of the 1st Department of the Main Transport Directorate of the  
NKVD

of the USSR. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1013. L. 63-64. Script.  
Typescript.

Protocol number 6.

**No. 80**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of  
Bolsheviks on sending an interned company of Manchus to Kazakhstan**

**09/02/1939**

Top secret 262 -

Question of the NKVD

Accept the proposal of the NKVD to send an interned company of Manchus (located at the Honghuz junction) to Kazakhstan for further evacuation to Xinjiang.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 165-166. Script.  
Typescript.

Protocol No. 6.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Molotov, Merkulov (NKVD)."

**No. 81**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union**

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on radio stations" [25]**

**09/02/1939**

Strictly secret 263

- On radio stations ("decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks") The Council

of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decide: ) dated September 5, 1937, in Siberia and the Far East, radio stations, along with their main work of blocking the anti-Soviet broadcasting of foreign radio stations, should also be used to serve the population with broadcasting. 2. To suggest to

the People's Commissariat of Communications that these radio stations operate under the name of existing broadcast radio stations so that they are not deciphered.

3. Oblige the People's Commissariat of Communications not to register these radio stations with the Bern and other international radio communications bureaus, and also not to publish them in officially published lists in the USSR.

4. To propose to the People's Commissariat of Communications within 15 days to draw up an operational plan to combat the anti-Soviet broadcasting of foreign radio stations and submit this plan to the Economic Council.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 165-166. Script.  
Typescript.

Protocol No. 6.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Peresyepkin, Beria, Voroshilov, Khlomov.

**No. 82**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union  
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the increase in the Kremlin garrison**

**09/02/1939**

Strictly secret

265 - Question of the

NKVD Accept the proposal of the NKVD to increase the garrison of  
the Office of the Commandant of the Moscow

Kremlin by 406 people. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 25. L. 166.

Original.

Typescript. Protocol No. 6. The text contains a typewritten note about  
the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Merkulov, Khlomov.



**No. 83**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union**

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the transfer of the city of Murmansk to a regime position**

**09/16/1939**

Strictly secret 122

- About the city of

Murmansk. 1) Transfer the city of Murmansk to a regime position. 2) Carry out this measure gradually, without noise and without unnecessarily intimidate

people. 3) In any case, deport from Murmansk no more than 500-700 unconditionally suspicious people, especially Finns, Estonians and other foreigners. Issue passports to the rest of the unpassported and ensure that Murmansk is not littered with anti-Soviet elements.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 26. L. 5. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 7.

**No. 84**

**From the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of  
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks  
"Issues of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus"**

**10/01/1939**

252 - Issues of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus 32.

Instruct comr. Beria and Mekhlis to submit proposals on issues of prisoners of war and refugees within three days. RGASPI.

F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1014. L. 57, 61. Original.

Typescript.

Protocol number 7.

## **No. 85**

# **Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on measures to combat interference with the work of radio stations of the USSR from foreign radio stations"**

**10/02/1939**

Strictly secret 258

- On measures to combat interference with the operation of radio stations USSR from foreign radio stations

Approve the next decision of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars USSR:

"1. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Communications to intensify the fight against interference with the work of radio stations of the USSR by radio stations of foreign states and the penetration of anti-Soviet broadcasting of foreign radio stations into the

territory of the USSR. 2. In order to strengthen the fight against interference with the operation of radio stations in the USSR by foreign radio stations, allow the NKSvyaz to carry out in 1939 the construction of simplified radio transmitters and the retrofitting of existing radio stations.

Allocate 8 million rubles from the reserve fund to NKSvyaz for these purposes SNK USSR.

3. Permit the NKSvyaz to form a special service within the radio department of the NKSvyaz to combat interference with the operation of USSR radio stations by foreign radio stations, in this regard increasing the staff of the NKSvyaz by 25 people and the staff of the regional communications departments by 144 people.

Allocate NKSvyazi in 1939 for the maintenance of this service from reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars

of the USSR 900 thousand rubles. 4. To entrust the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR with the leadership of all measures to combat interference with the work of radio stations in the USSR from radio stations of foreign states.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 26. L. 19. Original. Typescript. Protocol  
No. 7. The text

contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts  
sent by: t.t. Peresypkin, Beria, Pomaznev.

**No. 86**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on  
awarding employees of the NKVD with the  
attachment of a special message to L.P. Beria and  
the draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR**

**10/16/1939**

85 - On the awarding of Serikov P.A., Esipenko D.I., Bokova Ya.E. and others  
Approve

the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on awarding t.t. Serikova  
P.A., Esipenko D.I., Bokova Ya.E. and others (see appendix). October 14, 1939 No. 4616/  
b Sov. secret of the

Central Committee of  
the All-

Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN

In connection with the successful completion of a special task by a group of NKVD  
workers, the NKVD of the USSR asks to award 5 comrades who completed the task with  
orders of the USSR.

I am enclosing a draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

**DECREE**

OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION  
OF THE SSR About rewarding vol. P. A. Serikova, D. I. Esipenko,  
and Ya. E. Bokova and others

For the successful completion of the \* government \* task AWARD: ORDER OF THE  
"RED STAR" 1.

SERIKOV Pavel Andreevich - Captain of  
the State  
security.

2. ESIPENKO Danil Ivanovich - captain of the state  
security.

3. BOKOVA Yakov Efimovich. THE  
ORDER OF HONOR 1. KHANGULOV  
Viktor Tomasovich - Art. lieutenant of state security.

2. SLOMA Andrey Ivanovich.  
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the  
USSR M.I.

KALININ Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the

USSR Gorkin A.F. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1237. L. 107. Original. Manuscript; L.  
108-109. Script. Typescript. Protocol No.

8. \*—\* Entered  
by Stalin instead of the crossed-out "special". There are resolutions on  
the sheet: "For. I. Stalin", "V. Molotov. "T. Mikoyan is in favor, comrade  
Kaganovich is in favor, comrade Andreev is in favor, comrade Kalinin is in favor,  
comrade Voroshilov is in favor, comrade Zhdanov is in favor."

**No.**

**87 Special message L.P. Berii  
I.V. Stalin on the acceptance of  
interned Polish soldiers from Lithuania**

**11/07/1939**

No. 4982/

b Sov. secret  
comrade. TO

STALIN In connection with the consideration of the issue of accepting interned Polish soldiers from Lithuania, the NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to establish the following procedure for organizing the verification, selection and

reception of internees, send a government commission to Lithuania under the chairmanship of brigade commander comrade GA PETROV. and members: captain t. Art. lieutenant of state security Comrade PCHELKINA A.A.

The commission must have: the secretary of the commission, 2 photographers, photographers 2, typists 2, drivers 3; three cars.

2. Only residents of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, expressing a desire to remain in residence in the USSR.

3. Accepted privates and junior officers of the army of the former Poland are dismissed at their places of residence. Officers, military officials, police officers are accepted and sent for detention: officers to the Yukhnovsky camp, officials and policemen to the Yuzhsky prisoner of war camp, where they are filtered.

4. All those selected by the government commission, accepted into the USSR, receive a document with a photograph in their hands, which will serve as a pass through the border and a temporary certificate

personality.

5. The passage of internees across the border is to be carried out through four checkpoints located in Gudogats and Maritsinkants, 250 people a day through each checkpoint.

6. Expenses associated with the reception of prisoners of war (expenses of the commission in Lithuania, allowances for prisoners of war from the border to their place of residence and travel by rail) are paid by the People's Commissariat of Finance at the request of the NKVD of the USSR. Attached is a draft

resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 413. L. 14-15. Script. Typescript. Published without a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.



**No.**

## **88 Order of the NKVD of the USSR on shortcomings in the investigative work of the NKVD**

**11/09/1939**

Heads of departments and departments of the NKVD of the USSR, people's commissars of internal affairs of the union and autonomous republics, heads of the UNKVD of territories and regions, heads of district, city and district departments (departments) of the NKVD, heads of the DTO and ODTO of the NKVD, heads of special departments of the NKVD of military districts, fleets, armies, military formations and units, heads of the NKVD border detachments, heads of 3 departments of the ITL and ITK NKVD, heads of the URCM of the republics, territories, regions and cities. Despite repeated instructions from the NKVD of the

USSR (orders of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00701 of October 23, 1938, No. 00762 of November 26, 1938, No. 00786 of December 8, 1938, No. 00156 of February 20, 1939, No. August 1939, No. 00954 dated August 17, 1939, circular No. 136 dated July 25, 1939), in the investigative work of the NKVD bodies, a number of violations of the criminal procedure

code.

These violations basically boil down to the following: 1.

Contrary to the orders of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00762 of November 26, 1938 and No. 00954 of August 17, 1939, in a number of cases, arrests are made without the preliminary sanction of the prosecutor, decisions on detention of the accused are not announced. So, for example: a)

In April 1938, the

NKVD for the Kharkiv region, on investigation case No. 114096, Bratchik V.M. was arrested without the sanction of the prosecutor. The investigation into the case was completed

on March 31, 1939, and the case was sent, also without the consent of the prosecutor, to the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR. b) According to the investigative case

No. 12720 of the NKVD of the Crimean ASSR, they were arrested as members of the anti-Soviet organization Kukuyan,

Bikokvyan and others, including 10 people. On February 14, 1939, all the defendants from custody were released, and on April 17, 1939, they were re-arrested.

The decision on their arrest and the prosecutor's sanction for a second there are no arrests of these persons in the case.

2. Interrogations of those arrested, contrary to Art. 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR and § "b", paragraph 4 of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938, are often made

not within 24 hours after arrest, but after 10-15 days. Systematically violated Art. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR - the accused is charged not within 14 days from the date of arrest, but 1-2 months after the arrest. Moreover, the accused are not interrogated for weeks, and if they are interrogated, then these interrogations, contrary to Art. Art. 138, 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, are not always recorded.

The decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938 is violated  
of the year on the exact indication of the time of the beginning and end of the interrogations.

There have been cases of seizure of documents from the investigation files, in particular the protocols of interrogations of the arrested.

So:

In 1938, the NKVD of the BSSR was arrested on charges of espionage in favor of one of the foreign intelligence services Zubik-Zubkovsky P.A.

At first, Zubkovsky confessed and testified that he was recruited for espionage work in 1930 by Tamkovich. Subsequently, he retracted his testimony and stated that he was connected with Tamkovich as an agent of the NKVD. At the confrontation, he said that he was seeing Tamkovich for the first time and had never heard such a name before. This fact has not been verified. The file is missing 19 sheets between sheets 75-104. There are no explanations on this issue in the case. In this form, the case was referred to the Special

meetings.

The case of Zubik-Zubkovsky was returned for additional investigation to the NKVD of the BSSR.  
3. The

terms of the investigation are violated. In a number of cases, petitions to the prosecutor for an extension of the period of detention of those arrested are initiated with a delay of 2-3 months or more.

Contrary to Art. 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, investigative materials are either not presented to the accused at all, or are presented only partially.

So:

a) Investigation file No. 203308 of the NKVD of the Kalinin region on charges of Stroilov S.M: in the execution of Art. 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused asked to attach a number of documents to the case. The latter were not attached to the case, and there is no decision to refuse him this in the case.

b) A similar fact takes place in case No. 31218 in the NKVD of the Perm Region, where the accused Srebnitsky, when fulfilling 206 Art. The Code of Criminal Procedure requested the inclusion of a number of documents of significant importance in the case. Meanwhile, the investigation denied him this without sufficient grounds. c) According to the

investigative case No. 92726 of the NKVD of the BSSR on charges of Utinskogo A.O. in espionage: Utinsky is convicted by the testimony of his wife. Face-to-face bid was not carried out. The decision to bring the defendant to criminal responsibility was not presented, nor was the end of the investigation announced, and the materials of the investigation were not presented.

d) Investigation file No. 19727 of the NKVD of the Armenian SSR on charges of Bursiyan, Tanoyan and others, including 6 people: the accused do not speak Russian, meanwhile, the interrogation was conducted in Russian, in the absence of an interpreter. At the end of the investigation, the defendants were not acquainted with the materials of the case.

The cases listed above have also been returned for additional investigation.

4. There are cases when the organs of the NKVD, without contesting the decision of the prosecutors to terminate cases, continue to keep those arrested in custody. In violation of the

order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00762 of November 26, 1938, some NKVD bodies continue to send cases to the Special Conference under the NKVD of the USSR, which, with appropriate revision, could be considered in courts, or such cases that, due to the lack of corpus delicti, must be terminated locally.

So:

a) On April 22, 1939, the 434th military prosecutor's office issued a decision to terminate the case of Pavlov A.A. and sent the case to the head of the UNKVD for the Odessa region to fulfill the prosecutor's decision to release Pavlov from custody.

Having received the case, the head of the UNKVD for the Odessa region did not agree with the prosecutor's decision, however, without protesting it and without asking for sanctions for the further detention of Pavlov in custody before a higher prosecutor (in this case, the military prosecutor of the KOVO), continued to illegally detain Pavlov in custody until August 1939 year, when he sent the case to the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR with a request to cancel the decision of the 434th military prosecutor's office and send the case for consideration to the Special Conference.

b) The prosecutor of the city of Kizel (Perm Region) issued orders to close the cases and release Golitsyn, Dubitsky, Kuznetsov, Kiva and other arrested persons from custody. None of these resolutions was carried out by the city department of the NKVD, nor was it protested, and in the cases of Golubev, Ya.F. and Vechtomov A.M. The prosecutor's orders were executed only after 3 months. c) Investigation file of the special department of the KOVO No. 132762 on charges of Marushevsky B.P. according to the conclusion of the military prosecutor of May 21, 1939, it was to be terminated, and Marushevsky was to be released from custody. However, the special department of the KOVO did not challenge the conclusions of the military prosecutor, and sent the case for consideration by the Special Conference.

5. In some departments of the NKVD, the facts are still not obsolete loss of investigative cases and poor accounting.

So, for example:

a) on September 22 of this year, the head of Kungur Prison No. 7 discovered in this prison the remand prisoner Fisher I.M. interrogation, and the investigative file on Fischer's charge was not discovered. As the audit showed, the case on Fischer's accusation arose in December 1937 in the Kungur RO of the NKVD and in the

same month was sent to the 3rd department of the NKVD in the Sverdlovsk region along with the arrested person. In fact, the matter was at a standstill.

Fischer's case dismissed, arrested from custody released. The perpetrators are held accountable.

b) In the practice of investigative work of the NKVD in the Sverdlovsk region, the noted fact is not isolated. So, for example, investigative

part of the UNKVD in its production counted until September 15 of this year. arrest case on charges of Khupli, who died in prison in 1938. The case on the charge of Leurd M.E., who

was arrested in 1937, was sent from the NKVD for additional investigation to the Verkhne-Turinsk RO of the NKVD, where it lay motionless for a number of months. Head of the UNKVD for the Sverdlovsk Region, Major of State

Security Comrade. Ivanov, having received signals about the loss of 20 investigative files, did not take measures to immediately eliminate this criminal laxity. I order: 1.

Thoroughly check all the investigative cases being processed by the NKVD bodies and those in which there

is no data for

further investigation, stop the proceedings and release those arrested from custody.

2. Check the correctness of registration of arrests and eliminate all committed violations of the Code of Criminal Procedure in terms of registration of the investigative file.

3. Organize a check in prisons of all those arrested who are registered with the NKVD (with the exception of convicts), to identify those who may be held in custody without the necessary registration. On all such facts, immediately establish the advisability of further detention of those arrested and conduct a thorough investigation to determine and

punishment of the guilty.

4. Establish strict control over the observance of criminal procedural norms in accordance with the instructions (§§ 3, 10, 18, 23, 24), announced by the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00931 of August 11, 1939 and the circular of the NKVD of the USSR No. 167 of August 17, 1939 .

When fulfilling the requirements of Art. 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on group cases, it is mandatory for the accused to submit the material of the entire investigative affairs.

5. In case of disagreement with the proposals of the prosecutor to terminate the investigation cases, release the arrested, immediately protest the decisions of the prosecutors before the higher bodies of the prosecutor's office, asking in such cases for permission to keep

arrested in custody until the issue is resolved in the highest prosecutor's instance. Send copies of the protests to the NKVD of the USSR.

6. To impose a penalty on the persons guilty of the violations specified in this order and warn the entire operational staff of the NKVD that henceforth, for such violations of the criminal procedure code, the perpetrators will be subjected to strict

penalties.

Report to the head of the UNKVD for the Sverdlovsk region measures taken in pursuance of this order. 7. To acquaint the entire operational staff of the NKVD with this order. People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 7. L. 20-22v. Copy. Typescript.

**No. 89**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on refugees from the territory now occupied by the Germans"**

**11/10/1939**

3 - On refugees from the territory now occupied by the Germans Beria, Bulganin, Shvernik and Korniets. Convening a commission for comrade Beria. 2. To entrust this commission with an accurate calculation of the number of refugees and organize work on the expedient use of part of the refugees

as a labor force, and also consider the question of the return evacuation of the rest of them. Submit your proposals for approval by the Central Committee. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1016. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

**No.**

**90 Special message L.P. Berii I.V.  
Stalin about the arrests of employees  
of the Lithuanian newspaper**

11/13/1939 No.

5008 / b of the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN An inspection carried out by the NKVD of the Byelorussian SSR established following.

The editor of the newspaper Slovo, published in Vilna, was Stanislav Matskevich, a cousin of the Lithuanian Minister of War. The deputy editor was his brother Joseph MATSKEVICH. Both of them fled before the arrival of the Red Army in Vilna. The Slovo newspaper was subsidized by Prince

RADZIVILL, Count PONYATOWSKY, Count TYSHKEVICH, and others. The editorial office had 28 employees, of whom the following

persons were identified as living in Lithuania: A. BOKHENSKY, K. SHIKOVSKY, K.I. KURSKY, K. LYUBANSKY. B., Vyshemirsky G.K., Kozel-Paklevskaya Ya., Karpevic V.A., Krushinsky K.E. Of the employees of the Slovo newspaper, we have arrested: A.D. Tretyakov, a Pole, the son of an officer in the tsarist army, who worked

as a forwarding agent for the editorial office of the Slovo newspaper.

LEVITSKY S.A. - Correspondent of the newspaper "Slovo".

KRUPOVICH Ya.I. - Correspondent of the newspaper

"Slovo". RUMYANTSEV E.V., Russian, captain of the tsarist and Denikin's armies, worked as an administrator and correspondent for the Slovo newspaper. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of the USSR L. BERIA

RF AP. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 283. L. 201. Original Typescript. On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "T.t. Molotov, Beria. Lithuanians must give them to us, including a renegade



Dzevyaltovsky must be demanded. I. St.

**No. 91**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee  
of the All-Union Communist  
Party of Bolsheviks "on the release of  
funds for housing construction of the UNKVD in the  
Leningrad Region" with a note by V.M. Molotov**

**11/24/1939**

121 - On the release of funds for housing construction of the NKVD in the Leningrad Region

Propose to the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR to provide in the budget for 1940 the allocation of 10 mil. rub. for housing construction. November 24, 1939

Sov. secret TO

THE

POLITBURO OF THE CC

AUCP(b) T.t. ZHDANOV and BERIA are asking to allocate 10 million rubles in 1940. for housing construction to the NKVD Administration for the Leningrad

Region. In view of the fact that a significant number of employees of the UNKVD in the Leningrad Region are in difficult housing conditions, I consider it necessary to petition comrade. ZHDANOV and BERIA to satisfy. In this regard, I ask you to make the following decision:

"To propose to the Narkomfin of the USSR to provide for the allocation of 10 million rubles to the NKVD Administration for the Leningrad Region in the budget for 1940. for housing construction.

V. MOLOTOV RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1016. L. 37. Original.

Typescript. Protocol number 9.

**No. 92**

**Cipher telegram N.S. Patolicheva I.V. Stalin about the  
fire at the Rybinsk  
aircraft factory**

**11/29/1939**

No. 1163 /

sh Moscow, Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comrade. TO STALIN On November 27 at the Rybinsk Aircraft Plant No. 26 half of the machine shop No. 3-B was destroyed by fire. The crankcase group, block group, electronic, bronze

and aluminum groups almost completely failed. The commission to establish the causes of the fire recognized the existence of a sabotage act, the direct

culprits have not yet been found, an investigation is underway. A commission for the urgent restoration of the workshop was created. The following activities have been planned and are being carried out: by the evening of 28, the half of the shop that was preserved from the fire was insulated with a special insulated wall; The burnt part of the workshop was cleared by the morning of 28. On the 30th, the temporary overlap of the workshop ends. Reinforced concrete floors will be installed after the start-up of the shop.

Of the 133 machines, 83 require maintenance. The current repair deadline is December 2nd, most of them will be repaired on December 1st. 50 machines are subject to overhaul. Measures have been taken on a group of crankcases. By December 3, out of 11, repair 6 machines, for a block group out of 15, repair 10

machine tools.

At the same time, from December 4, the workshop will give half the capacity. The second phase will be completed by the 10th. From December 10, the workshop

will be launched at full capacity. We are taking measures to reduce the deadlines, mobilize building materials and equipment within the region.

I'm going to the factory for the  
second time. Secretary of the Yaroslavl regional  
committee PATOLICHEV RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 66. L. 14.

Original. Typescript. There are resolutions on the sheet: Stalin: "T-schu  
Beria. We need to find saboteurs. St. "; Beria: "GEM. Tov. Kobulov. Submit  
your suggestions. It is necessary to search hard and find the culprits. L.B."

**No.**

**93 L.P. Beria and L.M. Kaganovich  
I.V. Stalin on checking temporary  
residential buildings near [\[26\]](#)  
railways**

**12/01/1939**

Top secret Copy of  
the

Central Committee of the All-  
Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrade STALIN

\*Commissions allocated by the NKVD and NKPS checked all temporary  
residential

buildings adjacent to railways at a distance of up to 3 kilometers\*.  
The audit found that there are 80,945 temporary buildings ("dugouts",  
"Shanghai", "Chinese", "dig cities") adjacent to the railways and 318,260  
people live in them (with families). At the same time, 77% of all temporary  
buildings with 72% of the population are located along 12 railways: the  
South Ural, Stalin, Turkestan-Siberian, Tomsk, Omsk, Ashgabat, South  
Donetsk, them. Voroshilov, them. Kaganovich, Transcaucasian, V.  
Siberian, Tashkent.

Including on the above 12 roads:

	Всего	% к общему кол-ву
1) Общее количество временных строений	80 945 62 711	77%
2) Общее количество проживающих в них	318 229 263 680	72%

The composition of the residents is visible from the following data:

	Всего с % семьями	В т.ч. глав семей
Всего	318 263 -	113 364
Работающих на ж.д. транспорте	90 14928%	30 220
Работающих в др. госучр. и предприятиях	208 91066%	76 771
Без определ. занятий	19 210 6%	6373

\*Including 137,913 minor dependents and 66,986 adult dependents.

A significant part of temporary residential buildings is located near the most important railway junctions and structures: bridges, viaducts, depots, water towers, military platforms\*. So, for example, on Art. Bogotol of the Krasnoyarsk Railway, next to the largest elevator, locomotive depot and fuel depot, a settlement of 150 temporary dwellings called "Dig City" spontaneously arose. At st. Tashkent at a short distance from the railroad tracks

a street of 110 huts arose, built without the permission of the authorities. Some of these huts encircled the reservoir buildings, the oil pumping station and the coal overpass. At st. Acid Perm Railway, 30 meters from the track, there are 2 villages of 233 dugouts and temporary huts, which have the local name "Cockroach Hill" and "Nakhalovka". Around st. Perm II created a settlement called "Shanghai" from 252 temporary dwellings, etc. \*These settlements pose a great threat to the safety of train traffic\*. In

addition, they are kept exclusively in an unsanitary state and are centers of various epidemic diseases. The emergence of such a large number of temporary residential buildings in close proximity to the railway track is explained by the carelessness

of the unacceptable local railway administration and city, district, town and village councils, as well as local police and DTO bodies.

How

Local railway the administration (heads of departments, stations) allowed railway workers to build temporary premises for housing near the railway points, which led to violations of the established building rules along the railway ways. In the area of st. Chelyabinsk of the South Ural Railway 109 dugouts were built near the embankment of the railway track, and in a number of cases the telegraph line poles ended up inside the dugouts. DN-1 Odessa railway comrade KORNAUKH allowed signalman KRAVCHENKO to build a dugout in the area of the checkpoint where KRAVCHENKO worked. KRAVCHENKO dug out a dugout in an embankment under the railway line, dug up a water main and arranged for water to be drained to his dugout. A similar structure was erected in the same place by the compiler of trains KLINOVSKY. \* On some roads, the local

administration provided for housing a part of the wagons excluded from the inventory \* adapted for temporary housing, especially in the period 1932-1933, which were installed directly on the tracks and interfere with the normal operation of the station and nodes. At the Makhach-Kala and Derbent stations of the Ordzhonikidze railway, 52 car bodies are used for housing, installed 1.5 meters from the railway track. The inhabitants of these cars build cellars, storerooms and other utility rooms directly in the railway embankment.

canvases. At st. Moscow Oktyabrskaya Railway 46 car bodies were installed for housing on station tracks near military sites. At st. Moscow tech. railway them. Dzerzhinsky, 53 carriage bodies were installed directly on the tracks and at the station. Lyublino of the same road - 135.

\*Another reason for the spontaneous emergence of settlements from temporary dwellings in the railway zone is the extremely irresponsible attitude of city, district, settlement and village councils to the allocation of building sites and the absence of any kind of control over the type of buildings\*. In a number of cases, city councils set aside for construction sites adjacent to the railway track (Kazanskaya, Yaroslavskaya railway, named after V.V. Kuibyshev). At st. Kupino Omsk Railway in a temporary settlement of up to 500 dugouts, a significant part of these buildings was erected at the expense of loans for individual construction of standard buildings.

At the same time, it should be noted that along the railway track on the Omsk, Krasnoyarsk, Turkestan-Siberian, Northern, railway lines. them. Kaganovich built a large number of special settlements of the NKVD, in which a large number of exiles live. During the

inspection, it was found that the same villages of dugouts exist near the most important industrial enterprises and defense facilities. In Murmansk, in the area of the military port, there are 3 villages of dugouts: "Rosta", "Green Cape" and "Coal Base", numbering 241 buildings with 2000 inhabitants.

In Tashkent and Kursk, dugout settlements adjoin military airfields. There are also many dugouts in close proximity to military chemical plants in the city of Chapaevsk, Kuibyshev region. When checking by

commissions, among the residents of temporary residential buildings, 10,190 former Harbin residents, defectors, foreign nationals who did not have citizenship at all, former kulaks who returned from exile, prisons and camps, a criminal and other anti-Soviet element were identified.

The audit showed that the local police, D.T.O. and command and political composition of the railway. Transport officials do not at all deal with the issues of checking temporary dwellings and the people who inhabit them, around junctions, stations and along the railroad tracks.



The bodies of the railway and territorial police were not engaged in the development and verification of persons without specific occupations and do not carry out the established passport regime in the area of railways. As a result, among residents in temporary housing in the passport zone of the railway, the transport identified 1339 people without passports and a significant number of people living without registration. Particularly littered with anti-Soviet and criminal elements are temporary settlements on the Ural-Siberian railways. On the Tomsk Railway, for example, 1,479 persons living in temporary buildings with the presence of compromising materials were recorded, on the Omsk Railway - 1,225, on the East Siberian Railway - 548, on the South Ural - 592, etc. In addition, along the railways in the special settlements of the NKVD on the route of the Northern Railway.

6974 exiles live. Throughout 305 and 308 kilometers of the Krasnoyarsk railway there are settlements entirely populated by exiles. On the Northern Railway, exiles, with the permission of the commandant, do not live in special settlements, but erect temporary residential buildings for themselves in close proximity to the railway track, etc.

The exiles usually have a domestic connection with the railroad workers and corrupt them.

When checking the commission, 751 spies, saboteurs and a criminal element were identified and arrested. On the roads: on Stalinskaya - 110, Omskaya - 79, South Ural - 70, Tomskaya - 68, Southeast - 62, im. L.M. Kaganovich - 50 and Kazanskaya - 40 people. Submit the following

proposals\*\*:

- 1) \* Clear the temporary settlements existing near the railways ("dugouts", "Shanghai", "Chinese", etc.) from the suspicious anti-Soviet and criminal element living in them \*, for which: a) suggest that the NKVD of the USSR, within three months, confiscate and evict to remote

areas and labor camps all anti-Soviet and criminal identified in settlements near railways

element;

- b) establish a passport regime at the most important railway junctions of defense and economic importance, equating them to

regime cities, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to issue an appropriate decree on this;

c) the NKVD of the USSR to develop and submit for approval by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR a procedure for conducting a passport regime at the most important railway junctions of defense and economic importance, as well as a procedure for the seizure and expulsion of an anti-Soviet and criminal element living in settlements near railways. 2) Prohibit the construction of temporary residential buildings near the right of way of railways and,

from the spring of 1940, begin to eliminate temporary residential settlements existing near railway tracks and stations of the USSR, for which instruct the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: premises closer than 2 kilometers to the right of way of the railways are subject to demolition, and their owners - to criminal liability; b) to propose to the People's Commissariats of the USSR and the

Union Republics, city and district councils to oblige the owners of temporary residential buildings located near railway tracks and stations to transfer their temporary buildings to the sites designated for this within six months; c) to propose to city and district councils to allocate plots for the resettlement for the

construction of individual residential buildings at a distance of 2 to 3 kilometers from the right of way of the railways, depending on the terrain; d) invite the heads of economic enterprises and railways to provide assistance with materials and technical assistance to workers and employees living in temporary residential buildings who work at the respective enterprises

less than six months;

e) oblige the NKPS to prevent the construction of temporary dwellings at a distance closer than 2-3 kilometers from the railway line. To oblige the heads of railways and the heads of the

railway police to systematically check and prevent

construction of any kind of dwellings along the railways without special permission from the head of the road. 3) Propose to the NKVD bodies to carry the special settlements and camps of the Gulag from the railroad tracks at a distance of no closer than 5 kilometers.

4) Propose to the NKVD organs not to allow further clogging of settlements near the railways with a suspicious anti-Soviet and criminal element. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR BERIA People's Commissar of

Railways of the USSR L. KAGANOVICH RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163.

D. 1242 L. 11-18. Script.

Typescript.

On sheet 16 there are resolutions: "For. I. Stalin", "For. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, A. Mikoyan. Andreev - for. On the same sheet is the name of the solution.

# **No. 94 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the eviction of osadniks from western Ukraine and Belarus**

**12/02/1939**

No. 5332 /

b Top secret of the  
Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN In December 1920, the former Polish government issued a decree on planting so-called settlers.

Osadniki were chosen exclusively of the former Poles, were allocated land in the amount of up to 25 hectares, received agricultural implements and settled along the border of Soviet Belarus and Ukraine. Surrounded by attention and care, placed in good material conditions, the settlers were the backbone of the former government of Poland and Polish intelligence.

The bodies of the NKVD registered 3998 families of settlers in Western Belarus and 9436 in Western Ukraine, and a total of 13,434 families. Of this number, the NKVD arrested 350 people.

In view of the fact that the osadniks represent fertile ground for all sorts of anti-Soviet actions and the overwhelming majority, by virtue of their property status, are unconditionally enemies of the Soviet government, we consider it necessary to evict them, together with their families, from the areas they occupy.

In this regard, we ask you to approve the following measures:

1. Instruct the NKVD of the USSR to evict all settlers living in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, together with their families, using them in the forestry developments of the USSR People's Commissariat for Forests in agreement with the latter. 2. The most malicious of the evicted, in respect of which materials will be received about their anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary

activities in the past or present, subject to arrest with the subsequent transfer of cases about them to the Special Conference.

3. To instruct the NKVD of the USSR within two decades to develop and submit for approval by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR the procedure for resettling osadniks, providing for:

- a) a list of property and small agricultural inventory that can be taken by the evicted with them;
- b) organization of special settlements for evicted people in places of resettlement using living quarters of the USSR People's Commissariat for Forests;
- c) organization of commandant's offices of the NKVD at special settlements; d) the funds needed to carry out this operation. 4.

Establish that the livestock and basic agricultural implements of the evicted remain in place and are placed at the disposal of local authorities authorities.

To instruct the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of Belarus and Ukraine within two decades to develop and submit for approval by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR a procedure for the use of real estate of evicted settlers, their livestock and equipment.

- 5. The deadline for the end of the eviction is to be determined on 1.5.II-1940. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 199. L. 3-5. Copy. Typescript.

**No. 95**

**Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on  
captured Poles**

**03.12.1939**

Strictly secret

151 - Question of the

NKVD Approve the proposal of the NKVD on the arrest of all  
registered regular officers of the former Polish

army. Published: Katyn. Prisoners of an undeclared war: Documents  
and materials / Ed. R.G. Pihoy, A. Geishtor; Comp.: N.S. Lebedeva, N.A.  
Petrosov, B. Voshchinsky, V. Matersky. M., 1999. S. 237-238. Protocol  
number 9.

**No. 96**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the assignment of the railway named after L.P. Beria**

**12/11/1939**

6 - On the assignment of the Transcaucasian railway. road named after Beria L.P. Satisfy the petition of the railway workers of the Tbilisi railway.

node on the assignment of the Transcaucasian Railway. road named after comrade. Beria L.P. RGASPI F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1242. L. 22. Original. Manuscript. Protocol number 10.

**No. 97**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union**

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on refugees"**

**12/20/1939**

14 - About refugees (PB of 4.XII.39, pr. No. 9, item 168)

Cancel the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of 4.XII.39 part of the transfer to the German authorities of 58 thousand refugees.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1018. L. 4. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 11.



**No. 98**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of**

**Bolsheviks on the seizure and expulsion of "anti-Soviet" and criminal  
element**

**12/29/1939**

Top secret 70 -

Question of the

NKVD temporary residential buildings in the railway area. RGASPI.  
F. 17. Op. 162. D. 26. L. 160. Original. Typescript. Minutes No. 11. The  
text contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol.  
Beria, Khlomov.

**No.**

**99 Special message L.P. Berii I.V.  
Stalin about the illness of N.I. Yezhov**

***01/11/1940***

No. 83/

b Top secret Arrested

Ezhov Nikolai Ivanovich on January 9, 1940 began to complain of pain in the right shoulder blade, severe headaches and general malaise. A medical examination

carried out on January 10, 1940 established that Ezhov N.I. ill with croupous inflammation of the right lung. The pulse is 140 per minute, the temperature is

kept within 39 hours. Arrested Ezhov N.I. placed in appropriate conditions, with the provision of constant medical supervision.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.  
BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 377. L. 109. Original. Typescript.

**No.**

# **100 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the results of the operation to evict osadniks and forest guards from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus [27]**

**02/12/1940**

No. 559 /

b of the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comrade. TO STALIN I am reporting preliminary data on the results of the operation carried out by the NKVD of the USSR to evict siegemen and forest guards from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR.

The preparatory work was carried out with the expectation that the operation would be completed within one day in order to exclude the possibility of escapes and hiding of persons subject to seizure. Participated in the operation of NKVD and

police officers, Red Army soldiers of the NKVD troops, district and rural activists - 52

thousands of people.

The operation was launched at dawn on 10 February. By the start of day 11 February, the removal of the siegemen, forest guards and their families is completed.

	Всего	по УССР	по БССР
По данным учета подлежало выселению	27 356 сем. 146 375 чел.	17 753 95 065	9603 51 310
Изъято к полудню 11.II.	26 776 сем. 137 501 чел.	17 227 88 262	9549 49 239
Погружено в эшелоны к полудню 11.II.	24 133 сем. 124 247 чел.	16 388 85 362	7745 38 885

Seizure of persons who evaded eviction or did not appear on place of permanent residence continues.

There were no incidents of note during the operation. In some villages, from some

settlers attempted to escape or resist eviction.

In the village of Kovynichi, Dragobych region, a group of local residents tried to prevent the osadniks from being evicted. However, by the measures taken by the task force of the NKVD, 27 families scheduled for eviction were taken out. In the village of Kuklintsy, Tarnopol region, a group of up to 60 women who had gathered together asked that the settler not be evicted. After appropriate explanations, the group dispersed.

February 10 at night

at st. Voropaevo, Vileika region, the corpse of the head of this station, comrade. KISELEVA E.I. Examination of the corpse established that Kiselev's death occurred as a result of a blow with a blunt object to the back of the head. An investigation is underway.

In the Byelorussian SSR, due to severe frosts reaching up to 30 hours, several cases of mild frostbite of the fingers of the Red Army soldiers who participated in the operation were noted.

The population of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR reacted positively to the eviction of osadniks and forest guards. In a number of cases, local residents assisted the operational groups of the NKVD in detaining the fleeing siegemen.

Echelons with confiscated siegemen and forest guards are sent to their places of relocation.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 199. L. 50-51. Copy. Typescript.

**No.**

## **101 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the situation in Chongqing**

**03/02/1940**

No. 810/

b Sov. secret

Urgent

to comrade

STALIN The following message was received from the resident of the NKVD of the

USSR in Chongqing: The general situation in Chongqing is extremely tense. Inside Kuomintang discusses the issue of a break with the Communists.

There are two points of view on this issue: the first is expressed by Minister of War He Ying Qing and his supporters. This group is against a break with the communists, since a break, in their opinion, can lead to the death of the Kuomintang power and the state. The group considers it necessary to continue to maintain relations with the Chinese Communist Party. The second point of view is

expressed by the Chief of the Political Department of the Military Committee CHEN CHEN and the Wampu and Blueshirts group. These groups are for an immediate break with the Chinese Communist Party. They believe that the longer it goes on, the more difficult it will be to deal with the communists. These groups propose to fight on two fronts—against the Japanese and against the Communists.

Chiang Kai-shek has not expressed his opinion yet.

On March 3-4, a meeting of members of the Supreme Council of National Defense is to be held, at which the question of relations with the special region will be discussed. People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 65. D.

578. L. 150. Original. Typescript.

**No.**

**102 Note by A.Ya. Vyshinsky and L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin with the annex of the draft decision "on the elimination of shortcomings in relation to the procedure for coordinating arrests ..."**

**03/04/1940**

No. 949 /

b Top secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN At the same time, we present a draft decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On eliminating existing shortcomings in relation to the procedure for coordinating arrests, as well as release from custody by the courts, the NKVD and the prosecutor's office persons arrested in the cases of the NKVD.

We enclose the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's

Commissars of

the USSR of December

1, 1938. L. BERIA VYSHINSKY Copy sent to Comrade Vyshinsky.

**PROJECT**

TOP SECRET DECISION OF THE  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE

CPSU(b) "On elimination of existing shortcomings in  
relation to the procedure for coordinating arrests, as well as the release from custody  
by the courts, the NKVD and the prosecutor's office of persons arrested on cases NKVD"

In order to eliminate the existing shortcomings regarding the procedure for coordinating arrests, as well as the release from custody by the courts, the NKVD and the prosecutor's office of persons arrested by the NKVD, in addition to the decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 17.XI.-1938 " On Arrests, Procurator's Supervision and Investigation" and from 1.XII.-1938 - "On the procedure for coordinating arrests", the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks DECIDES: To suggest that

the judicial authorities, the USSR prosecutor's office and the NKVD of the USSR continue to be guided by the following: 1. Categorically prohibit

the production of arrests in violation of the procedure established by the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 1.XII.-1938, obliging the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office to bring officials to the strictest responsibility for violating this order. 2. Permissions for arrests of the highest commanding and political

staff of the Red Army and the Navy (from the commander and commissar of the regiment and above and for their respective positions in the Navy) are given only by prior agreement with the People's Commissar of Defense or the People's Commissar of the Naval fleet by ownership and sanction of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

3. Establish that the release from custody of persons whose arrest was made in agreement with the party bodies can take place only with prior agreement with the relevant party bodies. 4. Establish that the release by the Prosecutor's Office from custody of persons arrested on cases transferred to the Prosecutor's

Office from the NKVD bodies can take place only upon prior notification of the NKVD bodies. If there are objections on the part of the NKVD organs, the release of the arrested cannot take place until the issue is resolved by the higher organs of the Prosecutor's Office and the NKVD.

In case of disagreement between the NKVD of the USSR and the Prosecutor's Office

USSR - the issue is transferred by the NKVD of the USSR to the permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

5. Categorically prohibit any reference in the materials of the investigative and judicial proceedings to the decisions and resolutions of party bodies.

6. To oblige prosecutors to take an active part in the preliminary investigation carried out by the NKVD in order to eliminate the noticed shortcomings of the investigation even in the process of investigation, to send investigation cases to the jurisdiction in a timely manner and prevent them from returning to additional investigation without sufficient grounds.

If necessary, the prosecution authorities themselves are obliged to conduct additional investigative actions on investigative cases received from the NKVD. Participating

in trials, prosecutors are obliged to take all measures to clarify all the circumstances of the case. If the courts pass unfounded acquittals and rulings on the return of cases for additional investigation, prosecutors are obliged to protest such sentences and rulings in the prescribed manner.

7. To oblige the chairmen of the Supreme, Regional, Regional, District, City and Special Courts to fully ensure, during the judicial investigation, an exhaustive investigation of all the circumstances of the case and, if necessary, to ensure that the data of the preliminary investigation are supplemented with new materials of the judicial

consequences. Courts may return cases for additional investigation only in cases where the shortcomings of the preliminary investigation cannot be made up for in the court session itself.

8. To oblige the judicial authorities in all cases of acquittal and release from custody of the accused in cases transferred to them from the NKVD bodies, immediately report the verdicts to the NKVD bodies. 9. To note the presence in a number of cases of superficial and

inattentive consideration by the bodies of the prosecutor's office and the court of cases transferred from the NKVD, and their formal approach to resolving issues related to the termination of cases and sending them for further investigation.

10. Instruct comrade. BERIA and comrade. VYSHINSKY at a meeting of senior officials of the court and prosecutor's office of the USSR and the senior staff of operatives of the NKVD of the USSR to explain the present resolution.

"" March 1940 AP

RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 7. L. 24-28. Script. Typescript.



**No.**

**103 From the special message of L.P.**

**Berii I.V. Stalin about the documents**

**seized from the emissaries of the government of V. Sikorski**

**03/11/1940**

No. 953 /

b of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade STALIN As already reported by the NKVD of the USSR on February 26, 1940 No. 708 / b, at the emissaries of the "government" of SIKORSKY detained during the illegal border crossing from Romania to the USSR in Paris, brothers ZHIMERSKIY Yuzef and Stanislav, the border guards of the Chertkovsky detachment of the NKVD imperceptibly seized encrypted

correspondence, which they threw into the snow during the arrest. Documents that could not be deciphered for a long time have now been deciphered using the book of the Polish writer Adam Mickiewicz "Grandfathers", which turned out to be the cipher key.

At the same time, the NKVD of the USSR sends the following decoded documents translated from Polish:

1. Instruction of the "Union of Armed Struggle" No. 1 for trusted persons.

2. Order of the chief commandant of the "Union of Armed Struggle" dated On December 29, 1939, Mr. LENKOVSKY in the mountains. Lvov.

3. Order of the chief commandant of the Union of Armed Struggle dated 29 December 1939 to the commandant of the Bialystok district No. 2.

4. Extract from the decision of the Committee of Ministers for Homeland Affairs of November 5,

1939. 5. Instruction to the commandant of district No. 3 dated November 9, 1940 on order of receiving money.

6. Note dated January 9, 1940 for the commandant of the Lvov district. 7.

Instruction to the commandant of district No. 3 dated January 9, 1940 on

radio communications.

The decrypted documents were sent to the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR with appropriate instructions for their operational use.

The People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR were invited to acquaint comrade with these documents. Khrushchev and comrade. PONOMARENKO.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.  
BERIA TOP SECRET

Translation from Polish

### ***INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROFIDENTS No. 1***

Basic guidelines for the attitude of the Polish public towards  
to the

occupiers Methods of

resistance: a) Mandatory political and comradely boycott of the occupiers. Experience up to the present time shows that the Polish people indignantly reject any kind of contact with the occupiers, both German and Bolshevik. Polish families, women, even children, must fence themselves off from robbers with a stone wall of indifference, contempt and hatred. The robbers must feel how shameful their role is as torturers and violators of the liberties of the people, regardless of whether they act voluntarily or under duress.

b) In the struggle against the occupiers, all forms of legal, cultural, educational and allied organizations should be used. All manifestations of public life must be imbued with the spirit of faith in the upcoming liberation and settlements with the occupiers, and the mass demonstration of organizations or public groups with an expression of protest against the occupiers must take such a form that would give rise to direct repressions to the least extent. The Polish public will render gigantic services to the people's cause by selflessness and endurance.

c) It is not contrary to the interests of the new Poland that the Poles will serve in schools, administrative, commercial, industrial, agricultural, forestry, railway, postal and sanitary institutions, insofar as such a situation will give

them the opportunity to combine the fulfillment of working conditions with political obligations.

d) On occasion, without any embarrassment, it is permissible for the Poles to cooperate with the occupying authorities in public organizations aimed at helping the

population. e) The Polish Germans should be made to understand that they will be avenged on all previous falsehoods in their relations with citizens. The Polish communists should be reminded that their activities in the territory of the occupiers are in the nature of violence, that this violence will be repaid, that the communists who collaborate with the occupiers experience on their own back that with the improvement of internal affairs they will be forever lost to the Polish public and stigmatized.

f) Spies and provocateurs, in case of proven guilt, will be punished by death, documents about their guilt should be sent to the Polish government.

It is necessary to send documentation of the cruel repressions of the occupiers in Poland to the Committee - the names of those shot and mutilated, their brief description,

photographs, etc. The political leadership of the occupation will cooperate with the Polish government in France. The forms of this cooperation depend on conditions and possibilities. The Polish government, for its part, will make every effort to provide moral and material support to the secret political organizations of the country. These organizations should create their own communications service in order to secretly distribute the press, instructions and exchange secret correspondence. When organizing a communication service, it is necessary to adhere to the principle of two paths running in parallel to one area so that the first path does not know about the existence of the other and vice versa. In general, in all

secret work, as well as in the secret communications service, it is necessary to avoid all kinds of written traces. Mainly do not write down the names, pseudonyms and other secrets of the military organization. Active resistance organizations are now being created spontaneously and must unite among themselves under military command on the following principles: the secret military organization and the "Union of Armed Struggle" form an integral part of the armed forces of the Polish Republic. Main

the commandant of the secret military organization is subordinate to the supreme commander of the Polish

troops. The goals

of the organization are: a) By uniting carefully selected units in conspiratorial alliances, to create a center of active national resistance, which opposes oppression with the moral forces of the Polish public.

b) To act jointly in the restoration of the state through armed struggle, and from the moment the Polish troops enter the country, the organization is subject to dissolution and joins the ranks of the regular army. Forms and

ways of action: a) To

inform the Polish public about the political and military situation, as well as to fight German and Bolshevik propaganda to weaken the moral strength of the people. b) Maintain feelings of hatred towards

the occupiers and demand

to sweep.

c) The friendly, political and organizational ties of the Polish population with the occupiers will be considered by the Polish government as a betrayal of Poland, and persons seen in this will be punished. d) Carrying out combat and

sabotage activities on the territory of the country during the period of occupation - is determined by the instructions of the commandant of the Union of Armed Struggle. The latter appoints the time, nature and extent of these actions in accordance with the instructions of the supreme leader.

e) Military training of personnel for an armed uprising in the rear of the occupying armies, which should break out at the moment the regular Polish troops enter the country, is carried out by means of the Union of Armed Struggle.

Political characteristics of the organization: a)

The Union of Armed Struggle is a single organization operating on the territory of the country, and in no case can it be a union of several related organizations.

b) The "Union of Armed Struggle" is a common supra-party national organization that unites in its ranks all truthful Poles, regardless of their political convictions, who are eager for armed struggle against the invaders, and also gives back

their forces to recruit new members of the "Union of Armed Struggle" and create new organizations of this union. c) All

recruitment work for this union is carried out on an individual basis, mainly through socio-political organizations existing on the territory of the country, and committees of the "Union of Armed Struggle", acting in accordance with the instructions and directives of the Committee of Ministers for Country Affairs.

d) There can be no privileged members of the Union of Armed Struggle, all Polish organizations and groups must have equal rights and be subordinate to the political leadership of the Union of Armed Struggle.

e) Political competition and political enmity between individual groups is not allowed. f) The secret

military organization conducts all its work under the leadership of the district commandant of the Union of Armed Struggle.

g) It is necessary to avoid armed actions that entail losses and unwanted reprisals. Each armed action must have a strictly

defined goal and correspond to possible losses and casualties. h) The basis of the solidarity of all citizens of the Polish state,

regardless of languages and religion, in these difficult times should be an active joint struggle against the invaders.

i) The Polish government confirms the demand of the people for the need to resolve the issue of national minorities.

"Union of Armed Struggle" - "Godzembra" (pseudonym of General SOSNOVSKY - chief commandant of the "Union of Armed Struggle" - our note). I approve

"Guardian" (pseudonym of General SIKORSKI - head of the Polish "government" in Paris - our note).

December 4, 1939.

Translated from Polish:

Deputy. early 3 sec. 2 departments of the

NKVD GUGB - art. lieutenant of state

security MAZUR TOP SECRET

TRANSLATION FROM POLISH

**PRICAZ**

chief commandant of the "Union of Armed Struggle"  
for citizen LENKOVSKY

(presumably Colonel DOBROVOLSKII, is in an illegal situation in Lvov - our note.) Due to the arrest of Mr. KARPINSKY (pseudonym of General YANUSHAITIS - arrested, is under investigation in Moscow - our note .) I appoint you temporary commandant of district three (Lvov).

I oblige you to comply with my instruction dated November 29 of this year, sent to citizen KARPINSKY. In connection

with the arrest of Mr. KOPA (pseudonym of General BORUTA SPEKHOVICH, is in an illegal position, wanted - our note), appointed by me as the commandant of district two (Bialystok), I authorize you to also lead this district. The appointment is temporary, pending the election of the appropriate officer to whom you will convey my instructions for the commandant of district two. I ask you to notify me of your choice under the pseudonym F. I leave two places of residence for the commandant of the district to choose: Bialystok or Vilna. In the event of the arrival in Lvov of citizen

STOLYAROVSKY (pseudonym of General TOKARZHEBSKY, appointed commandant in Lvov - our note), subordinate the commandant of district three to him. His name will be communicated to you by the emissary. Sent through citizen ALBERT

(unidentified - our note), one million zlotys for Lvov, which was supposed to be delivered to intermediate points at the address of a bookseller, lawyer or master, should be divided in agreement with local political leaders.

Basically, I dedicate half of the money to military work.  
Part of this money to give to the appointed commandant of district two.

The guard (pseudonym of General SIKORSKY - our note) orders the district commandant to kidnap the arrested citizen VALIGUR (pseudonym of General ANDERS - arrested, is in Moscow under investigation - our note) from the hospital and transport him abroad.

In the event that Mr. LENKOVSKY, for any reason, could not perform the functions of the commandant of district three, he manages everything  
his deputy.

Chief Commandant - Godzemba (pseudonym of General  
SOSNOVSKY - our note). December

29, 1939

Translated from

Polish: Deputy. early

3 sec. GUGB st. Lieutenant Mrs.

security MAZUR TOP

SECRET Translation from Polish

<b>CHIEF COMMANDER</b>
------------------------

OF THE UNION OF ARMED

STRUGGLE TO THE

COMMANDANT OF DISTRICT No. 2 In connection with the arrest  
of KARPINSKY (pseudonym of General YANUSHAITIS - arrested, is in  
Moscow under investigation - our note), Mr. LENKOVSKY (presumably  
Colonel DOBROVOLSKII, who is currently in an illegal position in the  
city of Lvov - our note), who temporarily replaced the commandant of  
district No. 2 Bialystok, covering the territory of the former voivodships  
of Bialystok, Vilna, Novogrudok, Polessky. The commandant of the  
Warsaw district is Mr. RAKONI (pseudonym of Colonel

ROVETSKY - our note), who will appoint temporary commandants  
of the districts of Krakow, Poznan, Torun, Lodz on my behalf. Bialystok  
is entrusted with constant communication with Warsaw - RAKONS and  
Lvov - LENKOVSKY,

through which, until the establishment of base No. 3 in Lithuania,  
instructions will be sent to you. Through them, also try to get in touch  
with the commandant of Base No. 1 in Budapest, Mr.

POLESYNSKY (the pseudonym of Colonel ZAKREVSKY - our note)  
and with the commandant of Base II in Mr. PRAVDITS (the pseudonym  
of Colonel Bucharest ROZTVOROVSKY - our note). The instruction for  
the commandant of district No. 3 is also obligatory for

District Commandant Two.

On the territory of the Lithuanian occupation (Vilna region), in addition to organizational work, no armed demonstrations can be carried out. At the same

time I am sending you the decisions of the Committee of Ministers for Lithuanian Affairs. You will receive money from citizen LENKOVSKY. Upon assuming the office of the commandant of district two, inform about the possibility of launching radio stations. Give through the commandant three your call sign or hours of operation of the radio

station (technical data). The code for district two, as well as the obligatory identification signs for the emissary, are given in the instructions for Lvov. The commandant of district two is to give me the insignia of his emissaries.

Acknowledge receipt of instructions and money sent through the Commandant of District Three. I also look forward to reports on working conditions at District Two. We leave the choice of your location to you. If Bialystok is not suitable, settle in Vilna. The chief commandant is

Godzemba (pseudonym of General SOSNOVSKY - our note).

29/XII-1939.

Translated from

Polish: Operative. 3 sec. 2

departments GUGB ml. Lieutenant of State

security callous AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 206. L. 182-191. Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's mark: "NB".



**No. 104**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the return of the German aircraft**

***03/15/1940***

Top secret 206

— NKVD question

Approve the proposal of the NKVD to allow the crew of a German aircraft that violated the state border to return to the German side, as well as to transfer the aircraft to the Germans after repairs were completed.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 27. L. 52. Original. Typescript.

Minutes No. 13.

The text contains a typewritten notation about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Molotov (NKID).

**No. 105**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of**

**Bolsheviks "on the mistake of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Kyrgyzstan"**

**03/26/1940**

95 - On the mistake of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Kyrgyzstan of these workers and without understanding the political and business expediency of reinstating them in responsible work. As a result of such an incorrect indiscriminate approach, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Kyrgyzstan clogged individual links of the party and Soviet apparatus with people who do not inspire complete political trust, as well as

people who, by their unrestrained behavior, have a corrupting influence and undermine discipline in the party and Soviet bodies. 2. To explain to the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Kyrgyzstan that it is making a mistake by confusing the issue of the release of individual workers from arrest by court with the question of the possibility of restoring them to responsible work. Explain to the Central Committee of the

CP(b) of Kyrgyzstan also that the liberation from

under the arrest of communists, previously arrested for political reasons, should be carried out with the knowledge and consent of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of

Kyrgyzstan. 3. Instruct Comrade Kudimov, authorized by the CPC under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the Kirghiz SSR, to examine the facts of non-Party behavior of Comrade Comrades.

Mikhailova B.G., Kokombaeva, Kolbaeva K., Firsova and Tokombaeva, consisting in the fact that during the elections of party bodies they arranged a conspiracy, hidden from party meetings and conferences, to fail in the party elections of leading workers of the republic.

4. Send this decision to all regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee communist parties of the union republics.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1021. L. 30. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 14.

**No. 106**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of  
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks**

**on the abolition of emergency measures in the areas bordering Finland**

***04/03/1940***

Strictly secret

138 - Question of the

NKVD In connection with the end of hostilities, allow the NKVD of  
the USSR:

railway with individual passes - cancel.

2. Personal radios seized from the civilian population  
use return.

3. Cancel the order to close the radio stations of people's commissariats  
and

departments. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 27. L. 71. Original.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 14. In the text there is a typewritten note about the mailing:  
"The extract was sent: comrade Beria."

**No. 107**

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "Issues of the Western Regions of Ukraine"**

**04/04/1940**

Strictly secret 155

- Questions of the western regions of Ukraine 1.

Propose to the General Staff of the Red Army within 2 weeks to issue revolvers and cartridges for them to the following employees of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR: secretaries of regional party committees, first, second and third secretaries of district committees and city committees of the CP (b) U, chairmen and deputy chairmen of regional executive committees, chairmen and deputy chairmen of district executive committees. head regional trade departments, head. departments of the regional party committees and the first secretaries of the regional committees of the

Komsomol - a total of 1800 revolvers. 2. Oblige the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR to ensure the issuance of permits to carry weapons (revolvers) to these employees.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 27. L. 72. Original. Typescript. Minutes No.

14. The text

contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Beria.

**No.**

**108 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin and  
V.M. Molotov on awarding  
employees of the NKVD of the  
USSR [28]**

**04/18/1940**

No. 1245/

b Sov. secret

of the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks to comrade STALIN SNK of the USSR to comrade  
MOLOTOV

tasks assigned to them. The

NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to reward the most  
distinguished workers of the organs and troops of the NKVD with  
government

awards. I submit for your consideration a draft Decree of the  
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on awarding 382 people  
with orders and 375 people with medals.

In addition, a number of distinguished workers will be awarded by  
order of the NKVD of the

USSR. Among those presented for awarding orders by us are:  
comrade DEKANOZOV, now working as deputy people's commissar for  
foreign affairs, comrade PANYUSHKIN, plenipotentiary of the USSR in  
China, and comrade A. KOBULOV, adviser to the embassy in Berlin.

I ask for your decision.

APPENDIX: Draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council  
Union of the SSR.

**REFERENCE**

Order of Lenin - 15 - Red  
Banner - 36 - Red Star - 127 -  
Badge of Honor - 204 Total orders -  
382 Medal "For Courage" - 321 -  
"- "For Labor Valor" - 54 Total  
medals - 375 TOTAL - 757 People's  
Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.  
BERIA RGASPI. F. 17. Op.  
163. D. 1258. L.  
135-136. Script.

Typescript.

**No.**

## **109 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the exchange of prisoners of war with Finland**

**04/19/1940**

No. 1462 /

b of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade STALIN In accordance

with your instructions, the NKVD of the USSR reports: head of the Intelligence

Department of the Leningrad Military District brigade commander comrade.

EVSTIGNEEV and members - Assistant Head of the Legal Department of the

People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs comrade. TUNKIN and the head of the

NKVD POW Affairs Comrade. SOPRUNENKO. 5395 prisoners of war of the Red

Army and commanders are to be received from Finland and 800 Finnish prisoners of war are to be transferred.

The exchange of prisoners of war began on 16 April. As of today, April 19, 107 people have been transferred to the Finns, 792 people have been received from them. The exchange takes place at Vainikala, near Vyborg.

II. The General Staff of the Red Army planned the following order reception, transportation and maintenance of prisoners of war:

Prisoners of war arriving from Finland are divided into teams, and teams - into groups. For the further dispatch of prisoners of war, the head and commissar of the team are appointed and the necessary political, economic and sanitary personnel are allocated at their disposal at the rate of: for 200 prisoners of war - 1 medium commander, 1 political instructor and 10 junior commanders, and in addition to this, 2 doctors and 4 people per team middle medical staff.

According to the instructions of the General Staff of the Red Army, prisoners of war are not escorted, and accompanied by a dedicated command staff.



All accepted prisoners of war must be placed in barracks near the city of Novgorod, and the commanding staff is located separately from the Red Army. At the place of placement

of prisoners of war (in the barracks of the city of Novgorod), internal outfits in the barracks (on duty and orderly) are assigned from the assigned service personnel. No other protection is provided.

Dismissal to the city from the barracks is allowed only by teams no earlier than 10 days after returning from captivity. For the command staff, dismissal to the city is allowed on a single basis.

III. To carry out the corresponding operational-Chekist work among the prisoners of war taken by the NKVD of the USSR, the following was undertaken:

At the exchange office at st. Vainikala is 8 operatives of the Leningrad Special Department of the NKVD for preliminary filtration and further escort of the accepted prisoners of war in echelons, one operative for each echelon. In the place of placement of prisoners of war in the city of Novgorod, an operational group of 32 people was organized under

the leadership of the deputy. the head of the investigative unit of the OO GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, captain of state security KAZAKEVICH, who was given appropriate instructions on the procedure for carrying out the work.

IV. The procedure established by the NPO for the transportation and accommodation of prisoners of war does not ensure their proper isolation and does not guarantee against possible escapes. Barracks in the mountains. Novgorod are designed only for 3,000 people and will not be able to accommodate

all prisoners of war. Considering that among the prisoners of war accepted, there will certainly be a significant number of people processed by Finnish, and possibly other intelligence services, the NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to ensure thorough filtering of the accepted prisoners of war and to carry out appropriate Chekist-operational measures among them, which requires their isolation for a period at least 2-3 months.

To accomplish this, we consider it expedient to place prisoners of war in the Yuzhsky camp of the NKVD, located in the Ivanovo region, 47 kilometers from the Vyazniki railway station. In this camp

In the past there was a correctional labor colony of the NKVD for juvenile delinquents. The camp is designed for 8,000 people and is quite suitable for organizing accommodation in it.

prisoners of war.

The operational-Chekist group will be increased to 50 people and provided with appropriate leadership.

V. Proceeding from this, we ask for your decision: 1.

To propose to the People's Commissariat of Defense: a) prisoners of war accepted from Finland be sent to the Yuzhsky camp of the NKVD of the USSR; b) establish order during the movement of echelons with prisoners of war protection and escort, excluding the possibility of escapes;

c) transfer the necessary funds to the management of the Southern camp for food for prisoners of war;

d) organize inside the camp among prisoners of war relevant work. 2. Propose to

the NKVD of the USSR: a) prepare the Yuzhsky camp for receiving prisoners of war from Finland; b) to organize the external

security of the camp by the forces of the escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR; c)

organize the allowance of prisoners of war according to the norms and at the expense of the

funds of NCOs; d) to ensure the thorough conduct of Chekist-operational measures among prisoners of war, treated by foreign intelligence, dubious and alien elements and voluntarily surrendered to the Finns, with their subsequent bringing to justice; e) to complete the work on filtering prisoners of war within

3 months. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3.

Op. 66. D. 580. L. 88-92. Script. Typescript.

## **No. 110**

### **Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of**

### **Bolsheviks "on the fight against queues for food products" [29]**

***05/04/1940***

148 - On the fight against queues for food products. To approve the following draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: "The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides: To extend the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated January 17, 1940 No. 99-49c "On the fight against queues for food products in the cities of Moscow and Leningrad" to the following cities:

Minsk

Penza

Tula

Sverdlovsk

Molotov

Kirov

Nizhny Tagil

Serov

Rostov-on-Don

Taganrog

Mines

Magnitogorsk

Chelyabinsk

Leninsk-Kuznetsky

Prokopyevsk

Kemerovo

Stalinsk

Anzhero-Sudzhensk

Novosibirsk

Cheremkhovo Voronezh

Dzerzhinsk

Stalingrad  
Astrakhan  
Saratov  
Kazan  
Izhevsk  
Arkhangelsk

Shuya  
Ivanovo Alexandrov (Ivanovo  
region)  
Yaroslavl  
Rybinsk

Kuibyshev  
Ufa  
Artemovsk  
Vinnitsa

Dnepropetrovsk Poltava Chernigov RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1022. L. 41-42. Sc  
Typescript.

Protocol number 15.

**No. 111**

**L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the development  
of Soviet [30]  
prisoners of war**

**05/23/1940**

No. 2065/b

Tov. TO STALIN In

the course of the exchange of prisoners of war with Finland, \* former military personnel \* of the Red Army 5277 people were accepted, of which 373 were command, commanding and political personnel.

The returned prisoners of war are kept in the Yuzhsky camps of the NKVD. Of the total

number of prisoners of war in the camp, there are: 1368 Ukrainians, 176 Belarusians, 19 Finns, 173 Karelians, 97 Tatars, 39 Georgians, 31 Komi and others \*.

A group has been allocated for special work on prisoners of war operational staff of 50 people.

In the course of the work of the operational group, it was revealed: spies and suspected espionage - 106 people, members of the anti-Soviet volunteer detachment - 166 people, provocateurs - 54 people, mocked in captivity by our prisoners of war - 13 people, voluntarily surrendered to captivity - 72 people.

By May 15 this year. the task force interrogated \*1448\* former prisoners of war.

Among the identified spies recruited by Finnish intelligence to work against the USSR, the following deserve attention: POW ROMANOV Lev

Nikolayevich, who served in the 146th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division as a coder for the secret part of the regiment, before being drafted into the Red Army - the chief engineer of the Ashgabat City Council, personally reported, that he was recruited by the Finns for espionage work.

While in captivity, ROMANOV, at the request of the Finns, edited several counter-revolutionary leaflets, which later became the basis for his recruitment. Before leaving for the USSR, ROMANOV received an assignment from the Finns to get a job on the White Sea Canal or in one of the military units. For communication, his home address was taken. (In detail, ROMANOV was not interrogated, since he is in the Kovrov hospital due to a severe wound.)

The former Red Army soldier of the 138th cavalry regiment of the 25th motorized cavalry division of GRIPPA Nikolai Ivanovich, born in 1919, being interrogated, testified that the Finns had repeatedly offered him in the camp to carry out intelligence work against the USSR and join an anti-Soviet organization that aims to overthrow Soviet power "in the interests of the entire Russian people".

While in captivity of the FLU, Nikolai gave the Finns written answers to a special questionnaire, which included over 50 questions of a military, economic and political nature. In addition, at the suggestion of the Finns, GRIPPA got acquainted with anti-Soviet literature, from which he named three books: "Behind the Black Thistle", "Ship of Death", "Excellent Tailored Tailcoat".

A few days before the exchange of prisoners of war, GRIPPA was transferred to the Turku prison, where non-Russian prisoners of war were concentrated. In prison, GRIPPA was summoned by a Russian White Guard, a Finnish intelligence officer, who offered him, upon his return to the USSR, to get a job in the editorial office of a newspaper on the Fergana Canal. This officer was told that regardless of the consent of the FLU, an intelligence courier would come to him, who would contact him with the password: "Where were you on March 1, 1940." POW SIVOLAPOV

Sergey Grigoryevich, born in 1907, commander of a communications platoon of the 1st battalion of the 146th rifle regiment of the 44th rifle division, lieutenant, confessed that he, being in captivity, at the suggestion of the White Finns, answered a detailed questionnaire covering military-political and economic issues from life of the USSR. After that, SIVOLAPOV was taken from the camp to Helsinki to the police department, where he also answered a number of questions from the life of the Soviet Union in writing. SIVOLAPOV Finnish intelligence was asked to support in

further communication with him and recommend the method of communication that he finds more appropriate. SIVOLAPOV recommended radio as a method of communication. How he was supposed to communicate by radio, SIVOLAPOV does not say. While in captivity, SIVOLAPOV was listed under the name GRODOVSKY.

POW SHEMBERKO Roman Kharitonovich, a former clerk of the 25th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Division, a Ukrainian, before being drafted into the Red Army, an accountant of the Toporkovsky beet farm in the Zhytomyr region, confessed that on January 19 of this year. he was recruited by the White Finns for anti-Soviet and espionage activities on the territory of the USSR. SCHEMBERKO gave two written commitments to Finnish intelligence and was given the task of organizing counter-revolutionary cells in the

POW FESHCHENKO Valentin Vasilievich, a former club worker of the 85th page of the regiment, born in 1917, before being drafted into the Red Army, an artist of a railway club in the mountains. Samarkand, testified that he was captured after the conclusion of a peace treaty - March 13, 1940 at 18:00. While in the camps, FESHCHENKO was repeatedly recruited by Finnish intelligence for espionage work. The Finnish intelligence officer offered FESHCHENKO to go to America to study espionage, after which he promised to transfer him for intelligence work in the USSR. FESHCHENKO, during interrogation, says that he refused this offer, but agreed to conduct disintegration work among prisoners of war and, on the instructions of a Finnish intelligence officer, campaigned among prisoners of war for not returning to the USSR. Prisoner of war AKAT'EV, a former soldier

of the 18th page of the division, who worked before being drafted into the Red Army as an assistant driver at the station. Mayalskaya Kirov Railway road, testified that when he was repeatedly summoned for interrogation in the camp, the Finnish investigator was especially interested in the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the Kirov Railway. AKAT'EV told the Finnish investigator everything he knew about the construction of the locks and other structures of the Belomor Baltic Canal. Having received a proposal from the investigator to clarify on the map the data on the lifts, bridges and other structures on the Kirov railway, AKAT'EV saw that all the clarifications had already been made on this map, and therefore he could not add anything.

The testimony of 41 prisoners of war established that in February of this year. The Finnish command, together with representatives of the White Guard centers from Red Army prisoners of war and commanders, formed a volunteer detachment with the aim of using it against the Red Army. A former Red Army soldier of the

305th regiment of the 44th line of the division, a member of this detachment Stepan KRAVCHUK testified that on February 25 of this year. in the prisoner of war camp, recruitment into a volunteer detachment was carried out. In total, 152 people were recruited in camp No. 4 into a volunteer detachment. After recruitment, carried out by individual calls, all members of the detachment were transferred to a special camp, where they were divided into platoons and where they were anti-Soviet indoctrination. At the same time, it was pointed out to them that the purpose of the detachment was to act together with the Finnish reconnaissance units in the Ukhta direction. The commanding staff of the detachment was selected from Finnish officers who know Russian (4 people). After the conclusion of peace, each of the members of the detachment was asked if he wanted to stay in Finland, and warned about the need to hide from the Soviet authorities the fact of participation in a volunteer detachment.

According to the testimony of members of the volunteer detachment of prisoners of war LARYUKHIN and GOLODUKHIN, the former commander of the 14th road maintenance regiment GOLOV Vladimir, born in 1907, non-partisan, who worked as a mechanic at the Moskvoshveya factory before being drafted into the Red Army, served as a recruiter for this detachment. After the conclusion of peace, GOLOV held several meetings of the detachment members and demanded that the volunteers hide their participation in the detachment from the Soviet authorities, and also shelter the remaining defectors. During the interrogation, GOLOV admitted his

organizational role in the creation of the anti-Soviet detachment. According to the testimony of prisoners of war ANTONESYAN, SIDYAKIN and BUNDAK, Ukrainian prisoners of war were recruited into the "Ukrainian Legion", which is allegedly created by the Anglo-French in Transcarpathian Ukraine. Recruitment was carried out with the participation of white emigrants, Ukrainian nationalists SHULGIN and Colonel VORON. SHULGIN offered to join this legion prisoners of war BUNDAK and GRITSAYUK Dmitry Akimovich. GRITSAYUK was called to the office